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published on October 13, 2017
Christos Kyriacou
Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism
Between Gettier Cases and Saving Epistemic Appearances
I present an argument for a sophisticated version of sceptical invariantism that has so far gone unnoticed: Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism (BSI). I argue that it can, on the one hand, (dis)solve the Gettier problem and address the dogmatism paradox, and, on the other hand, show some due respect to the Moorean methodological incentive of ‘saving epistemic appearances.’ A fortiori, BSI promises to reap some other important explanatory fruit that I go on to adduce. BSI can achieve this much because it distinguishes between two distinct but closely interrelated (sub)concepts of (propositional) knowledge, fallible-but-safe knowledge and infallible-and-sensitive knowledge. I conclude that BSI is a novel theory of knowledge discourse that merits serious investigation.