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81. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 36
Frederick Sontag Hearing the Word
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That is the crucial question: Did God intend direct and final communication with us? There is little evidence that Jesus' appearance cleared anything up or gave us God directly. Wittgenstein, who wanted language to be clear, knew well enough that neither the Hebrew nor the Christian God's words could fall within his constructed linguistic net.
82. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 36
Daryl J. Wennemann The Role of Love in the Thought of Kant and Kierkegaard
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Following Ronald Green's suggestion concerning Kierkegaard's dependence upon Kant, I show how Kierkegaard drew upon Kant's The Metaphysics of Morals in order to develop his own doctrine of divine love. Where Kant saw only a peripheral role for love in the moral life, we will see how Kierkegaard places love at the center of human life in Works of Love. The leap of faith requires that every aspect of life be informed by love in response to God's love for us.
83. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 36
William F. Vallicella Classical Theism and Global Supervenience Physicalism
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Could a classical theist be a physicalist? Although a negative answer to this question may seem obvious, it turns out that a case can be made for the consistency of a variant of classical theism and global supervenience physicalism. Although intriguing, the case ultimately fails due to the weakness of global supervenience as an account of the dependence of mental on physical properties.
84. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 36
Walter Van Herck The Role of Tacit Knowledge in Religion
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Clarity concerning what kind of knowledge a religious person possesses is of the utmost importance. For one thing, J. Whittaker remarks that believers must have some knowledge that enables them to make the distinction between literal and non-literal descriptions of God. (1) In the believer's perception 'God is a rock', but not really a rock. God however really is love. Whittaker suggests that making this distinction requires knowledge that cannot be metaphysical or experiential, but a more basic form which he terms 'practical' knowledge. Without going into his discussion of the metaphysical and experiential view, I would like to elaborate on this notion of knowledge in three steps. Firstly, I want to consider a short passage in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (A 132-3 / B 171-2) on judgment. This passage points out that we necessarily know more than we can say or state. Secondly, Michael Polanyi's account of tacit knowledge will be introduced to see what 'religious tacit knowledge' could mean to be. Thirdly, analysis of a text from Meister Eckhart's Reden der Unterweisung will aim to show the relevance of this notion of practical (or tacit) knowledge in religious contexts.
85. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 36
David E. White The Elimination of Natural Theology
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The dispute between fideists and rationalists seems intractable since those who argue for faith alone claim that they are offended by the use of reason in religion. The advocates of reason claim that they are equally offended by the appeal to faith. This dispute may be resolved by showing that those who rely on faith may be seen as engaging in an experiment of living, so they can become part of a rational experiment without having to alter their practice; in contrast, those who use reason to justify religion can be seen as addressing a spiritual need. From an evangelical point of view, it would be wrong to disparage the mathematician’s use of the mathematical proof of God’s existence (such as Gödel’s). Wittgensteinian objections to natural theology can be met by showing that the use of reason in religion is distinct from the general kind of philosophical speculation to which Wittgenstein rightly objected. Those who claim that one must already have faith in order to seek understanding successfully can be answered by showing that their claim can be tested empirically only when there is a robust practice of natural theology among those who do and do not have a prior faith. There is reason for thinking religion should be subjected to a more rigorous scrutiny than used in secular matters.
86. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 36
Andrew Woznicki Philosophical Theantropy as the Principle of Religious Ecumenism
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One universal constituent element of human consciousness is belief in the existence of a divine reality that is experienced by persons as the most intimate and essential part of human life. Belief in transcendent reality, which is an immanent part of human nature, constitutes an awe-inspiring mystery (mysterium fascinans et tremens) — that is, a theantropy. Strictly speaking, ‘theantropy’ is a theological term which is used to express the "union of the divine and human natures in Christ" (as defined by Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary). The novum of my understanding of theantropy consists in the application of the concept to the phenomenological experience of the religious consciousness of humanity. Henceforth, I designate theantropy to mean an ontic union and an inherent disposition of the ‘human’ and ‘divine’ constituents in/of every human being. I will examine and reflect on theantropy as the philosophical principle of religious ecumenism as well as compare various solutions of theantropy not only with regard to a particular system of beliefs, but as it is experienced in each and every human being by following Augustine’s principle: "In interiorem hominem redi: ibi habitat Deus" (or in "intimor intimo meo").
87. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
José E. Burgos The Relational Nature of Species Concepts
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Édouard Le Roy as early as 1901 observed the existence of an intellectual movement seeking to break from traditional positivism and set for himself the task of drawing up the program of this new positivism. Noting that this program precedes the Vienna Circle, I endeavor to determine its nature and to evaluate its impact on logical positivism. Viewed in this light, the discussions between Le Roy, Poincaré and Duhem appear more prolonged and substantial than is usually thought. What we have here is perhaps not a homogeneous doctrine but a vigorous intellectual movement, from which logical positivists were able to borrow specific theses in their attempts to mitigate Mach's strict positivism; more important still, they had before them an example of neopositivism. History is not the only concern: among the issues debated, one encounters the claim that facts are theory-laden. This claim still stirs controversy today. An inquiry into the origins of the claim is one way of clarifying the arguments involved.
88. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Armando Cíntora Critical Comments on Laudan’s Theory of Scientific Aims
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I criticize Laudan's constraints on cognitive aims as presented in Science and Values. These constraints are axiological consistency and non-utopianism. I argue that (i) Laudan's prescription for non utopian aims is too restrictive because it excludes ideals and characterizes as irrational or non-rational numerous human contingencies. (ii) We aim to ideals because there is no cogent way to specify in advance what degree of deviation from an ideal is acceptable. Thus, one cannot dispense with ideals. (iii) Laudan does not distinguish difficult from impossible goals, making his injunction against utopianism imprecise. It is "semantically utopian" and, furthermore, a prescription for conservatism and mediocrity. (iv) Goals often contradict each other or are at least partially incompatible. Since Laudan does not say how to prioritize incompatible aims, axiological consistency is an utopian desideratum. Thus, his constraints on cognitive aims contradict one another. Finally, (v), Laudan's axiological constraints are too weak and in order to strengthen them, he must invoke without justification some implicit pre-philosophical cognitive aims. This opens the logical possibility of axiological relativism, which Laudan attempted from the beginning to avoid.
89. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
David Boersema Inductivism, Naturalism, and Metascientific Theories
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In this paper I will argue that, while inductivism as a view concerning scientific theories has been discredited, the (often implicit) criteria for evaluating metascientific theories is in fact primarily inductivist. The very philosophical community that has condemned and eschewed inductivism for scientific theories in fact applies inductivism for its own metascientific theories. While somewhat troubling, matters are compounded for those advocating a naturalist stance toward metascientific theories, since those advocates suggest that there is not (or should not be) a sharp division between scientific theories and metascientific theories.
90. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Assen I. Dimitrov Do Attractors Exist in Physical Space: The Truth Is Out There
91. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Gregg Alan Davia Thoughts on a Possible Rational Reconstruction of the Method of “Rational Reconstruction”
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Rational reconstructions standardly operate so as to transform a given problematic philosophical scientific account-particularly of a terminological, methodological or theoretical entity-into a similar, but more precise, consistent interpretation. This method occupies a central position in the practice of analytic philosophy. Nevertheless, we encounter-even if only in a very few specific publications-a vague image of it. This is due on the one hand to the problem of the intentions of application, i.e., of the normativity of rational reconstruction (descriptive/prescriptive-ambivalence). It is also due on the other hand to the problem of the significance of the method in the field of history of philosophy (systematic/historical-dichotomy). The varied usage within analytic philosophy, as well as the increasingly inflationary and interfering usage outside, contribute to make rational reconstruction somehow appear a Proteus in contemporary philosophical methodology. This paper attempts to administer first aid and to close a bit of the theoretical gap and thus to reach a more exact image for the interests of analytic philosophy. Self-application of the method appears to be the right remedy. A graduating rational reconstruction of a standard concept of rational reconstruction will be suggested, differentiating the concept of rational reconstruction according to normativity, and explicating the method of rational reconstruction into two such variants.
92. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Gustaaf C. Cornelis Is Popularization of Science Possible?
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If the philosophy of science wants to pass along its views adequately to the public, it is important that the latter have a basic general understanding of science. Only in this way can "popularization of science" be meaningful from a philosophical and educational point of view. Is "good" popularization a possibility or merely a utopian phantasm. I conclude that popularization of science is possible if certain conditions are met. Scientists have to take responsibility and be honest in their efforts, both toward science as well as the public.
93. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Gyorgy Darvas Ontological Levels and Symmetry Breaking
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I discuss the role of symmetry breaking in a philosophical context, and formulate laws of symmetry breaking. I deal with their conceptual and ontological background, limits of validity, their relation to the theories of evolution and reductionism and to level theories. Level theories are used to make a sequential arrangement of the forms of appearance of moving matter. Aspects of symmetry or symmetry breaking have never been involved in the treatment of these theories. Here, I first attempt to bring knowledges of different origins together. There are two types of level theories: a general one (in philosophy) and particular ones (in the inanimate, the organic nature and in the human society). Particular level theories differ from each other in the three fundamental ontological spheres, and in their description and contents . At the same time they may have common features, e.g., all are particular theories concerning their width of validity, and all are based on an arrangement by a common concept, namely the forms of interaction. The clarification of these conceptual problems was necessary to understand the laws of symmetry breaking. The law of correspondence between the ontological levels and their potential symmetry properties is formulated in four constituent statements and two concluding laws are also presented. The new features of this treatment will link level theories with (dis)symmetry principles, and formulate the laws of symmetry breaking.
94. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Vladimir G. Gamaonov The Relation-Functional Concept Of The Information
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There is such a point of view that information is an abstract unit as an invariant of informational processes. Information consists of object, procedural and morphological components.We have an opportunity to consider that information consists of object and procedural components. So we have the relation-functional concept of information.Information has such attributes as syntactics, semantics and pragmatics. These attributes are relational definitions. Semantics and pragmatics are considered to be external features (characteristics) of the definite syntactics.
95. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Maarten Franssen The Not-so-trivial Truth of Methodological Individualism
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I defend the truth of the principle of methodological individualism in the social sciences. I do so by criticizing mistaken ideas about the relation between individual people and social entities held by earlier defenders of the principle. I argue, first, that social science is committed to the intentional stance; the domain of social science, therefore, coincides with the domain of intentionally described human action. Second, I argue that social entitites are theoretical terms, but quite different from the entities used in the natural sciences to explain our empirical evidence. Social entities (such as institutions) are conventional and open-ended constructions, the applications of which is a matter of judgment, not of discovery. The terms in which these social entities are constructed are the beliefs, expectations and desires, and the corresponding actions of individual people. The relation between the social and the individual 'levels' differs fundamentally from that between, say, the cellular and the molecular in biology. Third, I claim that methodological individualism does not amount to a reduction of social science to psychology; rather, the science of psychology should be divided. Intentional psychology forms in tandom with the analysis of social institutions, unitary psycho-social science; cognitive psychology tries to explain how the brain works and especially how the intentional stance is applicable to human behavior.
96. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Serghey Stoilov Gherdjikov The Limits of Science
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Does science have any limits? Scientists say no. Philosophers are divided in their response. The humanities say that science is not "humanitarian," and thus not metaphysically deep. In response, scientists and some philosophers contend that science is the best knowledge we have about the world. I argue that science is limited by its form. Science has no object that derives from the human form. Everything that is incomparable to the dimension of the human body is reducible to notions that are commensurable to that body. This phenomenologically clarifies some of the most important discoveries in contemporary science. The Special Theory of Relativity shows the dependence of space and time on the accounting system. Quantum mechanics displays the limits of observation (Heisenberg) and logical indefiniteness by compelling the creation of a macropresentation of micro-objects and gets around logic (Feyerabend) through the principle of additionality. Experimental science has come out as an artificial projection of human expansion, not as a reflection of the transcendent order of the world itself. "The life world" successfully takes the place of "the objective world" of modern rationality.
97. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Francisco Flores “Top-Down” or “Bottom-Up”: Explaining Laws in Special Relativity
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Wesley Salmon has suggested that the two leading views of scientific explanation, the “bottom-up” view and the “top-down” view, describe distinct types of explanation. In this paper, I focus on theoretical explanations in physics, i.e., explanations of physical laws. Using explanations of E=mc2, I argue that the distinction between bottom-up explanations (BUEs) and top-down explanations (BUEs) is best understood as a manifestation of a deeper distinction, found originally in Newton’s work, between two levels of theory. I use Einstein’s distinction between ‘principle’ and ‘constructive’ theories to argue that only lower level theories, i.e., ‘constructive’ theories, can yield BUEs. These explanations, furthermore, depend on higher level laws that receive only TDEs from a ‘principle’ theory. Thus, I conclude that Salmon’s challenge to characterize the relationship between the two types of explanation can be met only by recognizing the close relationship between types of theoretical explanation and the structure of physical theory.
98. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
David Gruenberg Bootstrapping and the Problem of Testing Quantitative Theoretical Hypotheses
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I consider two alternative solutions to the problem of computing the values of theoretical quantities, and, thus, of testing theoretical hypotheses, viz., Sneed's structuralist eliminationism and Glymour's bootstrapping. The former attempts to solve the problem by eliminating theoretical quantities by means of the so-called Ramsey-Sneed sentence that represents the global empirical claim of the given theory. The latter proposes to solve the problem by deducing the values of the theoretical quantities from, among others, the very hypothesis to be tested. I argue that in those cases where the theoretical quantities are not strongly Ramsey-eliminable-which seems to be the case for most of the actual physical theories-eliminationism does not succeed in computing the values of theoretical quantities and is compelled to use bootstrapping in this task. On the other hand, we see that a general notion of bootstrapping-which, though implicitly, is present as a subreasoning in structuralism-provides a formally correct procedure for computing theoretical quantities, and thus contributes to the solution to the problem of testing theoretical hypotheses involving these quantities.
99. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Alexandru Giuculescu Order Versus Chaos or the Ghost of Indeterminacy
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Indeterminacy, uncertainty, disorder, randomness, vagueness, fuzziness, ambiguity, crisis, undecideability, chaos, are all different terms. Yet, they are also semantically related to the idea of something opposed to order or structure and organization. Such terms denote prima facie insuperable obstacles to the attainment of true, certain, or precise knowledge about things and events. After analysing the ontological, logical, and axiological status of indeterminary, I outline the aoristic logic which allows adequate descriptions of phenomena pertaining to an area of indeterminary. Aoristic logic provides a propositional calculus that makes possible the compatibility of order with indeterminacy.
100. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
David Gruender On Explanation: Aristotelean and Hempelean
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Given the great historical distance between scientific explanation as Aristotle and Hempel saw it, I examine and appraise important similarities and differences between the two approaches, especially the inclination to take deduction itself as the very model of scientific knowledge. I argue that we have good reasons to reject this inclination.