Displaying: 1-20 of 56 documents

0.158 sec

1. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 16
Fernando Aranda Fraga John Rawls: el Giro Contemporáneo de la Ética a Partir de su Teoría de la Justicia Como Imparcialidad
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Up to the middle of the 20th Century, studies of metaethics were the main object of study of the analitical current which covered that area, leaving aside fundamental problems, considered meaningless at that time. Even though Rawls is heir of this philosophical current, he supports a new approach which goes back to the substancial nature of ethics, though set in a framework whose political basis supposedly is liberal democracy, his methodology of contractualism and content, and a constructivism lacking metaphysical presuppositions, strongly influenced by Kantian thought. Taking these elements, Rawls designs a theory of justice whose main aspiration is faimess, a theory by which he tries to disprove the two main ethical currents of his time: Utilitarism and Intuitionism. To all this he adds a clear intention of considering an ordered society the one where Right is above Good. According to him, only then a pluralist society will be possible, a society where the ends of liberal democracy can be accomplished.
2. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 6 > Issue: 11
Félix Duque "Destruccion de lo Divino": La Tragédia del Absoluto en el Hegel de Jena
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The aim of this paper is to investigate a crucial period in the development of the young Hegel (Jena, 1801-1803). Watching the decline and fall of the Holy German-Roman Empire and the Napoleonic Wars, Hegel laid a first theoretical foundation of the modern State through an allegorical interpretation of Orestes' myth (Eumenides, Aeschylus) as a sort of study-case of the "tragedy in the ethical life". Hegel atempts in this way to overcome the decomposition of the old classical ideals, which takes place at the time of the emerging egoism of the bourgeois capitalism. The proposed solution by Hegel in 1803 is the last attempt to build a new religion on the basis of the reconciliation of the People with their own destiny.
3. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 8
Juan Manuel Aragüés Spinoza y el Poder Constituyente
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Le projet de Spinoza d'une philosophie de la joie se développe dès une position hipersubjectiviste, presque hobbesienne, laquelle aboutirait à une contraposition entre les subjectivités, vers une autre position dont les traits collectifs sont remarquables. Cette dernière ouvre la porte à une théorie démocratique radicale, munie de tout un batiment épistémologique et ontologique. On peut trouver, dans notre siècle, une autre philosophie, celle de J.-P. Sartre, qui a parcouru un chemin très prochain et qui présente des problèmes politiques parallèles à ceux de la théorie spinozienne, en concret en ce qui concerne la question de la liberté. Le présent article veut penser les limites de la conception spinozienne et sartrienne de la liberté et la dimension politique de la question.
4. Philosophie et Culture: Actes du XVIIe congrès mondial de philosophie: Volume > 1
Venant Cauchy Prefacio
5. Philosophie et Culture: Actes du XVIIe congrès mondial de philosophie: Volume > 1
Leopoldo Zea Perspectivas del porvenir
6. Philosophie et Culture: Actes du XVIIe congrès mondial de philosophie: Volume > 1
Judith G. García Cafferena Luis Lavelle 1883-1983, En el Centenario de su nacimiento: Devoto homenaje
7. Philosophie et Culture: Actes du XVIIe congrès mondial de philosophie: Volume > 1
Francisco Miró Quesada Concepto de Razón en Ortega
8. Philosophie et Culture: Actes du XVIIe congrès mondial de philosophie: Volume > 1
Leopoldo Zea Discurso en la clausura del Congreso mundial
9. Philosophie et Culture: Actes du XVIIe congrès mondial de philosophie: Volume > 2
Agustín Basave La determinación filosófica de la idea de cultura
10. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 19/20
Eduardo Pellejero J. L. Borges: Los Precursores de Kafka por una Historiografía Literaria no Historicista
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In a general way, the concept of forerunner is understood in the sense of someone who comes before another, preceding and announcing his coming; it is a category of history, its ascendant works from the past towards the future. The critic category that corresponds to it is that of “influence”. By 1951, J. L. Borges publishes a small article around certain singularities in Kafka’s work that claimed to reverse this perspective, rethinking the problem of forerunners in the dominion of literature history. Borges’s article strictly opposes to this classic conception of forerunner, almost like the nietzschean’s conception of history opposes to that of the German 19th century’s historicism. In Borges’s conception, history it’s not accomplished - it isn’t a result, a bill - , but it is played every moment, with every event. A text, an author, a work, sometimes just a new reading, are enough to realise an event able to completely resettle their essential relations. Retroactive effect of actuality over the past, the work puts in action a set of transformations that take place in literature history and are attributed to the works and the authors. In a sense, works and authors, as singularities, do not change, but became part of new series, of a new plan, of a new perspective; it is changed what it turns them exceptional, or minor, or simply irrelevant. It is in this sense that every writer create their forerunners - his labour changes our conception of the past as well as it will change the future’s - and that the historicist problem of influence can be replaced or fulfilled by a certain idea of resonance.
11. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 26
José Maria Zamora Calvo El Problema del “Quinto Cuerpo”: Plotino Crítico de Aristoteles (De Caelo I, 2-3)
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In the Treatise On the Heavens II, 1 [ 40 ], Plotinus rejects the explanation of Aristotle who, in De caelo I, 2-3, considers the “fifth body”, ether, the incorruptible matter of celestial bodies and heavens and, hence, different from the sub-lunar world’s four elementary bodies (fire, air, water and earth). Plotinus’ argument at tempts to found the kind of perpetuity which numerical identity implies -the identity which is proper of heavens and celestial bodies- on the harmony that reigns between their body and soul. This way, the Plotinian exeges is of the Aristotelian Treatise integrates the themes already raised in the Platonic Phaedrus and Timaeus. In this article I attempt to expound: 1 ) the concepts of perfection and the cosmological dualism in Aristotle, 2) the problem of the cosmos’ perpetuity, 3) the Plotinian search of a more satisfactory explanation, and 4) the theme of the two regions: sub-lunar and supra-lunar.
12. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 26
Tomás Calvo Martinez Un Excelente Comienzo
13. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 37
Sergio Rodero El Vínculo Sustancial y las Mónadas en Leibniz
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The substantial vinculum is for Leibniz the relation where the simple substances (monads) join to create a compound from which a collective substantiality arises, and it is not the simple addition of individuals substantialities. The vinculum is essential, determinant for the compound, but not for the simple thing. The connective thing turns definitive in the compound thing, so that the ontology of Leibniz bets strongly for the simple thing, for the individual thing, as update of the infinitesimal thing.
14. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 37
Gregor Sauerwald Kant Resucitado: Junto a un Renacimiento de Hegel en las Últimas Generaciones de la Teoría Crítica
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
En el contexto de la pregunta por el destino de la Teoría Crítica, la discusión entre Honneth y Habermas sobre el cambio en el paradigma de la Filosofía Política y Social con la tesis “de la comunicación al reco nocimiento” gira aquí en torno a una reconstrucción critica de la filosofía de Kant, un Kant ‘moderado’ en un modelo ‘explicativo’ o ‘hermenéutico’, y así ‘irrebasable’ del progreso moral, rompiendo su sistema, y un Kant ‘destrascendentalizado’, apto para fundamentar la necesidad de un diálogo entre la razón y la fe. ¿Por qué Kant y no Hegel, central este último para los dos filósofos alemanes en su superación de las aporías de la primera generación de la Teoria Critica? Pero ¿donde queda Marx, tan importante para los fundadores de la Escuela de Fráncfort? Y ¿no había exigido Habermas en 2009 con motivo del aniversarío de su discípulo, que Honneth, después de su viaje de Marx a Hegel, hiciera el necesario regreso? De tal maner a que en esta vuelta, Honneth trajera en su equipaje lo rescatable rescatado del Idealismo Alemán. Así la historia de la Teoría Critica queda inconclusa.
15. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 16 > Issue: 31
Fernando Aranda Fraga Evolución, Rupturas y Contramarchas en el Constructivismo Kantiano de John Rawls
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Starting in a paper where he defines his constructivist notion of morality (1980), Rawls begins - at least explicitly - to grow apart from Kant, one of his major mentors up to the moment, especially regarding that first original support given in A Theory of Justice. At the same time, he reveals himself as sympathizing with the political philosophy of John Dewey. In order to accomplish this microproject where he makes explicit the changes affecting his theory, he resorts to a reasoning based on the supposedly variants that, according to Rawls, are present in constructivism. Out of this new version of moral constructivism, he begins drifting apart from the rigorous Kantianism the first community voices had began to criticize in him in the 70’s.
16. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
Sergio Rodero Biología e Inteligencia Humana en Xavier Zubiri
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
El problema “biología e inteligencia”, considerado filosóficamente, forma parte de un problema más amplio, que provisionalmente podría denominarse “organismo y psiquismo” y debería ser tratado desde très puntos de vista distintos, mas estrechamente entrelazados: el de las acciones, el de la habitud-actividad y el de las estructuras. El terreno de los actos es el más aparente y se refiere a todo el enorme campo de las acciones del hombre - no distinguimos aquí entre actos y acciones- , que tejen la vida del ser humano; el terreno de las habitudes, y con él el de la actividad, es más profundo y alude al modo esencial de habérselas el ser humano consigo mismo y con lo que le circunda en las acciones que realiza; finalmente, el terre no de las estructuras es todavia más profundo - tan sólo en el sentido de más radical- y alude a aquellas realidades, de la índole que sean, por las que el hombre posee modos específicos de habérselas con las cosas y puede realizar determinadas acciones. En este trabajo nos vamos a ceñir lo más posible al problema “biologia e inteligencia” y al solar de las acciones y de las habitudes, dejando para otra ocasión el problema de las estructuras, que nos conduciría al planteamiento más englobante de “psique y organismo”. Por la unidad de los tres niveles y por la unidad de lo que es el ser humano y de lo que es su actividad, en ocasiones tocaremos aspectos que desbordan la “ inteligencia” y que desbordan también el nivel de las acciones y de la habitud.
17. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
Montserrat Bartolomé Luises La Crítica de Bruno en el Candelaio y los Dialoghi Italiani
18. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 35
María J. Binetti Kierkegaard: Entre los Primeros Románticos y Hegel
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The same criticism of unreal abstraction, and empty universality repeats from Hegel to romandes, and from Kierkegaard to them and to him. The current article aims at inquiring the conceptual consistence of that criticism, approaching the essential content of their thoughts, and finally setting forth a possible speculative continuity, which would extend from first Romanticism to Hegel, and from him to Kierkegaard, for coming at last even to us.
19. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 38
Lucas Díaz López El Uso Aristotélico de Variables en Lógica y sus Supuestos Ontológicos
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
A logical reading on Aristotle’s Organon discovers some inconsistencies in the text which have to be solved by reducing them to metaphysical decisions of the author, if they are not just identified as deficiencies in the exposition that should be corrected. The present article tries to display a line of reading paying attention to those so-called inconsistencies, in an attempt to understand them as specific steps in Aristotle’s research. In order to this goal it focuses on the exposition procedure of the Aristotelian figures: the use of variables, whose introduction by Aristotle has been celebrated all over logical tradition. An analysis of the distinctive and internal features in this procedure will allow us to link Aristotle’s logos research and the “being qua being” investigation, and to determine also - though in a negative way - the connection between this reading and the logical-traditional one on Aristotle’s Organon.
20. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 38
Nuria Sánchez Madrid La Distribución de la Naturaleza Humana en Temperamentos: Modos de Sentir y Ejercicio de la Libertad en la Antropología en Sentido Pragmático de Kant
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The article tackles with the role that Kantian notion of temperament plays within his theory of practical freedom. With this purpose, we will connect Kant’s approach to temperaments with the classical Greek approach to this principle of classification, in order to recognize in it the means to feel the passage of time and also the conditions of our relation to the world, that is, a physiological-empirical background for the exercise of freedom that, without being moral, shelter contents which reason will only try to reform, without expecting to silence it entirely. Our final goal is to extract relevant observations to answer adequately to Kant’s question What is Man?