

On Heraclitus' concept of λόγος

Theodoros Christidis¹, and Demetrius Athanassakis²
University of Thessalia

Our purpose in this paper is to bring about a new meaning of the term λόγος used in the fragments of Heraclitus' work. In ancient Greek literature this term has many different meanings³. We are going to restrict our interest in those meanings that Heraclitus used in his fragments, where the term λόγος appears ten times.

1. About the Meaning of λόγος

In our approach, the term λόγος has the meaning of the *communication* among the entities of the world, including particularly the one between nature and men. As it is evident from the following fragments, the λόγος is *what nature tells us and to what we should listen in order to approach knowledge*. But, it must be acknowledged that this meaning is enlarged and dressed with different nuances according to the context of the phrase, where the term λόγος appears. Let us examine the fragments, in which this primary meaning is manifest:

Fr. 1⁴ *Of the Logos⁽¹⁾ which is this⁵ always men prove to be uncomprehending both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it. For although all things happen according to this Logos⁽²⁾, they [men] are like people of no experience, even when they experience such words and deeds as I explain, when I distinguish each thing according to its constitution and declare how it is; but the rest of men fail to notice what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do asleep⁶.*

In this fragment we encounter the term Logos twice, with meanings which are slightly differentiated; so we label Logos by different signs as Logos⁽¹⁾ and Logos⁽²⁾. In the first case the meaning *could* be primarily the discourse of Heraclitus himself⁷, when we take into account the phrase

καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι
καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον

but on this issue we rather agree with Kirk⁸, who considers this meaning too restricted. Thus, taking into account fr. 50

Οὐκ ἔμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας
ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστὶν
ἐν πάντα εἶναι

we must accept that the meaning of λόγος is *what nature tells us*. The λόγος of nature is ubiquitous and exists from the very beginning of the cosmos. Men are in continuous contact with nature and are continuously listening to her λόγος. But many of them are not capable of understanding and interpreting this λόγος and consequently they are unable to communicate with nature. And although all things (and processes) are becoming according to this λόγος, many of them do not succeed in understanding it, as fr. 72 declares: *And in particular with what they are in continuous contact, they are departing from it*⁹. And that, with which they are in continuous contact, is conspicuously the λόγος of nature.

In the case of *Logos*⁽²⁾ the meaning is complemented by adding that what nature tells us constitutes the laws, according to which nature functions. This is the meaning of the expression '*all things happen according to this Logos*'.

It is evident that Heraclitus has grasped the general plan of nature's function and this is due to the fact that he himself has listened to the λόγος of nature; so, he has *experienced such words and deeds as he explains them, when he distinguishes each thing according to its constitution and declares how it is*. This distinction between Heraclitus – and more generally the true philosophers¹⁰ – and the many (the asleep, the unawake) is given in many fragments, as e.g. fr. 2, fr. 17, fr. 34 and fr. 89. We cite fr. 34: *the unwise after having listened (to the λόγος) seem to be deaf; the maxim testifies for them that 'although they are present, they really are absent'*¹¹. The expression '*after having listened (to the λόγος)*' supports our opinion that the λόγος is what nature says and to what we should listen. More emphatically this is stressed in fr. 50: *listening not to me but to the logos it is wise to agree that all things are one*¹². Here our emphasis is on the verb *listen*. We must listen to the logos of nature. But how is nature to 'speak' to us? Does she disclose herself to us explicitly? The answer is *no*. Heraclitus says this straight off: *nature likes to hide herself* (fr. 123)¹³. She hides herself, but not completely. Fr. 93 is an allegory, where Heraclitus mentioning the king of Delphi, Apollo, is referring to nature: *the lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither speaks out nor conceals but gives signs*¹⁴.

Because of this characteristic of nature, it is very difficult, even for the philosophers, to achieve knowledge. As nature speaks only 'like an oracle', giving

some signs about her, the philosopher who communicates with her can take only some *grains of knowledge*, as fr. 22 suggests in a beautiful metaphor: *those who search for gold dig much earth and find little*¹⁵. Heraclitus' epistemology goes further to acknowledge that *'an unapparent harmony is better than an apparent one'*¹⁶ (fr. 54), and that *'if you do not expect the unexpected you will not find it, because it is unexplored and without passage'*¹⁷ (fr. 18). The history of science confirms this view of the Ephesian.

2. Listening to the Logos

To sum up and to strengthen further our view on the meaning of λόγος as *what nature tells us, communicates to us*, we name all the fragments, in which we encounter the verb ἀκούω (hear or listen, as in frs. 1, 34, 50, 19), or some others in which we encounter verbs with similar meaning, such as ἐγκυρεῖσι (meet with, as in fr. 17), μαθόντες (learned, as in fr. 17), ὁμιλοῦσι (have constant intercourse, as in fr. 72).

Fr. 1 *Of the Logos which is this always men prove to be uncomprehending both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it.*

Fr. 50 *Listening not to me but to the Logos it is wise to agree that all things are one.*

Fr. 34 *The unthinking, having heard are like the deaf; of them does the saying bear witness that they are absent when present.*

Fr. 19 *Knowing not how to listen they don't know how to speak.*

Fr. 17 *The many do not think correctly of such things as those they meet with, nor they understand having learned, but they have private understanding.*

Fr. 72 *In particular, with what they are in continuous contact, they are departing from it. [Or in another rendering: Although they have constant intercourse with the Logos, men keep setting themselves against it.]*


It is noteworthy that in many cases the use of the verb ἀκούω is mostly metaphoric¹⁸. It has been said that fr. 93 probably refers to what Heraclitus says in his book. But, it is almost certain that the lord of the oracle in Delphi is a metonymy of nature herself, or, we could conjecture that he is an *intermediate fictitious figure* introduced by Heraclitus in order to give an explicit example of how nature communicates with men; how she transmits her signs to us, signs that convey information relative to her functioning. The conclusion is that all of these signs, messages, and informations are subjected, by nature, to restrictions akin to those adopted by an oracle. This is Heraclitus' strong conviction; it is reflected in the style of his mode of expression: he certainly uses an oracle-like style. Thereof results his dense, comprehensive, ambiguous some-times, dark in

many cases expression, because of which he has been given the nickname of *σκοτεινός*, and also of *αἰνικτής*.

Today, we know that in nature every interaction between her different parts or entities (from the galaxies to the elementary particles) corresponds to the exchange of information. With the development of the information theory during the last decades it has been accepted that the gathering or the transmission of information is the nodal point, the key, with the help of which physicists are capable of understanding situations and processes, which were incomprehensible to common sense. Now it became possible to give answers to questions of contemporary physics, which until now remained well hidden enigmas or had been characterized as paradoxes¹⁹.

We have seen that Apollo is a mythical model mediating the process by which nature discloses her secrets to men. Heraclitus was able to understand and deepen into this process. He has learned this lesson from gathering information observing the *words and deeds* of nature (as he must have *listened to her* and *talked with her* for many years). And also he probably had met one of the prophets of the god Apollo, a Sibyl living in the environs of Erythraea (in Ionia, near Ephesus), and has become acquainted with her style. Thus, when he writes in fr. 92 about how Sibyl gives her prophecy, he probably has identified himself with the prophet – he has applied in his style of writing and speaking the prophet's style and faculty to give messages. Now, Heraclitus fr. 92 says: *Sibyl with raving mouth utters things mirthless, unadorned and unperfumed words and reaches out over a thousand years with her voice thanks to god*.

Thus, we could draw a scheme, which would represent the circle of Heraclitus' ideas about the communication of men with nature.



Let's draw a square, as above, and name its vertexes with N, for nature, Aπ, for Apollo, Σ-Hq for Sibyl and Heraclitus and Av for men. This drawing represents the hypothesis: (a) that nature has taught Apollo how to meditate his words-oracles; (b) that Sibyl and Heraclitus follow the lesson and the mediation of Apollo in

order to communicate their Logos to man; (c) that Heraclitus following Sibyl's style – and thus Apollo's and eventually nature's style of communication – tells man how to *listen to and understand* his words, and how to learn to understand nature's utter-ances; (d) finally, the drawing shows the mutual dialogue between nature and man, a dialogue that Heraclitus expected to be realized.

3. Λόγος, σοφόν, γνώμη

There is a broader and more general meaning of λόγος, which is expressed in fr. 41: *wisdom is one thing: to be skilled in true judgment, how all things are steered through all*²⁰. What is implied here is that, if we understand the logos of nature, we shall be acquainted with this universal law, that *all things are steered through all*. This seems to be one of the most ingenious ideas of Heraclitus, which was not until now appreciated to the degree it deserves. It means that not only does nature communicate with us, men, but her function and all processes in her are governed through the mutual interaction of everything with everything. And this must be the broader meaning of the λόγος. Of course, it is important to notice that, although the word λόγος is not included in this fragment, it nevertheless is present via the words σοφόν and γνώμην. It has been proved that the σοφόν is identified with logos; and ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην means to be acquainted with λόγος. There is also the verb κυβερνᾶται, which is also used in fr. 64 *'thunderbolt steers all things'*²¹. As of many fragments, this one has also problems and many arguments have been made in supporting the different opinions. We rather agree with Kirk, who says that "thunderbolt is simply a symbol for fire, and that Heraclitus means only to assert that fire (and not Zeus, or the deity, or fate) steers all things, in the sense of 'is responsible for the way in which all things behave'"²². Thus, in one fragment we have that *all things are steered through all* (fr. 41) and in another fragment Heraclitus, if he should care for consistency, should say the same thing, that is that *all things are steered through thunderbolt*; thus, thunder- bolt must be the mediating agent of the interactions of *all things with all*.

4. Λέγειν - λόγος

We should here come again to the point raised by Kirk concerning the meaning of logos. Kirk points out: "Now the root λεγ- basically implies 'picking out' or 'choosing'; from this comes the sense 'reckoning' and so 'measure' and 'proportion'. This group of meanings is at least as primary as the sense of 'account' or 'discourse' taken as basic by Zeller... A further development, either directly from 'reckoning' or by way of 'measure' and 'proportion' leads to the sense of 'systematic formula', thence 'plan' and even 'law' (as, for example, in 'physical laws')"²³. Thus, we may

sum up the meanings of λόγος we have already mentioned, beginning from the more general one and going to the more specific: (a) λόγος is the means of communication of all things in the cosmos; (b) thus, λόγος is what nature says to us in our communication with her; (c) λόγος also comprises the plan or the law, according to which the cosmos, everything in the universe, behaves; (d) λόγος, accordingly, defines the measures that all processes must obey in order that the universe functions in the manner we see it or we find in rationally examining the most hidden harmonies in it²⁴.

Ξυνός λόγος

We now come to another characteristic of the term λόγος which is that it is *common* (ξυνός, κοινός). This term ξυνός, even if it is not accompanied by the λόγος, must be read as a metonymy of λόγος, as is the case also for the term *divine* (θεῖον), which has the meaning of the λόγος of nature²⁵. Let us cite the fr. 114+2: *Those who speak with sense must rely on what is common to all, as a city must rely on its law, and with much greater reliance; for all the laws of men are nourished by one law, the divine law; for it has as much power as it wishes and is sufficient for all and is still left over. Therefore it is necessary to follow the common* (that is the universal; for common means universal, comments Sextus Empiricus); *but although the Logos is common the many live as though they had a private understanding*.

Here we have to make two remarks: First, we stress the fact that λόγος is common to all things, to the cosmos as well as to human life and works; that is Heraclitus “connects ‘knowledge of being’ with ‘insight into human values and conduct’ and makes the former include the latter”²⁶. And second, not all men are aware of this fact, so *‘they have a private understanding’*.

In considering the first point, we have to combine the three fragments 114, 50 and 101; the latter is of paramount importance: *I searched myself*. The Delphic *know yourself*, to which it seems that Heraclitus responds in fr. 101, expresses this view, that all men should *search themselves* in order to find the limits to their efforts to understand the cosmos, including the human affairs. Thus, λόγος, as common to all existing entities, is also the means by which human consciousness tries to transform every information into knowledge, giving, at the same time, meaning to the concepts used and also manifesting its intention: that is, human consciousness *collects and selects*²⁷ ‘apophatically’, that is negatively, the wrong thing and sets ends, targets. By doing these operations, the human mind, or *psyche*, functions in accordance with the universal λόγος, and from this point of view *‘whichever route you follow you could not find the limits of psyche; so deep is its logos* (fr. 45).

But fr. 101 does not mean that, in order to find the *universal logos*, one has the one and only possibility to search inside himself. If this was the only route to grasp the *logos*, that is the universal law, then why has Heraclitus told us in fr. 55 that '*from all things of which I have sight, hearing, learning I prefer them all*', that is that he trusts his senses – of course under the restriction that the man of whom he speaks in this fragment is a philosopher, as we have already seen. It is obvious, in considering this fragment with fr. 45 and 115 (*the logos of soul is extending itself*), that one could trace the route of Heraclitus thought by saying that: from the self awareness one should proceed to the critique of the data of experience²⁸ and then search for the *logos*, which is common to all. In doing so one finds that the *logos of soul* is ever increasing, and that this *logos is very deep*.

Considering the second remark, that the many do not understand the *λόγος* of nature, Heraclitus insists in repeating this point in many fragments²⁹. This Heraclitus' persistent reference to these men, who cannot communicate with nature and understand her properly, combined with fr. 49, in which it is said that *the one* (the awake) *counts for me more than ten thousand men* (the many, the asleep, the unawake) has led many to reproach Heraclitus of being an eclectic, who disdains the many to the point of characterizing him as a misanthrope³⁰. This is a total misunderstanding of Heraclitus' spirit. Fr. 49 means that true philosophers or men of politics or lawmakers have a higher level of critical intelligence, of which Heraclitus had expressed his opinion in fr. 33³¹, 39³², and 121³³, in contrast to the ignorance of the many. But that does not mean that every man could not achieve some higher level of critical spirit, provided he would try hard and use his intellectual abilities. This fact is pointed out in the following fragments: fr. 113 *the ability of thinking is common to all men*; fr. 112 *rational thinking is the greatest virtue, and wisdom is saying the truth and behaving according to the nature, as it is proper for those who have know-ledge*; fr. 116 *every man has the ability to know himself and think rationally*; and fr. 115 *the logos that accretes by itself belongs to psyche*. The meaning of all of them is that: (1) The ability to think is common to everyone, regardless of where he comes from; what hinders the many to think rightly is their negligence or indifference or unconcern to try to improve themselves, and also their prejudices, their habits and routine life, etc. (2) Having the common ability to think, one has to acknowledge the virtue of the rational thinking, which gives us the possibility to reach wisdom, that is the truth about the cosmos, and pronounce this truth and behave according to the nature. (3) Rational thinking is common to all men, and it is expressed through our thoughts and acts; a condition for true knowledge is the Delphic dictum: *know yourself*. (4) Approaching the *logos* is a long process, which accumulates knowledge about the world, and this is the ability of the fiery soul³⁴.

Notes

¹ Professor Emeritus, University of Thessaly, Greece.

² PhD in History and Philosophy of Science, University of Thessaly.

³ See, e.g., in W.K.C. Guthrie, *The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans*, Cambridge University Press, 1962, reprinted in 1980, pp. 419-424.

⁴ The fragments' translation is taken from the book of G.S. Kirk, *Heraclitus, The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge University Press, 1962. In some cases we will change some words and in other cases we give our translation, which will be mentioned properly.

⁵ Kirk adds the words *as I describe it*.

⁶ Τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν οἰκᾶσι πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγέσμαι κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅπως ἔχει· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγεγρόντες ποιοῦσιν ὁκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὐδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.

⁷ As Burnet held it. But, as Kirk points out: "This view, in all its simplicity, has not won acceptance for the good reason that in fr. 50, where plainly the same kind of λόγος is under discussion, λόγος is formally distinguished from the speaker: *Οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας*. However, if λόγος could mean not only the book or, better, the discourse of Heraclitus, but also the content of this discourse, then a valid contrast could be made between Heraclitus himself and the λόγος".

⁸ Kirk cites the views of (a) Snell, that the logos is *Heraclitus' meaning*, transmitted through the medium of his words, and his meaning is also the meaning which he sees in things, (b) Hölscher, who developed Snell's idea by saying that the paradoxical truth about things is deliberately reproduced in Heraclitus' 'oracular response', (c) Gigon who took it to mean 'the truth in things as revealed by my (Heraclitus') book', (d) Gomperz who wrote of the community of man and nature at this period, [but, according to Kirk] he may have been taking too much for granted. Kirk, on this community between nature and man, says that "it is clear that Heraclitus considered his discovery to affect all things directly, including man". Finally, on this issue of the meaning of logos, Kirk points out: "In fact, although Snell's contention is attractive, I do not believe that there is necessarily any reference implied by the word λόγος in fr. 1 or any other extant fragment to the actual words of teaching of Heraclitus; and even if there is, it is clearly the meaning of this teaching, the objective sense, which it is important to examine". Cf. Kirk, op. c., pp. 36-8.

⁹ Our translation. The Greek text is: *ὃ μάλιστα διηγεκῶς ὁμιλοῦσι, τούτῳ διαφέρονται*.

¹⁰ The true philosophers, according to Heraclitus, are those men who are awake and have not *barbaric souls*. In fr. 55 and 101a he is referring to the senses: *Ὀκόσων*

ὄψις ἀκοὴ μάθησις, ταῦτα ἐγὼ προτιμέω and ὀφθαλμοὶ τῶν ὥτων ἀκριβέστεροι μάρτυρες. But, in fr. 107 he explains when the senses cannot be reliable: κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων. In fr. 35 he stresses on this point: it is absolutely necessary that the men who are dealing with the research of many (things, phenomena, etc) must be philosophers (χρὴ γὰρ εὖ μάλα πολλῶν ἱστορίας φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας εἶναι).

¹¹ ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν εἰκάσι· φάτις αὐτοῖσιν μαρτυρεῖ παρεόντας ἀπεῖναι.

¹² οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφὸν ἐστὶν ἐν πάντα εἶναι.

¹³ φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ. Kirk translates it as follows: *the real constitution of things is accustomed to hide itself*.

¹⁴ ὁ ἄναξ οὗ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει.

¹⁵ χρυσὸν γὰρ οἱ διζήμενοι γῆν πολλὴν ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὐρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον. This fragment combined with fr. 93 (on the Delphi oracle) and fr. 123 (*nature likes to hide herself*) poses an epistemological problem as to what point *truth or absolute knowledge* of the workings of nature could be grasped by men. The same problem had been brought up by Xenophanes in his fr. B 34, which Popper characterizes ‘so critical, so self-critical, so correct and so true’:

Καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὐ τις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται
εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,
αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε δόκος ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

Which, according to Popper, should be translated as follows:

But as for certain truth, no man has known it,
Nor will he know it; neither of the gods
Nor yet of all the things of which I speak.
And even if by chance he were to utter
The perfect truth, he would himself not know it;
For all is but a woven web of guesses.

Ref. Karl R. Popper, *The World of Parmenides, Essays on the Presocratics Enlightenment*, Ed. By A.F. Petersen, Routledge, London, 1998, p. 46.

¹⁶ ἁρμονίῃ ἀφανῆς φανερῆς κρέσσων. (The translation in English is ours).

¹⁷ ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπηται ἀνέλπιστον οὐκ ἐξευρήσει, ἀνεξερευνήτον ἐὼν καὶ ἄπορον

¹⁸ If, for example, we have our eyes shut, we can realize by listening to the whisper of the leaves that we are in a wood – in this case nature gives us information, which we *hear* literally. But, we mostly gather information by using our sight, and in this case the use of the verb *listen* is metaphoric.

¹⁹ One of the strangest effects in physics is the phenomenon of superposition: how can an object take two mutually contradictory choices? E.g., how can a photon be spin up and spin down at the same time? The answer has to do with information; the act of gathering and transmitting information is where scientists found the key to understanding the unsettling and counterintuitive idea of superposition.

²⁰ ἔν το σοφόν ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ὅκη κυβερνᾶται πάντα διὰ πάντων.

²¹ τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει κεραυνός.

²² Kirk, op. c., p. 356.

²³ Kirk, op. c., p. 38.

²⁴ We should at this point refer to a paper of Prof. N. Georgopoulos (*Heidegger, Heraclitus and Logos*, published in the collection of Papers read at the 2nd International Philosophy Symposium organized by the Greek Philosophical Society, May 1984). In this paper Prof. Georgopoulos refers to the meaning Heidegger had given to the word λόγος: "[t]he meaning of λέγειν is not exhausted by or limited to 'saying'. Its original meaning is such... that he [Heidegger] can support his conviction that it is not λόγος that is derived from language, but the other way around: language in its essence is determined by λόγος. For λέγειν, even when it is taken as saying, has an even more original meaning enfolded in it [the meaning of 'laying'] either in the sense of 'laying before' or in the sense of 'laying down'. To lay... means to bring to lie. As such, it also means to put one thing next to another, to lay things side by side, to bring things together. So lay means to gather or to collect... Λέγειν then for Heidegger is letting-beings-lie-together-before, letting beings show themselves. In short, λέγειν lets beings be... then λόγος is none other than this assemblage (Sammlung)... In this fashion λόγος occurs essentially as the pure laying which gathers and assembles... In brief and in simpler terms, λόγος is the source from which the activity of gathering originates... [Then] Heidegger turns to Heraclitus 'ἐν πάντα'. Πάντα refers to τὰ ὄντα, beings... Πάντα is what λόγος, as the laying that gathers, discloses. On the other hand and at the same time, in so far as λόγος gathers all beings, letting-them-lie-before us in disclosure, λόγος is the ἔν, the One, the Unique One that unifies τὰ πάντα. If ἐν and πάντα form a unity, so do ἐν πάντα and λόγος. ἐν πάντα says what λόγος is. Λόγος says how ἐν πάντα essentially occurs. Both are the same... In other words (Heidegger) identifies λόγος with being... It is being that determines the essence of language... If language in its essence is not significant vocalization, if speaking is not sound that expresses meaning, then clearly *hearing* too cannot be what it has been usually taken to mean, namely the perception of that sound. For Heidegger, hearing essentially is heeding, being attentive, more precisely it is an attentive, a gathered hearkening. Hearing comes to be in this attentive heeding. We hear not when we merely listen with our ears, nor when we remain on the level of acoustics. We hear not when we hear the sound of the word. We truly hear when we are all ears, when our attentiveness is such that it becomes part of what is spoken. 'We have heard', Heidegger says, 'when we belong to the matter addressed'. Λόγος, man's speech is not a primordial phenomenon. Rather it presupposes the original letting-lie-together-before, it presupposes a primordial unconcealment, a presence. What human language does is to allow to lie before us what is *already* present... The source of language is the correspondence of mortal λέγειν with the λέγειν of λόγος. It is this that Heraclitus points to in his exhortation to listen not to me but to the λόγος. [And Prof. Georgopoulos concludes by remind us that in his essay] Heidegger does not hold that his views in his search for the original meaning of λόγος coincide with those of Heraclitus". We should stress at this point Heidegger's opinion about the meaning of *hearing*, which seems to support our interpretation of this verb in Heraclitus' fragments.

²⁵ In the Presocratics' philosophy, the divine, τὸ θεῖον, is what has no beginning and no end, the eternal. This view is first attributed to Thales of Miletus.

²⁶ This is Jaeger's conclusion on the meaning of the word *phronesis*, and it is referred in Kirk, *ibid.*, p. 61.

²⁷ The verb λέγω, from which the term λόγος is produced, has the primary meaning of *collect, select for myself, place among, include*; and, of course, the common meaning of *say, talk, tell, expo-se, call, name, assert, maintain*.

²⁸ Experience includes not only what we learn from our senses, but also everything else we learn from what we hear or read; see, e.g., fr. 108: *from all discourses I have heard no one reaches this, to know that the wise is separated from all*.

²⁹ We shall cite here the relevant fragments: fr. 2 has already been given (*Therefore it is necessary to follow the common; but although the Logos is common the many live as though they had a private understanding*); fr. 17: *the many do not understand these things, (that is, what the logos of nature says to them), which they encounter, neither after having learned them they know them, but they form their own views (οὐ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα οἱ πολλοί, ὁκόσοι ἐγκυρεῦσιν, οὐδὲ μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι)*; fr. 34 (already cited): *the unwise after having listened (to the λόγος) seem to be deaf; the maxim testifies for them that 'although they are present, they really are absent'*; and fr. 89: *to the awake the world is one and common, but each of the asleep turn to their own world*.

³⁰ See in Diog. Laert., IX 1-17: "... μεγαλόφρων δὲ γέγονε παρ' ὄντιναοῦν καὶ ὑπερόπτης... καὶ τέλος μισανθρωπήσας καὶ ἐκπατήσας ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι διητᾶτο..."

³¹ νόμος καὶ βουλὴ πείθεσθαι ἐνός.

³² ἐν Πριήνῃ Βίᾳς ἐγένετο ὁ Τευτάμεω, οὗ πλείων λόγος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων.

³³ ἄξιον Ἐφεσίοις ἠβηδὸν ἀπάγξασθαι πᾶσι... οἵτινες Ἑρμόδωρον ἄνδρα ἑωυτῶν ὀνήμιστον ἐξέβαλον φάντες· ἡμέων μὴδὲ εἰς ὀνήμιστος ἔστω, εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλη τε καὶ μετ' ἄλλων.

³⁴ Conf. to fr. 118: *the dry soul is the wisest and the finest*.