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1. Heidegger Studies: Volume > 37
Nicoletta Cusano Sulla critica di Carnap al Nichts heideggeriano
2. Heidegger Studies: Volume > 37
Riccardo Berutti Omaggio a Emanuele Severino: un ritratto
3. Heidegger Studies: Volume > 38
Giacomo Borbone Rottura o continuità? Il «Platone» di Heidegger dal corso sul Sofista alla «svolta»
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Heidegger, in the writings of the so-called “turn” [Kehre] attributes to Plato a capital role in the history of philosophy, namely that of founder of metaphysics understood as the history of the oblivion of being. Yet, in his course on the Sophist (1924-25) Heidegger had not yet made such negative judgments. Is this double image of Plato that we can derive from Heideggerian writings the result of a rupture or is there perhaps a continuity? In this contribution I will show the continuity, even if it is accompanied by a rather critical judgment on Plato’s role as the founder of Western metaphysics.
4. Heidegger Studies: Volume > 39
Alberto Merzari Sulle soglie dell’apparente: l’ultimo Heidegger (1950–1976) lettore di Goethe
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The relevance of J.W. Goethe to Heidegger’s thinking still needs to be fully assessed: this is particularly true for the phase of Heidegger’s Denkweg following 1950, when by his own admission he started to re-valuate Goethe. The aim of this paper is to reconsider the late Heidegger’s (1950–1976) reading of Goethe in light of two recently published witnesses: 1) a brief comment on a few lines of Goethe’s Pandora in Notturno I (1954–1957) and 2) the selection of the manuscript Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage, issued as the 2011/12 Jahresgabe of the Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft under the title Auszüge zur Phänomenologie (1973–1975). After briefly recalling the events connected to the revaluation of Goethe in the 1950s (§1) as well as the altogether minimizing interpretations which have been given to it so far (§2), an attempt is made to demonstrate that the late Heidegger indeed experienced a growing connection to Goethe, notably as far as his way of seeing the phenomena is concerned. The paper first deals with Notturno I (§2a), where Goethe is judged to be to some extent sensible to the a-lethic movement of the Event, and then moves to the Auszüge (§2b), where Heidegger’s reformulation of phenomenology in terms of Phänomenophasis coincides with a new confrontation with Goethe’s Farbenlehre and in particular with Goethe’s notion of Urphänomen.
5. Heidegger Studies: Volume > 39
Gaetano Chiurazzi Origine della geometria e Origine dell’opera d’arte: riduzione, verità e storia in Husserl e Heidegger
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Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry and Heidegger’s The Origin of the Work of Art were surprisingly developed in parallel and deal with the same subject, the question of the origin: of a science, in one case, and of the artwork, in the other. From their comparison, the different conception that Husserl and Heidegger have of origin and truth clearly emerge. It concerns what Heidegger identified as the real point of his divergence from Husserl, when they tried to write the entry “Phenomenology” for the Encyclopaedia Britannica, namely the method of reduction. For Husserl, the reduction opens up a material content, an essence, which ensures the persistence of truth in historical transmission, beyond linguistic variability, as happens in geometry; for Heidegger, reduction brings to light the ontological and, we might say, grammatical condition of truth, that is, its being an event and giving rise to an original syntax, to a world. This is the function of the work of art, whose essence consists in its mere being-made, in its being, that is, a work: the actualization of a possibility.
6. Heidegger Studies: Volume > 39
Giuseppe Raciti Il tempo è raro. Una nota sulla struttura del Dasein heideggeriano
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This essay begins from the observation that a “theory of time” contradicts the Heideggerian intention to experience temporality based on a “pre-theoretical” condition and to emancipate it in this way from instances of the Western metaphysical discourse. Such a claim leads to the conclusion that Heidegger never elaborated a theory of time and therefore was never, strictly speaking, “a philosopher of time.” Thus, the necessary condition for releasing thought from the metaphysical mortgage would have to pass through the deconstruction of any “concept” intended to exhaust the nature of time. This gives rise to implications of varying intensity with respect to the structure and functions of Dasein. Most importantly, it concerns the tension between Entschlossenheit and Augenblick, on which Heidegger’s structure of Dasein depends.