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41. The Monist: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Errol E. Harris Spinoza’s Theory of Human Immortality
42. The Monist: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Lee C. Rice Spinoza on Individuation
43. The Monist: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Wallace I. Matson Spinoza’s Theory of Mind
44. The Monist: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Robert McShea Spinoza: Human Nature and History
45. The Monist: Volume > 90 > Issue: 4
Michael T. Ghiselin, Olaf Breidbach The Search for the Basis of Natural Classification
46. The Monist: Volume > 91 > Issue: 1
Travis Dumsday Group Privacy and Govemment Surveillance of Religious Services
47. The Monist: Volume > 91 > Issue: 1
Anita L. Allen The Virtuous Spy: Privacy as an Ethical Limit
48. The Monist: Volume > 91 > Issue: 1
49. The Monist: Volume > 91 > Issue: 1
Scott A. Anderson Privacy Without the Right to Privacy
50. The Monist: Volume > 91 > Issue: 1
Geoffrey Brennan The Economy of Privacy: Institutional Design in the Economy of Esteem
51. The Monist: Volume > 91 > Issue: 1
Chandran Kukathas Cultural Privacy
52. The Monist: Volume > 91 > Issue: 1
David Meeler Is Information All We Need to Protect?
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I will argue for a straightforward claim: privacy is best understood as protecting information about us from being known by others. To those unfamiliar with recent scholarship regarding privacy, this claim may seem self-evident, too trivial to deserve defense. At the same time, scholars of privacy may find the claim too narrow or outdated to enjoy sustained defense. This situation makes the view an interesting one, I think. My goal is to develop a conception of privacy that is concise enough to be legally functional and robust enough to be morally valuable. Beginning with richer moral conceptions ofprivacy, I will pursue a type ofreductioniststrategy by defending infonnational privacy as the only meaningful core of privacy interests. My reductionism is not necessarily conceptual. While I think a conceptual reduction might also be defended, my reduction can be seen, primarily, as practical. My reasons for focusing on information are straightforward:(conceptually) I suggest that any private matter must be related to the information aspect, and (practically) that protecting information privacy is sufficient for protecting the other aspects identified in the richer moral tradition; however, protecting only the other regularly acknowledged aspects (either access or expressive privacy) fails to protect information privacy. This analysis of privacy centered on information should be clean enough for legal application while addressing the deepest worries that motivate morally thick analyses. We define the parameters ofself-expression and legitimate government access most effectively by carefullydefining the parameters for protecting information about our lives.
53. The Monist: Volume > 91 > Issue: 1
Leslie Pickering Francis Privacy and Confidentiality: The Importance of Context
54. The Monist: Volume > 91 > Issue: 1
Steve Matthews Privacy, Separation, and Control
55. The Monist: Volume > 91 > Issue: 1
David Matheson A Distributive Reductionism About the Right to Privacy
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Ignorance theorists about privacy hold that it amounts to others’ ignorance of one’s personal information. I argue that ignorance theorists should adopt a distributive reductionist approach to the right to privacy, according to which it is reducible to elements that, despite having something significant in common, are distributed across more fundamental rights to person, liberty, and property. The distributed reductionism that I present carries two important features. First, it is better suited than its competitors to explain a sense of scatter that many have about the right to privacy. Second, it warrants caution about claims to the effect that the right to privacy is sharply to be distinguished from such rights as the right to liberty and the right to property.
56. The Monist: Volume > 91 > Issue: 2
Itay Shani Against Consciousness Chauvinism
57. The Monist: Volume > 91 > Issue: 2
Amie L. Thomasson Phenomenal Consciousness and the Phenomenal World
58. The Monist: Volume > 91 > Issue: 2
Terry Horgan, Uriah Kriegel Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind
59. The Monist: Volume > 91 > Issue: 2
Joseph Levine Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet
60. The Monist: Volume > 91 > Issue: 2
Colin McGinn Consciousness as Knowingness