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1. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 4
Jeffrey Benjamin White How Did Socrates Become Socrates?: On the Socratic Recipe for the Philosophic Life
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Socrates is philosophy’s greatest hero, and a model for the philosophic life. Yet, why did Socrates live the way he did? How did Socrates become Socrates? How can a contemporary philosopher aspire to be like Socrates, even in ways and contexts in which there is no record of a Socratic example? This short paper explores the implications of Socrates’ encounter with Callicles in the Gorgias on the aspiring philosophic life. In this dialogue, we find Socrates’ own testimony as to why he lives the way he does, how he comes to die the way he does, and also discover how it is that we can presently pursue the philosophic life by his recipe.
2. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 4
Alexandrov Vladimir Ivanovich Перспектива существования метафизики и философии в XXI веке
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The keynote idea of the theses is contained in the author’s assumption that modern philosophy doesn’t meet its claiming pretensions: to be universal form of knowledge. First of all philosophy is connected not with knowledge but with ideas and secondly being authentic it “exists only in everyday life”.1 In orderthat philosophy could realize its innate essence corresponding conditions of social being should exist but they are still absent and therefore philosophy is absent as well. Its place is occupied by metaphysics which is free movement of thinking that has no definiteness as the condition of being of any form of thought. That iswhy we watch crisis state of “philosophy” which becomes apparent in vagueness of its subject: “philosophy is not only one, there are many of them”. The author supposes that philosophy as the highest relation of mankind to objective reality is the only one. Philosophy lowered down from the heaven (Platon, Ciceron) in the field of human being must raise people not only to purity of thought, but mainly to purity of their activity both with each other and with nature. Then real interaction of men and nature will take place. This will be the beginning of spiritualization of the Universe. It may exist only under the conditions of social uniformity as historical form of Weltanschauung (world outlook) that removes religious form. Realization of its being supposes fundamental change of social life. It is necessary that private property should be replaced with social property in the sphere of social production. Only under these conditions philosophy may appear and exist as historical form of Weltanschauung.
3. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 4
Michael Ch. Michailov, Eva Neu Anthropologie und Philosophie: Was ist der Mensch?
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One Seit Platon (mit dem Spott von Diogenes) über Kant ist die Fundamentalfrage "Was ist der Mensch?" bis heute nicht nur von der Philosophie (als regina scientiarum), sondern von der Wissenschaft überhaupt nicht beantwortet. Phänomenologisch hat der Mensch a posteriori physische (somatische), psychische(perceptio, emotio, cognitio), mentale (logische), spirituelle (conscientia, volitio, actio) "Sphären". Ontologisch in Kontext von to ti en einai (Aristoteles) sollte der Mensch a priori ein "Programm" (Information) vor der Kosmogonie haben. Der (Neo‐) Positivismus (z.B. Hume bis Carnap, Russel*; * Nobel Laureate) verwirft Fragen der Metaphysik als Scheinprobleme. Damit bleibt das Menschen‐Wesen in Kontext von Postulaten, wie res cogitans (Descartes), Monaden(Leibniz), "Gott, Freiheit, Unsterblichkeit", Seligkeit und (moralischer) Vollkommenheit (Kant), absoluter Geist (Hegel) in der theologischen Dimension. Antwort könnte eine zukünftige (holistisch‐multidimensionale) philosophische theoretische und Experimentaltheologie (kontrollierbare Beobachtung) durch weitere Forschung geben, in Kontext (bzw. Existenz) von A. Physikotheologie bzw. (a) höhere (als drei) geometrische/physikalische Dimensionen (Hilbert, Riemann /Friedmann, Minkowski, Schmutzer), (b) Paralleluniversen (z.B. L. Randall), (c) Quantentheorie/‐philosophie (Planck*, u.a.), (d) Gravitations‐/Relativitätstheorie (Newton/Einstein*), (e) Vakuumenergie (Sato), etc. B. ChemoBiotheologie bzw. "psychischen" (Fechner) und "spezifischen" (Joh. Müller) Energien,"biologischem Feld" (Gurwitsch), künstlicher Biogenese (Oparin, Fox, Urey*, u.a.; 32 Fragen von John Bernal). C. Psychotheologie bzw. parapsychische Phänomene (Carrel*, Richet*/France, Rhinne/USA, Vassilev, Bechterew/Russia, etc.). D. Religionstheologie: (über‐) Bewußtsein, übersinnliche, immaterielle, supraphysikalische Phänomene (Sri Aurobindo, Dalai Lama*, Konfuzius/Laotse, Gopi Krishna, Papst Benedikt, Paramahansa Yogananda, Sri Yogendra, etc.)und ihre physiologische Begründung (Anand/Chinna, Kasamatsu/Hirai, Ornstein, Pauli*, von Weizsäcker, etc.). Damit hängt die ontologische Frage nach dem MenschenWesen mit der Lösung des Problemkomplexes "Gott Geist/Seele Mensch Natur" zusammen.
4. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 4
David Pérez Chico Philosophy as the Recovery of the Ordinary
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After centuries of philosophical explorations of the remote and the elevated, in our work we give credibility to the possibility that the time has come for philosophy to conquer back the ordinary. Nor only we assume this, but we would also conclude that the main task of philosophy is the recovery of the ordinary (world). A task that also helps to understand what philosophy is or should be or could be. We intend to explore philosophy traditional reluctance to the ordinary and its tendency to look for answers far from it explaining the reasons it has for it. Secondly we would explore the ordinary world itself, trying to characterize it and what does inhabiting it mean. And finally we would look at some philosophical problems (mainly epistemological and moral problems, but not exclusively) from the perspective that gives a philosophy that finds itself comfortable in the ordinary world.
5. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 4
С. Н. Некрасов Кризис философии в современном мире: конец постиндустриальной глобализации
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The last crash of the «kingdom of rationality» organized by postindustrialist globalization in the end of XX century is in reality a deadline of human prehistory. The mechanical thought told us about the prohibition of scientific research in such fields as artificial intellect with an appeal to war against science. From one side of left mondialism in style «West against the rest» we see a pseudophilosophical avantgardist idea of thousands truths, deconstruction, tolerance with the rhetorique of struggle against terrorism. From second side in the spirit of wright avtarkism a la «The rest against the West» postulates the global evel and thedevelopment of planet to a neofeudal state. It is necessary to point out ten questions to philosophers. Only ten questions to philosophers world community. The positive answer will turn philosophy to social reality and will define the degree of decline of world philosophy in the end of postindustrialist globalization.
6. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 4
J.O. Famakinwa Philosophy Relevance in the Contemporary World
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If philosophy is conceived as a method, seeing it beyond the traditional issues it addresses, issues that are not, strictly speaking, peculiar to it, then philosophy need not share the same criteria of relevance with science and technology. The paper argues that the generally held major criteria of relevance – utility, suitability, and social acceptability grounded on human desires and need are not philosophically satisfactory. The paper also argues that the Universalist conception of philosophy is, like science and technology, capable of contributing to human good – material and non- material. The conclusion is that granted that development is basically human, and, derivatively, material then the acquisition of the skills of philosophizing constitutes part of the species of development. The philosophical task of identifying errors (human and non-human) in specific human scientific and technological fields is capable of affecting the material and non-material progress of the contemporary world.
7. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Friday N. Ndubuisi The Question of Validity of Law
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Law is a powerful force in human civilization. The growth and stability in society are generally linked with the gradual development of a system of legal rules, in addition to the instruments for their regular and effective enforcement. Law can be used to protect or harm the interest of man. This dimension raises the issue of the ‘validity of law’. The legal positivists posit that law is a ‘moral-neutral’ entity, and once it is enacted by the appropriate authority, it cannot be adjudged immoral or unjust, by any standard outside the province of the law in question. The valid law for the legal positivists is law as enacted by the appropriate authority within agiven legal system. The Naturalists think otherwise. Cicero for instance believes that the validity of law is rooted on right reason in agreement with nature. In this paper I am more persuaded by the arguments of the Naturalists. I however present liberally the standpoints of the two opposing schools of thought – The naturalists and the positivists, with emphasis on the works of John Kelsen, Justice Homles, Cicero and Aquinas.
8. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Friday N. Ndubuisi Karl Popper on the Philosophy of Dynamism in Science
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There are a number of contentious issues in the study of philosophy of science. There is the issue of method, there is the issue of subject-matter, there is the issue of truth and certainty as well as the issue of rationality, and the utility of scientific discoveries. Popper demonstrated a lot of interest in the issue of method, stressing ways and means science as a living enterprise could make progress. His theory of conjecture and refutation, or falsifiability is in pursuance of this. He rejected induction as a method of science, insisting that falsifiability is a cardinal factor in any scientific research programme. In this paper I shall examine what Popper consider critical in the advancement of scientific knowledge. That is the task of this paper.
9. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Mehmet Tevfik Ozcan The Rule of Law and Human Virtue
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The rule of law is politico-legal realm of the modern society that it balances human gratifications, self-respect and prerequisites of legal order, after dissolution of the traditional society. Apart from our criticisms on the capitalist society there had been an expanding development of civic virtue of the human individual since early beginning of capitalism up to the 1980’ies when idea of self respect and the legal order relatively balanced. But, after neo-liberalism, the development is retrieving to the unbridled individualism, detrimental to the human virtue of all humanity.
10. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Vladimir N. Dubrovsky The Laws of Philosophy: A Contemporary Viewpoint
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Since there is a hierarchy in levels of the organization of the world (in, for example, its social, biological, physical and cosmic aspects) there is a plurality of aspects of scientific philosophy, each of which takes its bearings from this or that level of the organization of the world. This means that when speaking about the laws of philosophy, it is necessary to specify which aspect is being spoken about. In the course of my argument my guideline is the highest, or cosmic world, but I shall also use examples from the physical world. The first law of philosophy of the cosmic world is: each being has a single basis. (It realizes this basis of itself, i.e. it is a primary basis). The first law of the philosophy of the physical world can be stated as follows: all physical being is unique. The second law of philosophy of the cosmic world is: the basis of all being is active to the point of self-excitement. It is manifest and demonstrable of itself, fracturing unity into multiplicity. The second law of the philosophy of the physical world can be stated as follows: all physical being is active and excitable. The third law of the philosophy of the cosmic world is: the basis of all being excites itself unevenly. The third law of philosophy of the physical world can be stated as follows: every physical being changes by a conversion leap. These then are the three laws of the philosophy of the cosmic and physical worlds: uniqueness, activity, and leap. I end by showing how laws of cosmic ethics and a cosmic aesthetics follow from the laws of the philosophy of the cosmic world.
11. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Mayda Hočevar Central and Peripheral Cases and the Moral Point of View in John Finnis´ Theory of Law
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In Finnis´s methodology it is very important to build the appropriate concepts to describe, analyse and define law. As a natural law theorist Finnis goes beyond Hart when considering that the internal point of view is useless for delimiting what law is if one does not define the internal point of view of the internal point of view, that is, the moral point of view. Only from a moral point of view it is possible, according to Finnis, to build an authentic theory of law able not only to describe law but also to morally evaluate it. In Finnis methodology there is also the distinction between the focal and peripheral meanings of a term or concept, whichcorrespond, respectively, to the central and peripheral or secondary cases of and object referred by such term or concept. Because of this distinction Finnis is able to use a wide concept of law avoiding in this way many of the mistakes, which, according to legal positivism, are typical of natural law theories like, for example, confusing legal and moral validity. The importance given by Finnis to the internal point of view and the distinction between central and peripheral cases in order to analyse law is not original but Finnis introduces some particularities, which is what I try to present in this paper.
12. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Vladimir Lobovikov Juridical and Aristotelian Modalities: A New Theory of Their Unity
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In “Elementa Juris Naturalis” (1671) G.W. Leibniz formulated the genius intuition about the fundamental unity of juridical and Aristotelian modalities. Interpreting and explicating this intuition by virtue of the deontic logic G.W. Wright arrived to the conclusion that the unity of modalities in question is not an equivalence relation but an analogy one. However a complement for G.W. Wright’s explication of the intuition of G.W. Leibniz was submitted. This complement was a two-valued algebra of formal-natural-law philosophy of juridical and Aristotelian modalities as moral-legal evaluation-functions determined by one variable. In thepresent paper I submit a binary generalization of the mentioned unary complement. By virtue of this generalization some significant shortcomings of the complement in question are eliminated. The generalization deals with the modalities as moral-legal evaluation-functions determined by two variables.
13. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Patrice Canivez The Legislator’s Educative Task In Rousseau’s Political Theory
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In Rousseau’s political theory, the Legislator’s task is to draft the best possible Constitution for a given people. His goal is to maintain the public liberties and to ensure the preservation and prosperity of the State. However, the main problem is “to put law above men” – that is: above the citizens in general and the members of the executive in particular. This paper examines how the Legislator takes up the problem by educating the citizens. The process of education implies the development of reasonable thinking as well as the education of desire. Reasonable thinking is achieved through the formation of the general will. Education of human desire must be understood with respect to the distinction between amour-propre and amour-de-soi. The extension of amour-de-soi to a communityof fellow citizens plays a central role in the formation of the general will and contributes to the development of solidarity among the different social classes. Education of amour-propre plays a role in the development of a national identity. It plays also a role in the political governance of individual desires by means of an administration based on a hierarchy of functions, supervised by public opinion. However, the political governance of desire is challenged by the invisible power of money, which Rousseau tried to neutralize by limiting and slowing down the monetary circulation.
14. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Cristian Rojas, Marco Galetta La interpretación jurídica en la legislación venezolana
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The objective of our research is to examine the diverse methods of judicial interpretation, taking off from that established in Article 4 of the Venezuelan Civil Code. We attempt to explain what and how to interpret using the exegetic method of interpretation through an exhaustive analysis of the article, in agreement with Article 22 of the Penal Process Organic Code. Emphasis is placed on the classical methods of legal interpretation: grammatical, logical-systematic, and historical-comparative, among others.
15. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Asger Sørensen From Below to Above Rawls on Just War
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From A Theory of Justice to The Law of Peoples Rawls’s liberalism develops from individualism to a kind of communitarianism. This apparently makes him blind to conflicts between the individual and the collective, and the resulting position contributes to change his perspective on just war. From a duty to prevent war by civil disobedience he develops a duty to initiate war because of human right violations, and this must be criticized.
16. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Nuno Manuel Morgadinho dos Santos Coelho Order and Character: an Aristotelian Approach to the Contemporary Crisis of Efficacy and Legitimacy of Law
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Assuming that Aristotelian ethical thought is specifically related to the problem of stability and permanency of Polis, this paper researches the relationship between the human soul and the ethical-political order. Ethical life is described as an on-going process whereby we learn how to think and desire, due to the experience of each particular situation. Ethics shows the human life as a progressive assimilation of ethical-political order in which one becomes the man one is. But, on the other hand, it also shows that any order owes itself to the character of men who take part in it. Interiorising of customs – the purpose of ethical process of personal constitution – forms the man (character is built from the communitarian experience). The virtuous man’s soul is the strongest guarantee againstruination that always threatens Polis. The affirmation of a good life as a happy life in virtue – as the permanent and stable activity according to virtue – assures political order’s stability and the permanence of the Polis. This leads to a reflection about how much Politics owes Ethics: the possibility of the most esteemed idea in Aristotelian political discourse (the permanence of Polis) depends on the ethical process of human soul’s construction. The soul belongs to the order just as the order belongs to the soul. Seen as a virtue, Justice is a certain configuration of the soul (of desiring, thinking and even of feeling) of a man. The abandonment of that incarnate old conception of Justice is strictly related to the contemporary crisis of Law, whose weaknesses in legitimacy and efficacy are evident.
17. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Henrique Schneider Legalism as Legal Positivism?
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The Rule of law often is considered to be a criterion for legal positivistic thinking. According to this maxim: can the Chinese Legalistic thinking of Shang Yang and Han Fei be considered as a sort of Legal Positivism? There are many positions shared by both, like the idea of a positive law or the binding character of the law despite of person and sympathies or even the concept of the law as a system. There is, however a important difference between them: legal positivism can be best described as “rule of the law” whereas Legalism best fits the idea of “rule by the law”, since there were no secondary rules stating how the legislator had to make the law. On the other hand, the strongest approach to draw a parallel between both is the commonly shared concept of realism of the law as social construction.
18. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Mihai Badescu Mircea Djuvara: A Representative Value of the Romanian Legal Thinking
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His philosophical thinking was influenced by his legal knowledge, but when reading carefully his articles and papers we can notice a detachment from the philosophical premises in the development of the concepts of law. Like Del Vecchio, Djuvara makes no difference between law and philosophy and therefore the legal philosophy looks like a completion of law, these two concepts being comprehended only by a general, epistemological and philosophical approach; the issues related to the philosophy of law are not only isolated from the big philosophical issues but there are closely related to them so that the philosophy of lawintegrates completely in the general philosophy.
19. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Ion Craiovan On The Philosophy With Juridical Norms
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My paper tackles the generic relationship between philosophy and law, the necessity of applying philosophy to law, the legitimacy and range of such an approach, the configuration of the way in which philosophy has left its mark in the juridical sphere. It surveys, in a chronological order, as well as in terms of their co-existence, the various stages of the relationship between philosophy and law. 1. Although both have been “within the walls”, law secludes itself, relatively speaking, in “the world taken as a whole”, to shape its own identity, to survive as a self-sufficient, distinct technique (F. Geny), or it does it in a doctrinary way (positivism). 2. The representatives of philosophy in the juridical sphere are doing their best to uphold law’s struggle for knowledge, to have it gain recognition as a “science”, renounce its one-sidedness and harmonize with the others. 3. Juridical norms are not untouchable in relation with philosophy. Philosophy may work within juridical norms if it has an affinity with the content of juridical normativeness and respects its specificity. 4. The conclusion I reach is that we must try to cultivate a joint area bringing together philosophy and law, an area wherein the specific features of the two distinct fields reach a consensus for the sake of the human condition – hic et nunc. Philosophy bestows coherence and casts light on “law for man’s sake”, while the philosophically founded law appears to be the “normative project of the human”, a human practice inextricably connected with other types of practice, with man as a whole. The practical way to fulfil this goal, like the goal itself, will always be liable to criticism and improvement, open to debates and various options in a concrete socio-historical context.
20. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 40
Joon Seok Park Rethinking the Contract as Promise
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This paper aims to rethink the reason why nineteenth century common lawyers required a promise to be ‘accepted’. James Gordley expresses his opinion on this matter that they did it just in order to answer the annoying question of why and when a promise was binding. He might be right if he were dealing with the nineteenth century civil lawyers. But he cannot explain why common law of contract still employs the doctrine of consideration and refuses to replace the concept of promise with the notion of offer, despite the doctrine of offer and acceptance. This paper reminds readers that the word promise is rather moral than legal. Thenineteenth century common lawyers wanted not to lose the moral force of this word, so they could not exchange a promise for an offer. What they actually did is not to require a promise to be ‘accepted’ but to require ‘a promise’ to be accepted.