

assumptions in the light of the present situation, we then convert them into fundamental truths and build around them a new heaven and a new earth to justify our act. The gratuitous premises inevitably lead to a non-empirical and unverifiable conclusion, the chief merit of which is not that it furnishes a more unified and suggestive outlook upon new situations as they occur, but rather that it has been derived by a strictly logical process of inference.

When a system of philosophy loses contact with life and becomes absorbed in a set of purely professional problems there is ground for the suspicion that it no longer serves the needs which called it into being. To keep an eye on the social situation in which the problem has its origin, to bear in mind that it is the function of philosophy to reorganize the conflicting interests of life, is indispensable if philosophy is to protect itself against the danger of losing itself in problems that are the product of historic accident. The need of reconstruction from which philosophy is born is precisely the need to escape from the obsessions of the past and thus to liberate intelligence for the tasks of the present. Philosophic reflection means an unlimbering of our intellectual resources, an emancipation from the effects of mental habits and predispositions, in so far as these constitute obstructions to a more effective mode of dealing with present times and circumstances; and the "persistent problems of philosophy," accordingly, demand a solution, not in terms of "absolute reason," but rather in terms of the successive situations which give to each solution whatever value it may possess as a contribution to human progress.

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SOCIETIES

THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

THE PHILOSOPHERS IN WARTIME

PHILOSOPHERS, as somewhat amorphously defined by the popular imagination, are profound irrelevant people totally and absurdly unaffected by considerations of time and space. Philosophers have themselves contributed to this untutored estimate by persuading themselves that their interests were timeless and their conclusions eternal. Even the disciplined professional, therefore, might have anticipated that the first war meeting of the American

Philosophical Association would betray no concern with contemporary difficulties, but would concentrate its energies upon the changeless problems of the one and the many, and of change itself. Theoretically, the mere fact of there being current under the forms of time and space a war that was occupying the attention and the energies of the whole world should have made no difference at the Christmas meeting of the Association; it should have been marked by an infinite unconcern and by the peace that, contemporary events to the contrary, goeth with understanding.

Unfortunately for the popular estimate, the Philosophical Association last Christmas held, in more senses than one, a War Meeting. Apart from the internal dialectic that was waged over the problem of the Annual Definitive Discussion on a set topic, the outstanding contemporary character of the meeting was its concern with Ethics and International Relations, discussed in detail by Professor Fite in the columns of this JOURNAL. The time, energy and enthusiasm that were lavished upon this section of the programme were eloquently conclusive testimony to the relevancy of philosophy, and the essential human responsibility of which philosophers are acutely conscious in times of stress. Professor Tufts did indeed attempt to generalize the problem and state its changeless structure and essential conditions, but his full and richly illustrated presentation of the central ethical problems involved, was obviously controlled by its contemporary reference. The problem of sovereignty is certainly not a casual puzzle of the moment, yet its peculiar stress at the meeting, as presented by Professor Hocking, was a concern with the "vital circuits," the human relations that the state was able to facilitate and secure. Professor Overstreet's splendid prospectus of progress in human relationships was, above all, a war document; it was frankly and intensely concerned with the "points of stress" which brought about this war, and with reorganizing the world so that those stresses might be eliminated. It was a vision built out of the challenge of contemporary difficulties and a generalization from the obtruding particulars of our very present evils. The subject-matter of Professor Lovejoy's time-shortened paper was again an evidence of the interests of contemporary thinking. It was a discussion made acutely relevant by the events of the last three years: the analogy of state and individual ethics.

The discussion of the second and last day of the meeting was marked by an animated continuance of the ethico-international problem, marked by a many-sided debate as to method and motive in international relations, and brought into the region of the concrete and specific by Mr. Bates with his plea for a detailed consideration

of the facts in such a definite problem as that of the Japanese purpose in world politics. The whole discussion, marked by vision and a vivacious inventiveness as to technique, was given a logical certification by Professor Cohen, who came over from the aloof area of formal logic to urge that the peculiar function of the scientist was not to be a social scientist at all, but a kind of social logician. He must not be an economist—for which profession he was indeed badly equipped,—but a precise and penetrating critic of the economists' glib and unconsidered terminology. The philosopher was not to turn economist, but to make economists philosophically minded.

Following this austere and salutary warning to the wanderers from the philosophic fold, there was an abrupt shift to more traditional interests, with Mr. Smith's assault upon the sacred validities of the syllogism. His challenge was not allowed to pass. Professor Montague rose to demonstrate the unimpeachable quality of the syllogism and his own loyalty to Aristotle. The major premise was surrounded with all the passion and vision that had on the previous afternoon aureoled the future of the state. Nor was the syllogism alone in bearing the brunt of logical offensives. Bertrand Russell's symbolic logic came in for a somewhat damaging analysis at the hands of Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin, with whose paper the logical intensity subsided.

The afternoon session of the second day was variously concerned with esthetics, the history of freedom of thought, and the still vigorous and valetudinarian question of mind and body. Professor Woodbridge Riley's paper on "Early Free Thinking Societies in America" stood out as one of the few purely historical contributions of the meeting. Miss Parkhurst's paper on esthetics had a tempting persuasiveness both as to form and intent. Her thesis that esthetic experience could all be comprehended under the category of the evolution of mastery roused the queries of Professors Tufts and Gardiner. There seemed to be a unanimous agreement, however, that Miss Parkhurst's paper was not only an educative analysis of the esthetic experience, but an illustration of it. The afternoon ended, as afternoons will, when philosophers gather, with a discussion of the relations of mind and body, as presented in a paper on Parallelism by Professor Grace De Laguna, and in Professor Sellars's paper on Mind and Body.

The contemporary interest and relevancy of philosophy was given official support in Professor Moore's presidential address, which was an eloquent and substantial plea for a science of values, for a philosophy that should really be a guide to conduct, and have a function in society. As Professor Moore saw it, this was the opportunity

of philosophy, to be creatively interpretative and directive, to be the scientific control of men's possibilities, and an authentic programme of progress. We had been precise and progressive enough about means; that was the business of science; it was a challenge to philosophy, in an era of specifically human difficulties, to become a science of ends.

Philosophical assemblages ought, on the theory of timeless un-concern, to be careless of their environment, and the spirit of wonder should flourish wherever and under whatever material discomforts philosophers gather. But even the devotee of irrelevancy and of freedom from time and space could not but be sensitive to the conditions under which this meeting was held. The beautiful Princeton Graduate College was an ideal two days' retreat for world-weary or world-worried philosophers, and even the austerities of Meinong's Logic acquired values and colorful contours in the spacious café of the Common Room.

Professor Montague on the last afternoon of the session waived the time for the continuation of the Mind-Body Problem from its 1916 analysis. Parallelism and Interaction had been forced out by the time devoted to parliaments of nations and federations of the world. Officially, perhaps, the former problem was the more important; it certainly has a more time-honored genealogy. But then, perhaps, philosophers are not so callously irrelevant as they imagine, and are learning that as they have been unconscious responses to their own age, they may take it upon themselves consciously to direct the future. Certainly if the discussion on International Relations was not calculated to make philosophers kings, the philosophers were vitally concerned with the future of kingdoms.

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ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE discussion on "Ethics and International Relations" occupied two sessions at the last meeting of the American Philosophical Association, the afternoon session of Thursday (January 27), and the morning session of Friday. I have been asked to report the impressions and opinions of an observer—"from our special correspondent," so to speak. My general impression, aided by opinions heard and overheard, is that the discussion was a distinct success—not, perhaps, in the sense held by our efficiency-philosophers, that it achieved definite scientific results, but in the sense that it turned out to be stimulating; and the general feeling seemed to be

that it ended all too quickly. This I attribute to the fact that even philosophers, accustomed to view the world *sub specie eternitatis*, are more deeply moved by a topic referring to the temporal tragedy of the present time; but also, perhaps, to the fact that the room in which the second session was held was very cosy and comfortable. Even among philosophers it appears that the soul moves more freely when the body is satisfied.

The afternoon session was occupied by the appointed leaders of the discussion, Professors Tufts, Hocking, and Overstreet, to whom was added Professor Lovejoy. I understand that the papers of the first three are to appear in the *International Journal of Ethics*. I shall, therefore, give only the salient points, as I was able to get them. The paper of Professor Tufts, of Chicago, was full of interesting illustration, gathered from a wide range of literature, and left one with a strong impression of the multiplicity of issues involved in the question. His statement of the question was: (1) Are nations to be held morally responsible for their acts? And (2) if they are, how shall we account for the clash of national ideals—in other words, what are the moral issues? After outlining the various attitudes taken towards the first question,¹ he proceeded to answer this question affirmatively. Replying to H. C. Warren's contention that "international conflicts are not so much moral events as they are conflicts of social forces"² he reminded us that conflicts of individuals are also conflicts of forces, yet none the less moral events. Treitschke himself, in holding that the state, as absolute power, is above moral judgment, appeals to an ethical scale of values, as embodied in the laws of nature, and subscribes to the desirability of the heroic life. As for the heroic life, "I can only wonder," said Tufts, "whether those who have actually been close enough to the trenches and the empty homes in such a war as this, will still regard it as the best life. If so, I fear that no arguments from pure reason will have consideration. I can only say, in the words of Lincoln, 'I should think that any one who likes this sort of thing would be very much pleased with it.'" But if conflict is nature's law, it is also man's; and man is intelligent. If we admit that intelligence enters at all into the conflict of impulses—or of "social forces"—then the issues are thus far ethical and it becomes an obligation to supplant conflict by cooperation. (Personally, I assent to the argument from intelligence, but I prefer to base the conclusion upon the discontinuity of man and nature rather than upon the familiar pragmatic doctrine of continuity, for which Tufts seems here to stand; the reader may take his choice.)

¹ See his outline in this JOURNAL, Vol. XIV., p. 720.

² *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1916.

What, then, in general are the issues? First, there is the (pragmatically familiar) conflict between status and change; for example, between the vested rights, secured by treaty, of one nation to a given territory and the growing needs of another, or the growing capacity, for the use of its raw material. Such issues, Tufts suggested, might readily be settled by the processes of trade were it not for the intrusion of the merely alleged need of national prestige. And this involves, secondly, the conflict of aristocratic and democratic ideals, an issue parallel, it seems, to that of status and change. A militaristic state is likely to represent in its foreign as well as in its domestic relations a *Herrenmoral* which unfits it for entering a democracy of nations. To adjust all of these difficulties, it seems that we need not only an international court, but an international legislature.

Professor Hocking, of Harvard, contributed his part in a spoken address which was admirably balanced and direct.³ In general his purpose was to show that the idea of sovereignty is not only compatible with the idea of moral obligation between states, but positively implied therein; while at the same time the state is not a person. I must confess that I can not understand a moral obligation which is not between persons. Nor could I grasp Mr. Hocking's blackboard demonstration of the state as an entity transcending the individuals composing it. Having fair eyesight, I could see the points supposed to represent the individuals, but the social relations did not appear to be upon the blackboard—does Mr. Hocking mean that a social relation is a spatial relation between points? Nor could I appreciate the validity of the foundations offered for the idea of sovereignty: (1) That the state implies a leader whose decisions shall be final seems to me to be contradicted by the constitution of the United States and the status of its President; I fear that Mr. Hocking's state is based upon a militaristic model. (2) Nor am I quite certain that the state is "psychologically prior," in the sense that it is the interest that makes all other interests possible. The interest in food is also an interest which makes all other interests, including that of the state, possible; yet except for a certain view of life, which I suppose Mr. Hocking not to share, it is not psychologically—certainly not ethically—prior. And to say (3) that each state stands for a unique culture, or a unique experiment in living, seems to me to imply, after all (if, indeed, it be true), that the state is a person. Indeed, I should say that the personality—or the personification—of states was clearly implied in Mr. Hocking's conception of justice as between states; which, according to him, is a matter,

³ His theses may be found in outline in this JOURNAL, Vol. XIV., p. 698.

not of legality, nor yet of equity as defined by the courts, but of such a consideration of individual needs and ideals as we expect to find, for example, in the family.

In common with some others, I felt that the paper of Professor Overstreet, of the College of the City of New York, in answer to the question, "What will be the effect of the war upon our ethical concepts?" though most agreeable as a piece of composition, betrayed an enthusiasm rather too simply Utopian. Yet I should say that his analysis of the evils which have been brought to recognition, as evils, by the war was both accurate and solidly grounded. These were summarized by Mr. Overstreet as "Prussianism" (between states) and "profiteering" (between classes and individuals), the two being only different names for the same thing; which I should call the imperialistic attitude. Both Tufts and Overstreet made it clear, by the way, that the moral issues between states are only an extension of the issues within the state. "Prussianism" manifests itself, then, in economic relations, in the idea of the "sphere of influence"; that is, in the attempts of capitalistic groups to exploit weaker nations. In the cultural world it is represented by the attempt to impose one's national culture upon alien races; as exemplified by the egotism of "the big brother" and "the white man's burden" and by the various ramifications of the idea of "missionary zeal." In political relations it is represented by the idea of sovereignty, an idea now to be replaced by the idea of a rational organization of nations based upon "open door" for all cultures. All of these conceptions of prestige the war has put ethically out of date. If this means that the time is past when we could derive edification from the imperialistic swagger and twaddle of a Rudyard Kipling, I hope that Mr. Overstreet is right.

Professor Lovejoy, of Johns Hopkins, closed the afternoon session by giving a single illustration of "The Limits of the Analogy between Personal and State Ethics"—an illustration sufficiently interesting to make us regret that Mr. Lovejoy had generously given away his allotment of time. The absoluteness of sovereignty, he pointed out, is based by analogy upon the absoluteness of property rights within the state. But this absoluteness is qualified (shall we say? I do not know how else to express Mr. Lovejoy's meaning) by the state's right of eminent domain. There is, however, no state of states, and, therefore, no provision for eminent domain as between states. What is the ethical conclusion? From the speaker's reference to the action of the United States in the case of the Panama Canal (which I did not understand him to condemn) I supposed him to mean that when a state wanted badly a piece of another's

territory, it should simply "take" it—if it could. This caricature of his argument, uttered in the discussion of the next morning, Mr. Lovejoy promptly condemned; explaining that he meant only that you could not argue from the absolute right of private property to the absolute sovereignty of states. At the risk of putting an unfair question to what could be only the fragment of an argument, I venture to ask, Why not? Is it because, in point of fact, the right of property within the state is not absolute but limited (*e. g.*) by eminent domain? This seems to mean that (with Mr. Lovejoy, as I understood him) you may still argue from a qualified property-right to a qualified sovereignty; and if so, it seems that the analogy is, after all, complete.

Mr. Tufts began the morning session of Friday by knocking at Mr. Overstreet's "open door" with the question, how he would reconcile the open door for all cultures with the principle, laid down both by Overstreet and by Hocking, of each his own culture; what if one of the cultures in question happened to be cannibalistic?

Mr. Overstreet replied by explaining that a cannibal culture would be self-contradictory—no culture whatever; an argument which, I think, should be placed in the philosophical museum beside Kant's attempt to prove that self-contradiction is involved in suicide. In any case, why should cannibals not be permitted to eat one another; or, perhaps, in lieu of birth-control, their superfluous children? Mr. Overstreet went on to define the open-door policy as standing for "the principle of opportunity." But he also qualified it (as I should say) by introducing a principle of universal requirements to which all should conform. Later in the discussion he also denied that by "open door" he meant "*laissez faire*." This seemed to me to reveal the point of obscurity in his whole argument, as applied both to international relations and to economic relations within the state. How shall we test the sincerity and reality of a need, whether individual or national, except by the sacrifice, or the effort, that will be made to get it under free competition?

Mr. Bates offered some interesting contributions to the discussion of the open door from an experience of some years in Japan. In particular he pointed out that oriental peoples are becoming keenly alive to the fact that nine hundred million orientals occupy only one fifth as much of the earth's surface as six hundred million of other peoples. But when he rejected the suggestion of birth-control as irrelevant, I could not follow him. Does he mean that unlimited prolificacy is a right peculiarly oriental?

Mr. Bates was followed by the present writer with the suggestion that the attempt to show that international relations are irrelevant

to ethical considerations is based upon a distinction purely academic, academic distinctions being defined as those necessary for the preservation of professorial fences. "Sovereignty" is nothing but the departing shadow of the divine right of kings, surviving to-day as a convenient legal fiction. But the professor of politics finds the doctrine of sovereignty a useful protection against usurpation on the part of the professor of ethics; who in turn protects his chair by teaching the uniqueness of the "ought." In point of fact any relation becomes *ipso facto* ethical so far as the parties to the relation become conscious of one another—and thus mutually "responsible." An absolute state, representing irresponsible power (such as Treitschke's), might be expected to function without fuss and talk; to demand respect for its power is to appeal from power to reason. Hence, there are no modern states of any importance whose relations are not to some degree ethical, but, while the peoples of even European states remain so largely "foreign" to one another, the relations of states remain also largely unethical, *i. e.*, simply physical, or economic.

Professor Hoernlé, of Harvard, returning to the question of the "open door," urged that a distinction be made between cases involving equal cultures and those involving a higher and a lower culture. For example, the South African blacks, if allowed to develop their own culture, would turn to farming or grazing. But surely this is impossible; for who, then, would work the white man's mines? This sounded to me like good British-imperialistic doctrine; though I seem to have heard something similar from those ladies who cherish a moral indignation against the employment of women in factories, on the ground that it decreases the supply of household service. I seemed to understand Mr. Hoernlé better when he went on to say that (for equals, of course) we all desire some kind of international organization, but that those who would be wardens of international peace must keep themselves clean; and that this calls for a great development of moral consciousness in the private citizen as well as for a more intimate and diffused knowledge of peoples by one another.

Mr. Hocking, replying to the present writer, denied that mutual knowledge between peoples was sufficient to bring about a moral relation; since they might know one another and yet be unable to affect one another (a situation in which I seem to discern implications of telepathy). A moral relation, he contended, must be based upon a field of common good which imposes an obligation upon all.⁴ In line with Mr. Hoernlé, Mr. Hocking urged a distinction between

⁴ Here I should like to suggest two questions: (1) Is a good as between individuals a common good or a mutual good? and (2) can there be mutual knowledge without mutual good, and conversely?

sovereign states and partly-sovereign states. The most difficult of international questions is the allotment of territory to races. This should be determined, not by prolificacy, but by the contribution of the race to culture; which only the sovereign states are competent to measure.

Professor Calkins, of Wellesley, pointed out that, while Hocking and Overstreet both stressed the rights of national cultures, they were opposed on the question of sovereignty, and she wondered, therefore, whether by "sovereignty" they meant the same thing.

According to Professor Wright, of Dartmouth, if the decisions of an international court are to be obeyed they must be based upon some kind of popular and emotional appeal; which means that they must appeal to patriotism. We must have not only a common understanding, but a common feeling; and for this our main hope lies in religion and society.

By this time Professor Creighton, of Cornell, appeared to think that the discussion needed a cold bath; which he proceeded to administer by asking how the decisions of an international court would be enforced. If by force of arms, then, as was shown at Pekin, there appeared to be no difference in quality between national and international exercise of force. For his own part, he would rather appeal to the individual nations; if not persons, they, at least, have a conscience and are real. If we are to have international justice we should begin by carrying out our own laws; we can not expect to have justice between nations until we have it at home. Therefore he would stand, not for less nationality, but for a more intense national consciousness. And, after all, war is not so bad as a superficial amiability and a superficial peace.

I can only explain the failure to reply to Professor Creighton by the fact that luncheon had been already postponed. My own reply would be that I, too, prefer that virtue begin at home; which means, I take it, that while making the world safe for democracy we should also practise democracy. And I dare say that, as a hard fact, the policeman's club is not less brutal than the private citizen's fist. Yet civilization seems to prefer the policeman, even with his club. And as for "superficial amiability," it strikes me that, from a point of view really unsentimental, superficial amiability between nations is just the thing that we want first. Does any sensible man expect most of the persons whom he meets to be more than superficially amiable? And to how many is he capable of offering more? If genuine brotherly love thrives so slowly between individuals of the same race, how soon are we to expect much of it between races? Personally, I believe that, in the cause of decent international rela-

tions, it would be a great gain if we should postpone for a while the cultivation of brotherly love and begin with a recognition of the fundamental value for civilization of "superficial amiability."

Two more suggestions were offered before the discussion closed. Dr. Dunham, of Temple College, Philadelphia, thought it possible that the result at which we are aiming in international courts might be anticipated through the "horizontal" conference of classes; or, in his use of the phrase, by "peaceful penetration." Professor Cohen, of the College of the City of New York, pointed out that the chief service to be rendered by philosophers in the cause of international peace must consist in the enlightenment of the masses by a critical analysis of such phrases as "peace without indemnities," and the like. But if philosophers succeed in clarifying only a few ideas, I feel that they will surely be doing much.

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CONCERNING LOGIC

TO recall the drift of the comments upon logic offered at Princeton in December by members of the Philosophical Association might appear to be a task promising small chance for collective observation. What, in the way of common subject-matter, common tendency, or common point of view could one reasonably look for in a tentative innuendo upon Meinong, a tentative restoration of Aristotle, an untentative dismemberment of Bertrand Russell, and a query as to what—whether Aristotelian or Bradleyan, whether dressed in the symbols of an Englishman or of Mrs. Ladd-Franklin—logic pretends to be, anyway? Indeed, the four papers,¹ beguilingly simple in outward aspects, served their respective authors as an occasion for unburdening their minds upon problems of such variousness that not two categories or a dozen could be expected to cover them. The existential implications of Riemannian space, the status of Baroko, the legitimacy of introducing into the world *Inhalt*, *Objekt*, and *Objektiv*, the propriety of transplanting differences from terms to copula, the mysteries and glories of the null class—such topics among others figured in the discussion. From the midst of minute technicalities and occasional comprehensive generalizations, there emerged not always simple searchings for the truth, but avowals of allegiances and antipathies, and a strain of proselytizing as well as

¹ *The Subject Matter of Formal Logic*, by Morris Cohen; *Shall We Repeat Aristotle?* by H. B. Smith; *Symbolic Logic and Bertrand Russell*, by Christine Ladd-Franklin; *Meinong's Contributions to Logic*, by R. F. A. Hoernlé.

honest questioning. What might the timid reviewer, withdrawn a little from the dust of conflict during Mrs. Franklin's valiant and singlehanded passage of arms, thus belatedly make of it all?

Retrospectively, one is tempted—though perhaps by virtue of a too obstinate predilection for the discovery of likeness amid difference—to say that the main contentions of the four logicians contributed predominantly to one very general, very persistent, but unalterably interesting conflict—that between the new and the old, between modernity and traditionalism. It was not in each case the same innovation arrayed against the same dogma. Nor was the intended outcome invariably a strangling either of the novel or of the established in favor of its rival. For Mr. Hoernlé, for example, the safe and sane, as over against the new and questionable, was represented by the doctrines of the Oxford idealists as opposed to those of Alexius Meinong. Mr. Smith, on the contrary, brought forward nobody less hoary than Aristotle himself against the promoters of the newest fancies in logic. Moreover, while nothing short of an evaporation, however gentle, of Meinong's distinctions in favor of Bradley's terminology and viewpoint appeared to be contemplated by Mr. Hoernlé, Mr. Smith, with trustful impartiality, looked for a reconciliation all round in the interest of mutual benefits. Indeed, the explicit aim of Mr. Smith's remarks was to show that only by an acceptance of the null class, a totally modern invention, could some of Aristotle's syllogisms maintain themselves. From the discussion that followed there seemed to be, in the minds of members, a pretty general doubt whether Aristotle stood in any real need of special devices for the preservation even of his Baroko. The doubt was as solid, in favor of an unassisted Aristotle, as was the other doubt, made manifest after Mr. Hoernlé's paper,—the doubt shared by him, regarding the validity of Meinong's lucubrations. The tide thus turned in both cases against realism. It turned that way, in fact, pretty persistently. For the outcome of Mrs. Franklin's heated protest against the reading of Mr. Russell by those calling themselves metaphysicians amounted likewise to a victory for the anti-realists. Not that Mrs. Franklin argued specifically against the existence of "classes." Their downfall she quite fully took for granted, without need for further shots, in the prelude to her invectives against the later inventions of Mr. Russell. But the sympathy with which her hearers appeared on the whole to respond to her treatment of the copula *epsilon* carried with it a certain degree of anti-realistic enthusiasm. That enthusiasm, it ought in justice to be added, was partly the product of a kind of embarrassed discomfort felt, in the presence of a battery of mathematical symbols, by those

who had never read through the entire three volumes of the *Principia* with a marked degree of ease and pleasure. Similarly, might one not hazard, it was the barbarous language of Ameseder, quoted by Mr. Hoernlé, and the apparent wilfulness of some of Meinong's intricacies that accounted in part for the lack of sympathy felt for the German realist during the process of his inquisitorial ordeal.

Though the disapproval of the modern form of Platonic infection appeared to be spontaneous and genuine, there yet lurked, or so it seemed to the reviewer, under half-joking skepticism regarding the reality of the null-class—of any “class” in fact—and of such monstrosities as *Objekt* and *Objektiv* as subspecies of subsistent *gegenstände*, a timid interest in those queer beasts. Mr. Smith's paper immediately preceded lunch of the second day, and during its early courses the talk was not of syllogisms, nor of pragmatic proof, nor yet the Absolute. It had to do with the supposed nature and contents—the geography, so to speak—of that huge receptacle for all manner of impossible, self-contradictory and non-existent objects denominated the null class. For the thoughts of philosophers, realistic and anti-realistic alike, appeared to be hovering about the invisible threshold of that untraversed kingdom whose very existence was doubted, but whose portals had been thrown open, inviting believers and skeptics alike to enter. Aristotle's ability to get on without the assistance of the null class, and Meinong's inability to define without circularity the differences between an object of a *Vorstellung* and the object of an *Urtheil*—such circumstances, though important, doubtless, philosophically, seemed not quite sufficient to banish from the imagination and the emotions certain entities, insusceptible of proof, but somewhat glorious as to name and pedigree.

The reviewer, in all humbleness, is compelled at this point to confess that the recording of a special gleam in the eye and a slightly intensified philosophic ardor on the face of the company when the fate of strange-minded realists' protégés was in question, may conceivably be the recording of an hallucination induced by a quite private and personal feeling for the aforesaid protégés. It may be proper at once to absolve all anti-realists of the Philosophical Association from the charges of an even momentary impulse of friendliness toward the disputed members of the Platonic kingdom which possibly they felt not a whit. We have already confessed that it may be similarly due to an idiosyncrasy of mind that we asserted any connection between Mr. Hoernlé's assimilation of Bradley's “that” and “what” with Meinong's doctrines, and Mr. Smith's employment of twentieth-century Platonism as a crutch for Aristotle.

After which scanty notice of the logical trilogy and tentative withdrawal of all in it that may offend, we have still on our hands, uncommented upon, the admirable paper of Mr. Cohen. Here again the issue appeared to be largely between the new and the old, as represented, for example, by the pre-Kantian view of geometry as the science of actual space *versus* the present interpretation of the subject. In the subsequent discussion there was revealed an astonishing difference of opinion between Mr. Cohen and Mr. Smith regarding the existential implications of the laws of Euclidean and of Riemannian space. Thus again, though somewhat obliquely, did realism come into question.

Mr. Cohen defined logic and characterized its functions suggestively and with incisiveness. None the less the company never reached a total agreement on the relation of mathematics and logic nor on any other matter. For reflections on the advantages of this circumstance, those interested are referred to the discussions of the meeting in 1913.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Mythology of All Races. LOUIS HERBERT GRAY, Editor; GEORGE FOOT MOORE, Consulting Editor. Boston: Marshall Jones Company. XIII Vols. Vol. I: *Greek and Roman*, WILLIAM SHERWOOD FOX (1916). Vol. VI: *Indian*, A. BERRIEDALE KEITH; and *Iranian*, ALBERT J. CARNOY (1917). Vol. IX: *Oceanic*, ROLAND B. DIXON (1917). Vol. X: *North American*, HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER (1916).

This experiment in popular synthesis of exotic material can not but arouse the liveliest sympathy and interest among the reading public at large as well as among professional students of primitive lore. Thus, the editors are to be congratulated upon the entire plan of publication and, on the whole, upon the way in which it has been carried out to date. From the standpoint of book-making—and in a series such as this the item is not unimportant—the four volumes before us deserve the highest praise. The books are well printed on excellent paper and embellished by a considerable number of illustrations in the text as well as by full-page tables, usually selected with care and invariably of high technical excellence. As to the contents, a synthetic presentation of the world's mythic lore has for so long been a desideratum, that to see a first attempt in this direction actually *im werden* is most satisfying, and one is tempted to