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21. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Gülriz Uygur The Relationship between Law and Morality from the Internal Point of View
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This article insists on the relationship between law and morality from the internal point of view. H.L.A. Hart makes distinction between internal and external viewpoints. In the framework of Hart’s approach, it is difficult to imagine the internal point of view as a moral point of view. In fact, the internal point of view illuminates the normative character of rules; it shows that the members of the group accept the rules as standards of behavior for the group as a whole. To explain the internal point of view which includes also moral view, we should leave Hart’s definition. But we may use his definition as accepting and using a rule. For this, we should question the meaning of accepting a rule and using a rule.
22. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Chueh-an Yen Normative Gap, Subjugation and Recognition
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In this paper I will argue that normativity in its pure form is a matter of gap. I will elucidate this idea in three aspects. First, I will suggest that the ‘ought’ is the unique creation of human language to deal with the contingencies and the complexity of the world. And the particular merit of the nature of ‘ought’ or the normativity is not what it positively can offer or do, but what it negatively leaves rooms for, because the ‘ought’ opens up some space for reason or action. Second, every normative system must transform the real human being into its own normative construction of person. I call it the subjugation process. Third, the normativity can show its force more deeply through the escape, resistance and refusal, in another word, through struggle for recognition of the agents. This aspect has certain connection with the critical theory.
23. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 41
Milan Tasic On What Should be Before All in the Philosophy of Mathematics
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In the philosophy of mathematics, as in its a meta-domain, we find that the words as: consequentialism, implicativity, operationalism, creativism, fertility, … grasp at most of mathematical essence and that the questions of truthfulness, of common sense, or of possible models for (otherwise abstract) mathematical creations,i.e. of ontological status of mathematical entities etc. - of second order. Truthfulness of (necessary) succession of consequences from causes in the science of nature is violated yet with Hume, so that some traditional footings of logico-mathematical conclusions should equally be falled under suspicion in the last century. We have in mind, say, strict-material implication which led the emergence of relevance logics, or the law of excluded middle that denied intuitionists i.e. paraconsistent logical systems where the contradiction is allowed, as well as the quantum logic which doesn't know, say, the definition of implication etc. Kant's beliefs miscarried hereafter that number (arithmetic) and form (geometry) would bring a (finite) truth on space and time, when they revealed relative and curvated, just as it is contradictory essentially understanding of basic phenomena in the nature: of light as an unity of wave – particle, or that both "exist" and "don't exist" numbers as powers of sets between 0א and c (the independence of continuum hypothesis) etc. Mathematical truths are ''truths of possible worlds'', in which we have only to believe that they will meet once recognizable models in reality. At last, we argue in favour of thesis that a possible representing "in relief" of mathematical entities and relations in the "noetic matter" (Aristotle) would be of a striking heuristic character for this science.
24. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 41
AhtiVeikko Pietarinen Why Pragmaticism is Neither Mathematical Structuralism nor Fictionalism
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Despite some surface similarities, Charles Peirce’s philosophy of mathematics, pragmaticism, is incompatible with both mathematical structuralism and fictionalism. Pragmaticism has to do with experimentation and observation concerning the forms of relations in diagrammatic and iconic representations ofmathematical entities. It does not presuppose mathematical foundations although it has these representations as its objects of study. But these objects do have a reality which structuralism and fictionalism deny.
25. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 41
Woosuk Park Isn’t the Indispensability Argument Necessarily Analogical?
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Both the defenders and the challengers of the indispensability argument seem to ignore the obvious fact that it is meant to be an analogical inference. In this note, I shall draw attention to this fact so as to avoid unnecessary confusions in any future discussion of the indispensability argument. For this purpose, I shall criticize Maddy’s version of the indispensability argument. After having noted that Quinean holism does not have to be one of the necessary premises, I shall suggest alternative formulations of the indispensability argument as an analogical inference. Also, some further reflections on how to evaluate Maddy’s objections to the indispensability argument will be in due order.
26. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 41
Andrei Rodin Category Theory and Mathematical Structuralism
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Category theory doesn't support Mathematical Structuralism but suggests a new philosophical view on mathematics, which differs both from Structuralism and from traditional Substantialism about mathematical objects. While Structuralism implies thinking of mathematical objects up to isomorphism the new categorical view implies thinking up to general morphism.
27. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 41
Joongol Kim Numbers, Quantities and Hume’s Principle
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This paper argues against neo-Fregeans that Frege was right to conclude that we cannot obtain the concept of number from Hume's Principle. Neo-Fregeans have claimed that Hume's Principle is analytic since it can be viewed as an implicit definition of the concept of cardinal number. But it will be shown that if taken as an implicit definition, Hume's Principle is satisfied not just by the concept of number but also by the concept of discrete quantity, and hence it cannot be viewed as an implicit definition of the concept of cardinal number as distinct from the concept of discrete quantity.
28. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 41
Donald V. Poochigian Mathematical Identity: The Algebraic Unknown Number and Casuistry
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David Hilbert’s distinction between mathematics and metamathematics assumes mathematics is not metamathematics, cardinality of mathematics is less than cardinality of metamathematics, and metamathematics contains mathematics. Only by abandoning the last renders these characteristics consistent. Every set identifiable only in a metaset, following Kurt Gödel, the metaset is convertible into the set by translation of its constituents into constituents of the set, rendering the set indistinguishable from the metaset. Reversing Kurt Gödel, the set is convertible into the metaset by translation of its constituents into constituents of themetaset, rendering the set indistinguishable from the metaset. Set being indistinguishable from metaset, the set of mathematics is unidentifiable as constituent of the set of metamathematics. Only inductively by exclusive resolution of all constituents of the set of all disjunctives of the sets of mathematics and metamathematics is the set of mathematics identifiable. Generated is endless arbitrary qualification of mathematical identity exhibited in continual proofsof its axioms. Understood as clarification, when everything is unique, no concealed contradiction is contained. Constituted is the endless non-repeating digit to the left of the decimal of an algebraic unknown number. Manifest is casuistry, now neither objective nor specious identity, but instead necessary subjective identity distinguishing sets.
29. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 41
Alfred A. Vichutinsky Of a Real Philosophy and the Natural Sciences Free of the Paranoia
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The bases of tenets of the World came from the East; Pythagoras learnt all there up the 26 years. At a home, the east ideas where took in no; then he bound the mathematics with the elements of matter. This was the best way to a blood feud of the all Humanity. The 17th age gave the bases of mathematics and the Greek atomism; this had led to the paranoia in all sciences. The LCE was brought in 19th age with bases no; really it was the box of Pandora in the form of wrong sciences of the Nature. The wise revenge of Pythagoras was in the form of riddle for the best thinkers in the World in all times; us solved one in the 50th years. A base of the World is of the material space (MS) with praatoms (PAs) Ao; they are of the affinity to matter. A density of the MS is of ~ 5.10‐6 kg/m3 close to the Ears. PA Ao is of quant of matter and antimatter; they are of rotate in the different sides. All matter takes up Ao and to grow. In the giant stars to go the bursts giving Ao, or caloric. The matter of being in the World on base of the key law of conservation of heat (caloric) and matter by loss of energy; it is main. Leibniz offered to the conservation of mv2 in the World. But Newton knew that any move is damped, and it need in filled up. This the author proved by tests over the 300 years just. D.Bernoulli given to the model of gas. I. Kant proved that mv2 is the quantity of heat by stop of the body; it is no the energy! A key leitmotiv of thought is blocked the grasp of facts if ones not leaded to an accepted concept. P. Mayer had the blunder in base of the LCE; a work of gas expansion in Torricelli tube is equal nil strong! This is the gross blunder of a sick paranoiac! The 21 age gave up a new philosophy and a way to endless engine. The super skills from ideal quartz with moving jaws to respond to the all new philosophy and sciences.
30. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Jeffrey Benjamin White Conscience, Consciousness, Sciousness and Science: A Glimpse at Neuroethics and the Future of Moral Philosophy
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No question has demanded so much attention from the philosopher of mind as has this one: What is consciousness? One promising answer begins by noting that consciousness is, itself, a conjugate of more basic stuff. For the ethicist, there is a question that seems at least formally related to the question of consciousness: What is conscience? Could it be that a similar approach carries similar promise? The following short paper first examines consciousness as a conjugate, and then pursues the implications of this analysis for a novel understanding of conscience as the grounds for a science of ethics.
31. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Francesco Belfiore Mind as an Evolving Triadic Entity
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In this paper, through external and internal observation (introspection), it is shown that the human mind (or spirit) can be defined as an evolving, conscious, triadic entity consisting of unitary-multiple components - intellect, sensitiveness, and power - which in turn are made of multiple ideas, sentiments, and actions, respectively. The three mind components are interdependent, each needing the support of the other two for its activity. This interdependence, which is linked to the problem of mind-body relationship, is explained by the observational fact that no physical object can exist if not under particular patterns of forms/structures and associated movements/functions, patterns which are non-physical and represent the “activities” of that object. Conversely, no activity can exist if not associated to a structured and functioning physical object. “Intellect” and “sensitiveness” are regarded as the activities that necessarily arise from the extremely complex structure and physical functions of the brain and other body apparatuses (“power”). Mind can exert outwardly oriented activities, directed to external objects, or inwardly oriented activities, directed to mind itself. The latter activities give the awareness that mind is capable of undergoing evolution, i.e.,development of intellect, sensitiveness and actions. Evolution enables the mind to continuously transcend itself, and could be regarded as the source of “moral values”. Inward mind activity gives rise to moral thoughts, moral feelings and moral acts (counterpart of ideas, sentiments, and actions, produced by the outward mind activity). This conception of mind opens new perspectives in such diverse fields as ontology (the triadic nature might be extensible to all existing objects), ethics (identification of the “good” with the mind-evolution itself), and still others.
32. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
JeeLoo Liu From Realizer Functionalism to Nonreductive Physicalism
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It has been noted in recent literature (e.g., Ross & Spurrett 2004, Kim 2006, McLaughlin 2006 and Cohen 2005) that functionalism can be separated into two varieties: one that emphasizes the role state, the other that emphasizes the realizer state. The former is called “role functionalism” while the latter has been called “realizer functionalism” (Ross & Spurrett 2004, Kim 2006, Cohen 2005) or “filler functionalism” (McLaughlin 2006). The separation between role functionalism and realizer functionalism mars the distinction traditionally made between functionalism and the identity theory, because realizer functionalism can be seen as the synthesis of functionalism and the identity theory. In this paper, I begin with an analysis of the distinction between role and realizer functionalism. I shall further develop realizer functionalism as a viable, or arguably the best, explanatory model for the mind-brain relation. Finally, I will argue that under realizer functionalism, we can give an account of how mind is placed in the material world without at the same time giving up on the autonomy of psychology. The autonomy of psychology is tantamount to the thesis that mental properties are not type-identical with, nor type-reducible to, physical properties of the brain. In the philosophical debate on reductive and nonreductive physicalism, reductivism seems to be gaining the upper hand these days. In the final section of this paper, Ishall sketch my defense of nonreductive physicalism. I believe that the current enthusiasm for reductionism is misguided, and I shall show that under realizer functionalism, reductionism in the sense of reductive explanation, i.e., providing explanation of the psychological in terms of the underlying physical properties, is not a feasible project.
33. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Woojin Han The Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts: Too Good to be True
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John Hawthorne (2002), David Braddon-Mitchell (2003), and Robert Stalnaker (2002), almost simultaneously but independently, developed a physicalistic argument which depends on such two conditional analyses: (1) If we experience dualistic pain, zombies are possible; (2) If our world is physicalistic, zombies are impossible. Hawthorne assumes that only an oracle will tell us which conditional is the case. From this setting, he concludes that zombies are conceivable butimpossible. I first show that Hawthorne actually fails in deriving neither the conceivability of zombies nor their impossibility. Next, I argue that Hawthorne’s reasoning entails an absurdity that any entity like God, whose existence is controversial, will be conceivable but impossible.
34. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Athanasios Raftopoulos Ambiguous Figures and Nonconceptual Content
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Macpherson (2006) argues that the square/regular diamond figure threatens representationalism, which holds that the phenomenal character of experience is either identical, or supervenes on, the nonconceptual content of experience (NCC). Her argument is that representationalism is committed to the thesis that differences in the phenomenal experience of ambiguous figures, the gestalt switch, should be explained by differences in the NCC of perception of these figures. However, with respect to the square/regular diamond figure such differences in NCC do not explain the gestalt switch. I examine Macpherson’s claims and argue that representationalism can account for the experience of ambiguous figures by explaining differences in the phenomenal content of experience by means of differences in the NCC of that same experience. The thrust of my argument is that Macpherson’s account of what happens when subjects, upon viewing a tilted A and an A, report their experience by using the concept-term “A”, mistakes seeph with seedox. If this confusion is cleared, then representationalism can offer a coherent account of the gestalt switch in the diamond/square figure on the basis of the NCC of that experience.
35. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Richard H. Corrigan Would I Endorse my Determined Endorsement? Moral Responsibility and Reflective Endorsement
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In her recent article ‘Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism’, Lynne Rudder Baker contends that libertarian intuitions can be accommodated by compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility. She proposes a principle called the ‘Reflective Endorsement View’ which she believes is capable of achieving this end. The Reflective Endorsement View holds that once an agent reflectively identifies with his actions in a particular way, he is morally responsible for those actions, irrespective of whether he has the power to do otherwise or the cause of the action ultimately originates in him. I contend that Baker’s compatibilist Reflective Endorsement View is too stringent and exclusive for moral responsibility. I argue this on the basis that the very intuitions that led Baker to formulatethe various conditions that must be satisfied for moral responsibility can be used to show the inadequacy of her position.
36. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Zihu Liu The Structure System of Human Spirit, Together with Stratification Analysis
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In this paper, the spirit of human was discovered to be a kind of system to process information which is obedient to the life’s oriented. It emanates from body but surpasses body, they can work together harmoniously, and grow up jointly. Just like the hardware and the software of the computer, our physical body corresponds to the hardware, our spirit corresponds to the software. This software system is far from nothing, it has specific structure system and runningmechanism, it exists in the form of information, and its function is obvious.
37. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Gerard Elfstrom Scientists and Free Will
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Many scientists believe that the universe, including the human brain, is governed by natural laws and that all can be explained by natural processes. In consequence, they believe that all events, including brain events, are determined. From this, they often conclude that free will cannot exist. I believe these views are mistaken and will present several lines of argument to support this position. I conclude that the operation of free will is compatible with determinism, can be explained by natural processes and does not entail immaterial substance.
38. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Caleb Liang Perceptual Phenomenology and Direct Realism
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I discuss the so-called “problem of perception” in relation to the Argument from Illusion: Can we directly perceive the external world? According to Direct Realism, at least sometimes perception provides direct and immediate awareness of reality. But the Argument from Illusion threatens to undermine the possibility of genuine perception. In The Problem of Perception (2002), A. D. Smith proposes a novel defense of Direct Realism based on a careful study of perceptual phenomenology. According to his theory, the intentionality of perception is explained in terms of three phenomenological features of perception: phenomenalthree-dimensional spatiality, movement, and the Anstoss. He argues that this account of perceptual intentionality can resist a central premise of the Argument from Illusion, i.e. the “sense-datum inference.” After presenting Smith’s theory, I argue that he fails to distinguish two independent tasks for the direct realist, and that he underestimates the threat of the so-called “sense-datum infection.” My contention is that even if Smith’s theory of perceptual intentionality is correct, Direct Realism has not been saved from the Argument from Illusion. To resist the Argument from Illusion, it is not enough to merely consider how to block the sense-datum inference. The direct realist must also find a way to undermine the sense-datum infection. If so, I suggest, Direct Realism cannot be defended by perceptual phenomenology alone.
39. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Salahaddin Khalilov The Specificity of Human Body: Two Ideas in One Thing
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A human being is the carrier of two different ideas, and there is no direct relation between them. One of these ideas refers to the body. The body itself is a system genetically coded and programmed in advance. On the other hand, one part of the body – the brain – appears to be the carrier of another idea that reflects the whole Universe – the Cosmos. Due to the function human (concretely, brain) is Microcosm, regarded as epitomizing the universe. So human brain or widely to say, human itself is the carrier of the ideas of body parts, and essence-idea of whole body, as well as passive idea of whole cosmos. In a practical life of the human being only very little part of this cosmic idea is actualized and used. Untraditional reflections of this great potential as a result of unusual events beyond ofstandards are also possible. Then knowledge, information-ideas that a human being was ignorant and that were not acquired as a result of his sensual practice throughout his real life, may be activated and these cases are regarded as mystery and sensation. While all human beings possess this potential, capacity, we have not yet acquired well the mechanisms of activation of these passive ideas. Studying the ways of the activation of the passive ideas of our brain is one of the main tasks nowadays.
40. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Laureen Park Freud’s “Epistemology”: The Break of Dawn in the Unconscious
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For Freud, what appears to reason is already predetermined by an unconscious that distorts and censors the “true” meaning behind the explicit one that is allowed to appear to us. The evidences of dreams make this clear. Explicit thoughts or symbols that ultimately connect to our waking life and reality are mere vehicles for the expression of unconscious “thoughts”. Furthermore, dreams evidence a censoring mechanism (that is relaxed in the state of sleep) that keeps these unconscious “thoughts” from rising to the surface in our waking state. So how does Freud have an “epistemology”? Dreams also exhibit rational and cultural mediation. Censorship involves “knowledge” of what to prohibit and what to allow according to normative dictates. Ego-consciousness (or reason) is theultimate arbiter between unconscious and rational demands. Unconscious thoughts are, therefore, ultimately subject to rational deliberation.