

FROM THE HISTORY OF POLISH PHILOSOPHY

DIALECTICS AND HUMANISM

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MAIN DIRECTIONS OF POLISH PHILOSOPHY *

The beginning of philosophical research in Poland dates from the end of the XV century. The Polish philosophy from the Renaissance period has to its credit more than one important achievement, highly appreciated in that period, also abroad. This philosophy is connected with the first period of the blossoming of the Cracow Jagiellonian University. Two outstanding commentators of the Aristotelian and mediaeval logic lived in Cracow at the end of the XV century. Not only in their interpretations, but in certain critical remarks they showed an independence of thought and maturity, worthy of attention.

The first of them, Jan from Głogów, published, among other things *Exercitum novae logicae* and *Exercitum super omnes tractatus parvorum logicalium Petri Hispani*. The second, Michał from Wrocław, issued the *Introductorium dyalecticae quod congestum logicum apellatur*. They were both professors at the Cracow University and had their disciples and successors.

Sebastian Petrycy from Pilsen (1554—1627), the first philosopher writing in Polish, lived and worked in Cracow in the second half of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th century. He mainly dealt with Aristotle, whose *Ethics*, *Politics* and *Economy* he translated into Polish (1618). He presented his own philosophical views, as it was the custom at that time, in the form of commentaries to Aristotle's practical publications. It is worthwhile to emphasize in this connection that in his epistemological reflections he put a stress on the value of experience and of the inductive method.

Also another philosopher of that time, Adam Burski (1560—1611), besides Jakub Górski (1525—2583), was a representative of revived stoicism in Poland. In his work, published in 1604, entitled *Dialectica Ciceronis* he came out in favour of empirism and put forth the postulate to use the inductive method in natural sciences — even before Bacon. Finally, attention should be drawn to the rather rich philosophical-political literature of that period. In this connection of particular interest are two authors: Jan Ostroróg (1431—1501) and Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski (1503—1572). Ostroróg published in 1477 *Monumentum pro reipublicae ordinatione*, in which work he called for a reform of the state in the

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modern sense, outpacing in different questions Machiavelli whom he preceded by a whole generation.

The further development of Polish philosophy was adversely affected by the long struggle between protestantism and catholicism, the latter finally prevailed owing to the influence of the Society of Jesus only during the reign of Zygmunt III (1587—1632). The Jesuits were oppressing free thought for a long time, not only at the Cracow University, where they held a strong position, but also in numerous other academies and colleges, both in the domains of religion and philosophy. As a result, Polish philosophy lost contact with the modern thought developing vigorously at that time and reverted to scholastics in its degenerated form. Also other important circumstances — such as for example wars lasting for more than 70 years (1648—1721) the internal political decay, the diminution of the dynamics of the Polish spirit (*die Verminderung der Spannkraft der Polnischen Geistes*) — seriously impeded the development of philosophy.

The influence of the outlived scholastics was broken down only about the middle of the 18th century. In this connection, perhaps the most decisive was the activity of Stanislaw Konarski (1700—1773), although his philosophical works considered within the whole of his literary achievements, are rather of secondary importance. In connection with this, new interests in modern philosophy came to light. Contact was established anew with West European philosophy. Translations of foreign philosophers appeared in print, there were travels abroad in order to study under the care of outstanding philosophers, finally attempts were made to gain a Polish audience for philosophy through the medium of Polish writings. Naturally, one referred to the philosophy of the Enlightenment Age prevailing at that time.

At first the philosophy of Wolff was introduced, followed by the ideas of Leibniz. Soon, however, under the influence of Condillac, the French philosophy prevailed and along the route the English empiricism, particularly Locke, and later the Scottish school. The influence of Kant also became noticeable. In this connection, the philosophical writings of the Sniadecki brothers are of an educational value. Both were serious, independent researchers. The older of them Jan Śniadecki (1756—1820) was a mathematician and astronomer, while the younger one, Jędrzej Śniadecki (1768—1838), was a natural scientist. They both dealt, however, with philosophical problems and exercised in this field a long lasting and dominating influence. Jan Śniadecki, in a work entitled *Philosophy of the Human Mind* (1819), engaged in a rather critical approach to Kant and was severely attacking metaphysics. At the same time, however, he accepted Kant's thesis that science refers only to phenomena; on the other hand he formulated himself an idea of "good" metaphysics, whose task would be to work out the most general problems arising from scientific cognition and which thereby would be based on experience — a conception which was later on put to the fore also in other countries.

Jędrzej Śniadecki on the other hand, in his work *On the Uncertainty of Judgments and Sciences Built on Experience* (1799) — undergoes a visible influence of Kant, glorifying the *Critique of Pure Reason* and, in its spirit putting intellectual cognition higher than experience. At the same time, and in a very significant manner, he points to the

dangers implied by a purely empirical factor of natural sciences and postulates the necessity of critical account of experience, in which he appears as a predecessor of some foreign philosophers of the 19th century. Next he makes a distinct turn in the direction of the Scottish school.

Several outstanding followers of Kant also act in the first decades of the 19th century (for example J. Szaniawski, F. Jaronski), as well as two Germans Voigt and Abicht who worked for some time in Poland. Criticism, however, never played a leading role in Polish philosophy.

A distinct change in Polish philosophy took place during the lifetime of the Śniadecki brothers. The works of writers of German idealism (Hegel and also partly Schelling and Fichte) were eagerly read, and numerous outstanding persons travelled to Germany to see its main representatives. For several dozen years, the German idealism had won a decisive influence on Polish philosophy. The period of idealism began in Poland later than in Germany and lasted longer, almost until the 1870's. Some epigones of idealism, for example the well known researcher into the works of Plato and messianist Wincenty Lutosławski, are exerting their influence in Poland to this very day.

Characteristic for this period is the appearance of many outstanding philosophical individualities, such as for example J. Hoene-Wroński (1778—1853), J. Goluchowski (1797—1858), J. Kremer (1806—1875) and A. Cieszkowski (1814—1894). They have been also called in Poland "Polish Messianists", for the so-called Messianic thought played in all the systems of the above mentioned philosophers an important role, particularly as regards Hoene-Wroński. In opposition to the Śniadecki brothers they were neither natural scientists (only Hoene-Wroński was at the same time a mathematician), nor professional philosophers. All of them obtained a humanistic education and took up an appropriate attitude.

Besides, characteristic for all Polish idealists was the system manner of philosophizing. Almost every one of them was building his own philosophical system, may it be said without elaborating for it a broader monographical basis. Points of departure for these systems were supplied by German idealists. The conceptual apparatus also stemmed from them for the major part. In spite of that, all the Polish idealists endeavoured to go beyond the German idealistic philosophy, and even to overcome it at various points. As a result none of the above mentioned philosophers was for example a Hegelian in the strict sense of the word. The manner in which the German idealism was transformed in Poland is characteristic for the entire Polish idealism, despite the differences between individual systems. Religious faith played an important role in the shaping of these systems, namely faith remaining generally within the framework of Christianity. As a result, almost everywhere came into being a distinctly theistic *Weltanschauung*. The notion of God replaced the Hegelian idea and occupied the central position. This led to far reaching transformations of Hegel's thinking within individual systems. Secondly, it was endeavored everywhere to overcome Hegel's rationalism or at least to supplement it in most various manners. Namely, almost everywhere the tendency appeared to emphasize the role of feeling and will both in cognition and the attitude of man towards the world. Thirdly, all Polish idealists introduced into system

constructions national elements, particularly the problem of the peculiarity of the Polish national character, the problem of the fate and exceptional mission of the Polish nation in the development of mankind, particularly in the creation of a true and absolute philosophy. On the one hand this led to a specific historiosophy and on the other hand to the so-called Polish Messianism (for example in the works of Hoene-Wroński) according to whom the Polish nation would be the Messiah of nations and destined to save humanity by its sufferings. This Messianism comes to the fore, even abstracting from philosophy, also in the Polish romantic literature. But one should not consider the latter as philosophy, as we are prone to do frequently, for it is only an expression of poetic phantasy and poetic faith, but not philosophic theory. Another matter is the fact that in purely philosophical matters pertaining to Messianism the border line between philosophical research and personal faith and feelings of the philosopher is almost completely effaced. Responsible for this are not only the spirit of the epoch, but also the conditions in which Polish philosophy had to develop in those times. Outstanding philosophical personalities emerged at a time — with resulting certain insufficiencies in the shaping of notions and scientific experience. The magnitude of individual world outlooks and metaphysical theories could not therefore satisfy the severe requirements of creating notions and leadership. May it be said that similar phenomena appeared at that time not only in Polish philosophy. As in other countries, this has influenced also in Poland negatively the further development of philosophy. A regression set in everywhere.

The general spiritual atmosphere in Poland began to change following the defeat of the uprising against Russia in 1863. At the time when the most outstanding, old representatives of the Polish idealism were still alive, acting for the most part in the spirit of their respective systems, both in Polish literature and in political milieu, a divorce had come about from the spirit of romanticism. The west European empiricism and positivism began to gain an ever growing impact. A distinct literary movement came into being, called the "Warsaw positivism". It was connected with a return to natural sciences, to a historiography oriented in a positivist manner (particularly in Cracow), with the putting forth of a programme of "organic work" in the political and social domain. The Polish idealistic philosophy became alien to the thinking of that time. In connection with this an unpropitious climate for philosophy prevailed at that time, although the works of philosophers such as J. Stuart Mill and Spencer were diligently studied at that time. Thus, the Warsaw positivism had few followers, engaged in purely philosophical research. J. Ochorowicz was one of the most important among them (1850—1917) who came forth with a positivist programme already in the seventies'. However, his positivism differed in several essential points from the thought of Comte. In particular, he did not share Comte's opinions as regards internal experience and psychology. This is understandable owing to the fact that Ochorowicz himself was distinctly interested in psychological problems and devoted himself entirely later on to that science.

Among other positivists may we also mention Krupinski, A. Eger, and also the leaders of the literary positivism: A. Świętochowski and P. Chmielowski. The general philosophical atmosphere of this period (the 1870's and 1880's left an impact on quite a number of philosophizing

natural scientists; all of them assumed a positivist attitude, that is more precisely an empirical attitude, just as it occurred in other countries. The philosophizing physician, W. Biegański (1857—1917), who in later years devoted himself entirely to philosophy and who rendered great services in laying the foundations of the philosophy of medicine and medical cognition, also stemmed from these circles. It may be said in this connection that his influence belongs to a later period of Polish philosophy. Neither the activities of H. Struve (1840—1912) should be underestimated, who, as a professor at the Russian university in Warsaw, made a great contribution to the philosophical culture in Poland. His numerous and well written works are, however, of a rather eclectic character. All this period, taken as a whole, was rather a transitional period.

At any rate, this period shaped in the coming generation of professional philosophers, beginning their activity in the nineties', a reluctance to great, ill founded or not founded metaphysical systems, or a longing for philosophy fulfilling the requirement of scientific discipline. The postulate of "philosophy as an exact science" would be raised more and more frequently from various sides also in the nineties'. Thus for example it was done in Cracow by Stefan Pawlicki (1839—1916), in Warsaw by Adam Mahrburg (1860—1913), who was known as a connoisseur of Greek philosophy and an adherent of Neo-Kantianism, finally in Lwów by Kazimierz Twardowski (born in 1866).

Twardowski, a pupil of Franz Brentano and once Privatdozent in Vienna, and then in the years 1895—1931 professor of the Lwów University, unfolded in Lwów a very lively and most effective activity in the field of pedagogics. In the course of only a few years he created there a big philosophical research centre which was constantly gaining in importance, and was predominant in Poland in the first decades of the 20th century. Twardowski educated several generations of independently working philosophers who are today teaching at numerous Polish universities. Naturally, part of them are following other ways than his.

The extraordinary significance of Twardowski consisted in the fact that he did in fact outline in a certain sense a new period of the Polish philosophy. Namely he imposed on the philosophical research in Poland a new style of work. Worthy of attention is the fact that Twardowski achieved it not so much by his writings, but owing to his personal influence. For actually he did not publish many works¹. Neither has he ever written a voluminous book or created a system. This was not accidental, but the result of the deliberate will of a researcher. In sharp opposition to all system constructions, Twardowski wanted to write, just as his pupils, only monographs on single, closely defined problems which were difficult to grasp. The striving for the greatest precision of analyses, scientific responsibility for every formulation, every thesis, moved to the fore of his entire scientific and pedagogical activity. The positive result thereof are to be seen above all in the creation of precisely defined notions, in the introduction of subtle language and

¹ His most important works include: *Idee und Perzeption* (1892), *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellung* (1894), *Conceptions and Notions* (1898), *On the so-called Relative Truths* (1900), *Funktionen und Gebilde* (1911), *On the Essence of Notions* (1924).

substantial differentiations (see the later method of "separation" in the use by phenomenologists), out of concern for the univocal meaning of statements put forth and their precise justification. The negative results — in the elimination of all insufficiently clear theories and notions, in the exclusion from philosophical investigations of all problems which seem insoluble, and in the at least temporary refraining from taking up problems for which the to date research failed to create sufficient foundations. On the outside this expressed itself in the rejection of all metaphysics, in the setting aside of the supreme theoretical problems of epistemology and in the narrowing of philosophical research almost entirely to detailed investigation of a descriptive-psychological nature, of a logical and a formal-ontological nature (problems of the object theory).

As I have already mentioned, Twardowski was a pupil of Brentano and always remained in close relations with the so-called Austrian school. In many points, however, he parted with his master and was independent, thus outdistancing numerous Brentanists. At present, when we are already in the possession of Husserl's phenomenological and ontological investigations, as well as of his pupils, the research of Marty in the domain of the psychology of the language, Meinong's reflections in the domain of the theory of the object, it is often overlooked that in all these domains Twardowski with his analyses becoming more and more precise was a precursor in numerous domains and not an epigonus. His distinction between act, contents and object of the representation, his pointing to the fact that each act of consciousness had an intentional object corresponding to it, the taking up of the analysis of so-called "general subjects" (later called in Germany *Spezies, idealer Gegenstand*), his investigation of the formal structure of the object, his studies on various functions of the speech and different varieties of language forms — all that was carried out in the 1890's could be cited here as a justification of my thesis of the great significance of Twardowski not only for Polish philosophy, but also philosophical trends outside Poland. Also his attempt, undertaken after the *Logische Untersuchungen* by Husserl, to overcome psychologism in a different manner than did Husserl in that work, should be taken into account. In his work *Functions and Derived Conceptions* he defined conception units at the product of subjective operations, as it was later done also abroad, may it be said even without the knowledge of the result achieved by Twardowski. It is true that Austrian and German researchers went much further in their research than Twardowski in many cases, but this does not alter the fact that it was he who had given the first impulse.

But perhaps it is not an accident that Twardowski in some analyses did not come so much to the fore. Outside of certain secondary aspects of his scientific activity, this is certainly linked with his principle of absolute clarity, for that principle leads in practice to omitting more difficult problems with regard to which it is impossible to arrive at definitely clarified results. On the other hand this is connected with the method which makes it possible to examine always only isolated detailed problems. This brings to light also the danger harboured by Twardowski's method of philosophizing.

Twardowski's programme of work would be probably possible to realize if, first, one could bring about a community of selfless researchers

fully understanding one another, and, second, if somebody would take the lead of this community, grasped great sets of problems and directed the consistent and planned elaboration of those problems. Twardowski always endeavoured to create such a community of researchers. In spite of that he did not fully succeed to carry out such a programme of work, for the second condition was not fulfilled to some extent. In fact, taking into account Twardowski's methodological principles that condition could not have been fulfilled. Namely, if one undertakes, out of principle, the working out only of individual isolated problems, inevitably disappear from sight problem interconnections. Precisely this creates the danger of falling into fragmentary contributions and a shallow presentation of problems, but also into ineffective work on falsely set problems, for the authentic sense of all deeper problems comes to light only against the background of a vast interconnection of problems and is more closely defined by it. What is more, problems carry with them their own tension. If we set them aside in order to work them out in more propitious circumstances, nevertheless they disturb us and lead to a situation in which we accept unconsciously and without control certain suppositions and prejudices, which later on, not having been exposed, haunt us and create unfavourable conditions for our conscious work. No wonder then that wherever it was possible to single out problems in a precise manner and without distorting their sense, results were obtained in Twardowski's Lwow school which certainly were worthy of attention, that is as regards special logical and some descriptive-psychological problems. But a distinct stagnation set in after a number of years in the approaching of more general and more fundamental problems, which — when a new impulse appeared — brought about a departure of a group of Twardowski's outstanding pupils and contributed indirectly to a gradual formation of a new movement.

This impulse stemmed from modern mathematics and new logical research by Frege, Schroeder, Whitehead, Russell, Couturat and others. Jan Łukasiewicz, one of the oldest pupils of Twardowski, was first in Poland to undertake these investigations and began, about 1910, to work independently in this direction. In the course of several years he gathered round him many young researchers. Thus the foundations were laid under Polish logistic which is now in full blossom.

At first it seemed that everything remained the same: attention was centred on a new and very special set of problems, but they were worked out as formerly in the same monographic style. But, gradually and imperceptibly, one could say on the margin of this specialized research that a new philosophical stand was coming into being — despite the fact that at present the main representatives of Polish logistic do not want to be considered as philosophers. But this too is significant for the deep contradiction between the new logistic school and Twardowski's basic stand.

That which in the case of Twardowski was only an extreme scientific caution and restraint, turned in the case of those dealing with logistic into scepticism, and even at times into disregarding whole areas of philosophical problems. That which Twardowski considered to be a care for the precision of the conceptual apparatus and correctness of linguistic formulations, later turned into an analysis of words only. The monographic manner of solving individual problems, characteristic for

Twardowski, degenerated into the negation of any unity of philosophy: there is no philosophy, but only a multitude of "philosophic" disciplines. Twardowski's struggle against any emotional or volitional influencing scientific research, his postulate to preserve precise verification criteria during the solution of every philosophical problem, turned into the so-called "Antiirrationalism" (the term introduced by K. Ajdukiewicz).

The antiirrationalism consists on the one hand in scepticism with regard to any immediate knowledge which is neither a sensory experience, nor an internal psychological experience, but on the other hand belief in the omnipotence of contemporary methods of mathematical research. In fact, the two moments remain in close connection with one another, for from the empirical point of view, which recognizes only external and internal observations, it was impossible — following the breakdown of psychologism in logic — to motivate logic philosophically otherwise than by reaching a radical physicalistically tinted nominalism on the one hand and on the other hand, under the influence of modern and formalistically interpreted mathematics — a conventional rationalism and a sceptic relativism. A formalistic-physicalist theory of the language took shape which made the sense of a linguistic term nothing else but an operational rule of applying sensorily perceived signs in given combinations (this happened already around 1920, that is many years before the analogous attempts of the so-called Vienna neo-positivism). Instead of the eidetic intuition which was rejected, one used the conscious application of conventions in the creation of basic notions and in the selection of axioms to which one adds later an extremely refined deductive method. But each convention can be opposed by another convention, resulting later in sceptical relativism. Every theory can be accepted if it is only formally faultless. Well, even the notion of truth for which once fought Twardowski in fact loses its sense, while the notion of reality obtains a relativistic interpretation. In this manner, despite all the basic hostility towards metaphysics, the result was that precisely among logic exponents two in their essence metaphysical theories of reality came into being, one created by L. Chwistek and the other by K. Ajdukiewicz. Chwistek adopts the multitude of realities, which would be different as realities and within which one could place oneself at will. Those are namely: the reality of impressions, the reality of representations, the natural reality and the physical reality. Ajdukiewicz on the other hand speaks of the multitude of equal images of the world, each of them dependent on a linguistically constructed conceptual apparatus. Along this road he arrived, despite his distinctly physicalist basic stand, to metaphysical idealism based on a physicalist theory of language.

These are in a most general outline the philosophical foundations of the logistic movement in Poland. Its representatives believe that proceeding from their basic stand and logistic research they will be able to reform philosophy as a whole. One may judge it as one wishes. It is indubitable, however, that the purely logical achievements of Poles are not only on the level of present-day knowledge in this domain, but in many points opened new horizons also for foreign research, as shown by the works of such scholars as C. J. Lewis, Langford, Quine, Scholz, Carnap, and others. The logic training introduced by logic specialists among the Polish philosophers is not devoid of significance also for the further development of philosophy in Poland.

The head of the logistic school, the so-called "Warsaw" school, was Jan Łukasiewicz (born in 1878). Since 1916, a professor in Warsaw he gathered there round him a number of gifted researchers who in part are also Twardowski's pupils. The most outstanding among them include today: S. Leśniewski, A. Tarski, T. Kotarbiński, J. Lindenbaum, K. Kuratowski (Warsaw), A. Ajdukiewicz (Lwów), T. Czeżowski (Wilno), Z. Zawirski (Poznań). The already mentioned L. Chwistek (Lwów) is also active in the field of logistic, but he does not wish to be counted among the Warsaw group. Initially he was a pupil of W. Heinrich and of the mathematician S. Zaręba in Cracow, later, however, under the influence of B. Russell he came to logistic. The deceased Cracow mathematician J. Sleszyński also made a valuable contribution to logistic research (see in particular his book entitled *The Theory of Proof*).

Naturally, it is impossible to present here in greater detail the results of these logistic works. There exist about 100 highly specialized papers in this connection. We must draw attention, however, at least to several Łukasiewicz's main works.

Łukasiewicz is distinguished above all by a good knowledge of Aristotle, stoic and medieval logic, as shown by his papers "On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle" (1910) and the article on stoic logic (in "Erkenntnis" 1935). His logistic writings should be mentioned here: *The Logical Foundations of the Calculus of Probability* (1913), *Two-valued Logic* (1921), *Elements of Algebraic Logic* (1929), *Philosophical Remarks on the Many-Valued System of the Calculus of Sentences* (1930), and others. The theory of deduction is the main domain of his interest, as well as the methodological structural moments of the deduction system. The construction of many axiomatic systems of the theory of deduction, proof of the interdependence of their axioms, and also the construction of a method making it possible to prove the consistency of logical axiomatic systems — those are perhaps the most important results of his research. Łukasiewicz himself laid the main emphasis on his discovery of three-valued and later of many-valued logic. Next to the values "truth" and "falsehood" a third value is introduced, this results later in the invalidity of the principle of excluded middle. Łukasiewicz arrived at that idea around 1920 — on the one hand by demonstrating numerous contradictions in the logic of Aristotle, and on the other hand owing to reflections on the problem of indeterminism. But he arrived at the later development of many-valued logic independently from any philosophical problems. But one can notice here a distinct analogy to non-Euclidean geometries.

At the end of the twenties Łukasiewicz took an extremely negative stand towards philosophy in the traditional sense. He negated the existence of any scientific value also in great philosophical systems. The sharpness of his criticism subsided somewhat in the following years. But the conviction that a reform of philosophy can be effected only by logistic and its method has been characterizing to this day his fundamental stand.

T. Kotarbiński is the philosophical Warsaw group leader. Although he remains in close contact with those dealing with logistic and made a review of the main results of their work in his book *Elements of the Theory of Knowledge, Logic and Methodology of Sciences* (1929), initially he was interested in problems of practical philosophy and attempted to build a theory of action, which he calls *praxeology*.

Despite all fear of metaphysics, prevailing among Twardowski's pupils, Kotarbiński is in his deepest essence a metaphysician, which is visible above all in his "reism". Of course, Kotarbiński would protest against characterizing his "reism" as a metaphysical theory, for he interprets it frequently as a simple reform of the language. In fact, Kotarbiński makes the attempt of reducing many Aristototele's categories to only one: the category of substance, or, speaking his language, the category of things. Thus, only things can exist, but there are no other properties, relations, qualities, phenomena, processes, no events. In keeping with that only names of things are genuine names and only they should be used in a "correct" language. All other names, such as "redness", "equality", "struggle" and the like, either are no names at all and do not signify anything, or could be entirely reduced to names of things, but even then they should be rather avoided. In particular one should formulate only such indicative sentences which in the place of a subject have genuine names of things. The so-called pansomatism is a particular instance of reism, according to which there exist only material things and sensitive at the same time. Owing to its metaphysical contents, reism is very close to the materialist world outlook. On the other hand, if it is examined from the "semantic" point of view, it seems to constitute a radically carried out protest against the objectivization of everything that does not indicate any material structure. At the same time, however, Kotarbiński tightens so much the notion of "existence" that according to him only things "exist". Thereby all other properties of an object are eliminated and the whole theory assumes once more the face of a metaphysical approach.

Among other more philosophically oriented writings of the logistic group one should also mention the works by K. Ajdukiewicz²; and also the work by A. Tarski *The Notion of Truth in Formalized Languages*. Ajdukiewicz was first in Poland to introduce a radically formalistic examination of the language. His main thought is to build out of logistic and semantics a language of a new theory of knowledge. In this connection he arrives to the already mentioned view on different images of the world. Finally, one should also mention the philosophical-naturalistic reflections of Zawirski and several younger scientists (for example I. Dąmbska and D. Steinberg)³.

The campaign against metaphysics conducted since the nineties' of the past century encountered resistance on many sides. Thus professor M. Wartenberg from Lwów — *nota bene* an outstanding connoisseur of the Kant philosophy, to which he devoted several big works — published in 1907 a book under the characteristic title *Defence of Metaphysics*. Also the above mentioned Messianist W. Lutosławski many times protested against the liquidation of metaphysics. There is no need to emphasize that also neotomism came out against this attempt, and was widely spread among the catholic clergy.

Not the logistic detailed investigations were attacked from many sides, but the introduction of the logistic manner of thinking and

² Above all *Zur Methodologie der deduktiven Wissenschaften, Sprache und Sinn, Das Weltbild und Begriffsapparatur*, etc.

³ Naturally there exist also other researchers interested in the philosophy of nature, for example J. Metellmann whose book *Determinism in Natural Science* (1934) is worthy of attention. They do not belong, however, to the logistic group.

method into philosophical investigations, as well as the above outlined basic stand. Twardowski himself did it in a characteristic manner already in 1921 in an article under the very eloquent title "Symbolomania and Pragmatophobia". B. Gawecki attacked the presented by Kotarbiński programme, of dividing philosophy into many detailed disciplines, as well as the overestimation of the role of logic.

Also R. Ingarden, pupil of E. Husserl came out against various philosophical views represented by the logicist school. Thus, in a paper directed against Kotarbiński he endeavoured to prove that the postulate of dissolving philosophy in special sciences was ill-founded, and also attempted to justify the unity of philosophy. Contrary to L. Chwistek's book *The Multiplicity of Realities*, he attempted to show that the logicist, formalistic-conventionalist manner of thinking should not be applied either to theory of knowledge or metaphysical problems. At the last philosophical congress in Prague he came out indirectly against the basic stand of the logicians. On that occasion he argued against the Vienna neo-positivism that the attempt at eliminating any sense of language creations, which is something different than the sign itself, renders impossible also scientific linguistics, and thereby is self-defeating⁴.

He levelled at Kotarbiński's reism the charge that it is impossible from a purely formalistic-ontological point of view to accept a categorized structure of an object and at the same time reject the structure of property, for, in essence, both features belong mutually to one another⁵.

As regards the positively oriented works of Ingarden, almost all of them, except for the dissertation *Intuition and Intellect in H. Bergson* and a few smaller works, tend toward the preparation from various sides of a solution in the controversy idealism — realism. *Reflections on the Problem Idealism — Realism* bring to light the fundamental lines of the problems involved in this controversy and oppose various ontological related problems to corresponding metaphysical and epistemological problems, the final decision being reserved for metaphysics. In connection with this, several small papers aim at the consolidation of the theory of knowledge (*On the Danger of Petitionis Principii in the Theory of Knowledge*, *On the Place of the Theory of Knowledge in the System of Philosophy*, *Psycho-physiologic Theory of Knowledge and Its Critique*). On the other hand, Ingarden's ontological research also comes into account. Thus the attempt is undertaken in *Essentiale Fragen* to define closer the essence of an individual object and to oppose it to a general and particular idea. Already in the work mentioned earlier he dealt with the formal structure of an individual object.

The book *On a Literary Work of Art* is devoted to an analysis of a literary creation. At the same time, however, a literary work of art serves as an instance of a purely intentional object, on which it is shown that it has such a formal structure and such a mode of being that no attempt to reduce real objects to purely intentional ones — such an attempt was undertaken in the phenomenological transcendental idealism — cannot be crowned with success. Also a small historic paper

⁴ See "L'Essai logique d'une réforme de la philosophie", *Revue Philos.*, 1935.

⁵ "Vom formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes", *Studia Philosophica*, Vol. I, 1935.

entitled "Some Premises of G. Berkeley's Idealism" belongs to the same range of problems⁶.

Contemporary philosophic research in Poland is not confined, however, to the above mentioned directions and works. First of all, certain pupils of Twardowski, who have remained loyal to him, continue to work in his spirit, for the most part in the domain of descriptive and experimental psychology. Among them one should mention, outside the deceased B. Bandrowski and A. Stogbauer, above all the following researchers: W. Witwicki (Warsaw), who deals particularly with emotional life and at the same time is the author of splendid translations of numerous dialogues by Plato. Next Stefan Blachowski (Poznań), Stefan Baley (Warsaw), who has devoted himself in recent years particularly to the psychology of the child, as well as M. Kreutz (Lwów), who analyses methodological problems of experimental psychology. In addition, Twardowski formed already after the war a young generation of pupils devoted to him (T. Witwicki, M. Lutman-Kokoszyńska, I. Dąbska, L. Blaustein, Mehlberg, Auerbach). They are, however, under the partial influence of Ajdukiewicz and Ingarden.

Psychological research developed well in Warsaw since the times of Ochorowicz mentioned earlier and is represented by numerous important and independent researchers⁷.

Naturally, there is also a number of researchers who follow their own ways and who could not be counted among the representatives of any of the described trends. Among them one should take into account above all those who, despite the great differences separating them, have that in common that they are oriented humanistically and work in the domain of the philosophy of history and the philosophy of culture. From the oldest generation, still coloured positivistically, we may mention Supinski and E. Majewski (theory of civilization). Writer and philosopher Stanislaw Brzozowski, who died young, unfolded a very lively activity in the first decade of the 20th century. Referring to J. B. Vico he laid emphasis on the humanistic philosophy of history (it may be said that without knowledge of Dilthey) and underlined the creative role of man in history. In connection with this he presented a vision of the world in a constant *statu nascendi* (under the influence of H. Bergson) and began to build a "philosophy of work". Dilthey's views are being presented in Poland by the well known Germanist Z. Łempicki, who has had merits also — as a connoisseur of literature. Studies worthy of attention, referring to Dilthey, Spranger and others have been written by B. Suchodolski.

Finally, an interesting sociologist has his own stand. Florian Znaniecki (born in 1882) published numerous papers (*Problem of Value in Philosophy, Humanism and Cognition, Introduction to Sociology, Cultural Reality, The Laws of Social Psychology*, etc.). The notion of culture is in the centre of his interest. Historic objects are creation of culture. Their whole constitutes the cultural reality within which it is possible

⁶ Almost one page and a half of the text — beginning with the sentences: "Thus, in a paper directed against Kotarbiński he attempted to prove..." up to the last sentence on the the work on the subject of Berkeley — was taken into square brackets.

⁷ See *Recherches Philosophiques*.

to distinguish different orders and levels. Both the real and the ideal world is the product of all psychic individuals. This is the stand of cultural idealism.

In order to give a full picture of contemporary philosophical research in Poland one should now speak of numerous works in various, so far not discussed, domains of philosophy, such as for example the philosophy of language (writings by the deceased J. Baudouin de Courtenay, Jan Rozwadowski), the philosophy of law (Leon Petrazycki, Makarewicz, Krzymuski, Znamierowski, Lande), ethics (Biegański, Rubczyński, Gabryl), aesthetics (Sobeski, Tatarkiewicz, Elzenberg, Ossowski), etc. It is impossible, however, in a short article, even to outline the whole variety of contemporary philosophical research in Poland. That which has been presented above should therefore be treated as a very inadequate, shortened and incomplete picture of that which was actually done in Poland in this domain.

Lwów, 1936, University

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Translated from the German original

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