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141. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Małgorzata Czarnocka, Stanisław Czerniak

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142. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Michael Mitias

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The majority of theologians, philosophers, and religious leaders have, during the past five decades, either argued or taken it for granted that the primary aim of interreligious dialogue is mutual understanding and that the purpose of realizing this aim is mitigation of alienation, hatred, and violence between the religions and cooperation on worthwhile projects. On the contrary, the author of this paper argues that the primary aim of interreligious dialogue should be to create a bond of friendship between the various religions of the world. In his attempt to establish the validity of this proposition, the author, first, advances a concept of "collective subject" as a condition for the possibility of friendship primarily because friendship is viewed as a relation between two human subjects; second, he introduces a general concept of friendship whose main elements are good will, mutual affection, and social service; and, third, he argues that religions can, qua collective subjects, establish a bond of friendship between them.

143. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Kevin M. Brien

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This essay explores significant affinities with respect to the humanism of the Marxian and Confucian Ways. Although orthodox Marxism suppresses the humanistic dimensions of Marx’s thought, they are foremost in his earlier writing, and were never abandoned in his later thought. All varieties of Confucianism recognize its humanism. The essay argues that both perspectives involve process modes of understanding; that both have a convergent understanding of abstract general terms; that both view the human being as a community being; that both advocate similar ideal modes of becoming; and that both are concerned with the problems of human alienation.

144. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Temisanren Ebijuwa

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The quest for a decent political order in many societies is imperative today because of the heterogeneous nature of our social existence and the complexity of our ever increasing socio-economic and political experiences. Since the public sphere is a domain of freedom exemplified by dialogical engagements, the outcome of such encounter must involve the intelligible thoughts of all discussants with the sole aim of dealing with the concerns and commanding the commitment of all to the decisions reached. In this study, it is argued that Deweyan democracy as an alternative theory of rational inquiry is relevant for engaging the present sordid condition of many Africans democratic practice and policy outcomes. As a rational procedure, it is averred that John Dewey’s emphasis on epistemic properties of democratic discourse makes the proceduralist account of democracy superfluous and exposes the weakness of the content of democratic discourse in political actions and decisions. The study also contend that given the consensual state of Dewey’s epistemic thought, Jürgen Habermas theory rather than expanding the space of epistemic democracy stifled it because of his insistence on the force of a better argument in the resolution of conflicting concerns of dialoguers. The study therefore, argues for Dewey’s democracy as an alternative mode of political order since it does not undermine the views of the citizens but gives room for the activation a certain set of attitude that can challenge prevailing opinions and accepts the views that do not embrace conventional wisdom—a procedure that is necessary for the growth and development of our democratic space.

145. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Stanisław Czerniak

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This article aims to reconstruct Max Scheler’s conception of three types of knowledge, outlined in his late work Philosophical Perspectives (1928). Scheler distinguished three kinds of knowledge: empirical, used to exercise control over nature, eidetic (essential) and metaphysical. The author reviews the epistemological criteria that underlie this distinction, and its functionalistic assumptions. In the article’s polemic part he accuses Scheler of a) crypto-dualism in his theory of knowledge, which draws insufficient distinctions between metaphysical and eidetic knowledge; b) totally omitting the status of the humanities in his classification of knowledge types; c) consistently developing a philosophy of knowledge without resort to the research tools offered by the philosophy of science, which takes such analyses out of their social and historical context (i.e. how knowledge is created in today’s scientific communities).

146. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Stanisław Czerniak

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In this article I ask about the theoretical-methodological consistence between research sub-disciplines, which their creators see as discourses or paradigms that correspond on a general philosophical level. I will base this analysis on the historical-philosophical examples of certain sociology of knowledge and philosophical anthropology conceptions developed by Max Scheler as part of a broader philosophical theory. Scheler’s intention, which he often articulated in his writings, was to show philosophical anthropology in its role as the categorial foundation of the sociology of knowledge, a reservoir of the philosophical assumptions that underlie sociocognitive theories. The interpretative hypothesis in this article is that a) some parts of Scheler’s sociology of knowledge (the so-called class idol conception) would be very difficult to see as "grounded" in the conceptual model of philosophical anthropology he proposed, and b) that there exists an anthropological standpoint that differs from Scheler’s—Helmuth Plessner’s—and is more logically coherent with the "class idol" idea.

147. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Małgorzata Czarnocka

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The object of my inquiry is Max Scheler’s cognitive subjectivity conception, which in particular addresses the problem of subjectivity in science. Scheler introduces two kinds of subject: the first is the standard cognitive subject encountered in epistemological theories—an individual subject which really carries out cognitive acts. The second, collective subject, controls the first, imposing upon it the cognitive forms it has developed; I call this subject the creating subject. In Scheler’s theory, the creating subject is represented by the ethos of groups that initiate cognition, which determines the validity criteria of cognition. Therefore, Scheler’s cognitive subject is dual; both its forms have different attributes and functions in cognition: the individual cognitive subject is nonautonomous and determined by a superior collective one. The Schelerian creating subject can be seen as a detranscendentalised equivalent of Kant’s transcendental subject, insofar as both shape cognitive forms and thereby determine the cognitive acts of the individual subject.

148. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Aivaras Stepukonis

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The article explores a special mode of the human mind outlined in the writings of Max Scheler under the notion of the functionalization of essential (a priori) knowledge. While the concept of a priori was given its profound elaboration in the writings of Immanuel Kant, Scheler applies it with a number of significant modifications. Along with the a priori of objective reality, which is the mind’s first step in grasping the autonomous world, Scheler comes to posit a species of a priori that is subjective. A person’s exposure to an objective essence exercises a special kind of influence on that person’s mind: what was once an objective a priori is appropriated as a subjective a priori, the thing thought becomes a “form” or pattern of thinking, the thing liked becomes a “form” or manner of liking. “Functionalization” characterizes precisely the mind’s ability to transmute the essential knowledge of autonomous reality into subjective a priori forms of knowing and anticipating that reality. This transmutation unfolds on three intuitive planes: that of meaning which is known, that of value which is perceived or apprehended, and that of existence which is encountered in the resistance of objects to the will of the percipient.

149. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Małgorzata Czarnocka

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150. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Algis Mickunas

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The essay provides arguments and the disclosure of principles which are at the base of the modern Western understanding of the world and the human role in it. The principles are ontological, i.e., the conception of nature as a sum of material, atomic parts, and metaphysical, i.e., mathematics as a basis of scientific theories and methods. The conjunction of these principles constitutes what is known as “instrumental reason,” resulting in the universal technological globalization and nomadic civilization. The latter is composed of detached, technical experts, capable of residing anywhere without any cultural or ethnic commitments. The results of their activities are a global network of technical means both for global nomadic tourism and anonymous associations without personal involvement.

151. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Vladimir V. Maliavin

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The paper explores the significance of the Chinese concept of harmony (he, xiehe) for establishing a stable and efficient global governance. The author assumes that to meet demands of the emerging global community this concept should be assessed in the context of two other important notions: “commonality” (yong) and “similarity” or “sharing” (tong). The merging of these concepts has been a real basis of the Chinese tradition and it can serve as a foundation of a new global order based on the principle of synergy.

152. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Aivaras Stepukonis

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Humanity is moving towards a new world order, a “meta-civilization” with common values, processes, and organization, where cultural, national, and religious conflicts based on cultural differences are so easy to ignite and difficult to put out. In a world like this it is necessary to trace the origins of such differences (similarities as well), and study the conditions of their appearance. It is important to raise the awareness of the representatives of diverse civilizations and to encourage them to look for common grounds to foster intercultural understanding. With regard to the newly emerging world, philosophers do not keep aloof, they do rise from their cozy armchairs and confront the factual world where it is most problematic. “Innovative” ideas put forward today by the experts of international relations who emphasize the role of different civilizations in the global world, in fact were generated by the Honolulu movement of comparative philosophy much earlier. The members of the movement were already aware of the vital need to bring together foreign, often conflicting, civilizations and search for common intellectual footage between them. As a response to the problem they proposed the idea of a “world philosophy.” The article presents a typology of six distinguishable meanings of a “world philosophy” that were developed and circulated by the Honolulu movement of comparative philosophy, with a brief critique of each meaning.

153. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Vytautas Rubavičius

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The heritage of civilizations in geopolitics is progressively used to consolidate the vision of a multipolar world and, thereby, to establish its important place in the arena of international affairs. Civilizational heritage and civilizational imagination become increasingly important geopolitical factors which begin to shape the relations between China, Russia, Turkey, the United States and the European Union. In global politics during the last decades, in one way or another, Samuel Huntington’s ideas of the interactions between civilizations and their development externalised with the stress on the increase of civilizational conflicts. These ideas made great impact on political elites of main world powers. The author of this article—drawing attention to the importance of cultural and especially religious factors for civilizational processes and the interactions between civilizations, which were also raised by Huntington—examines the peculiarities of the Russian and Turkish civilizational and geopolitical discourses, and connects to those discourses the current geopolitics pursued by the political elites of these countries. The promotion of the current role of the civilization and its geopolitical legacy highlights the uniqueness of civilizations and creates an effort to strengthen the civilizational imagination and to use the civilizational imperial experience and its cultural heritage in current political events. The Russian discourse is characterised by the historical anti-Western and anti-European attitude of Eurasian Messianic civilizational distinctiveness, while the Turkish rhetoric is characterised by the elevation of the imperial Ottoman Islamic cultural and political heritage. Both the discourses are linked by an imperial mentality, orientation towards a multi-civilizational and multi-polar world as well as the demand to create a new world order in line with such an emerging worldview. The article also discusses some of the ideas prevailing in the European Union that underpin the policy of creating a post-national European cosmopolitan community. However, such discourse lacks a cultural, civilizational as well as religious heritage, which brings people together and can form a long-lasting sense of civilizational community.

154. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Zhang Bin, Julius Vaitkevičius

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Early and later Confucians, known in Chinese as the “ruists” school of ancient origins, perceived the idea of “harmony” as a fundamental concept that lies at the basis of self-cultivation, society and governance. In modern times this idea still plays in one or another form a dominant note in Chinese politics and social life. The article attempts to search for causes of the significance of “harmony” by focusing on analyzing two pivotal Confucian texts compiled in the Han dynasty, namely, Records of Music [Yue ji 樂記] and Divination of Music [Yue wei 樂緯]. The analysis shows that ruists belonging to Zhou dynasty’s imperial class of music officials, gradually developed the aesthetics of music into a complex idea of "harmony" that contains the highest aesthetical way—“Dao”—which guides both the whole universe as well as the evolution of human society.

155. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Tadas Snuviškis

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Daśapadārthī is a text of Indian philosophy and the Vaiśeṣika school only preserved in the Chinese translation made by Xuánzàng 玄奘 in 648 BC. The translation was included in the catalogs of East Asian Buddhist texts and subsequently in the East Asian Buddhist Canons (Dàzàngjīng 大藏經) despite clearly being not a Buddhist text. Daśapadārthī is almost unquestionably assumed to be written by a Vaiśeṣika 勝者 Huiyue 慧月 in Sanskrit reconstructed as Candramati or Maticandra. But is that the case? The author argues that the original Sanskrit text was compiled by the Buddhists based on previously existing Vaiśeṣika texts for an exclusively Buddhist purpose and was not used by the followers of Vaiśeṣika. That would explain Xuanzang’s choice for the translation as well as the non-circulation of the text among Vaiśeṣikas.

156. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Žilvinas Svigaris

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The living world is expanding thanks to the rapid and massive expansion of new technological capabilities. At the same time, paradoxically, it has been narrowed as thinking itself has become narrower and impoverished. Thinking has been pushed away by knowledge in almost all areas of the living world. Instead of thinking, modern man is becoming more and more curious. The acquisition of massively produced knowledge has become a form of consumption or even of entertainment. New theories that appear every day and reveal the failures of the previous ones only emphasize the limitations and fragmentation of the attitude itself. Although such knowledge is useful in solving practical local tasks, its universal validity is unfounded. What is needed is a more open consciousness which is able to reconcile different modes of experience. The rejection of ancient spiritual contemplating traditions and desacralization have impoverished the ability to express reality. This paper presents—as an attempt to recreate contemplative thinking—the conceptions of Martin Heidegger and Shinichi Hisamatsu, two thinkers living in different cultures. The paper pays a special attention to the way of being. The articulation of the state and the posture of the thinker and his/her attitudes uses concepts, that are often ambiguous, multidimensional, but already capable of articulating phenomena that could not otherwise be named. Such a stance paves the way for creative thinking capable of extending and overstepping the limits of the strict causal Western way of thinking.

157. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Audrius Beinorius

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This article deals with some earlier applications of psychology for the analysis of the colonial condition offered by three thinkers—Octave Mannoni, Frantz Fanon and recent applications of Freudian psychoanalytical theory in the poststructuralist approach of Homi K. Bhaba. An attempt is made to compare their standpoints and reflect more broadly on what their implications mean for the future of psychoanalysis’ place in postcolonial critique. Also to answer a vital question in the theoretical project of postcolonial studies: Is psychoanalysis a universally applicable theory for psychic disruption in the colonial context? What are differences in the application of psychological theory for studies of colonial discourse? The conclusion of the paper is: Despite the problematic inheritance of racializing thinking psychoanalysis has proved to be an important and reoccurring methodology in colonial critique and postcolonial theory. Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize that psychoanalysis itself is a colonial discipline and must become an object of colonial discourse analysis.

158. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Rasius Makselis

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The article presents an interpretation of Plotinius’ concept of eternity, which is defined in his treatise On Eternity and Time III.7 [45] as the “life of being.” The textual and philosophical analysis of a number of related passages from Plotinus’ Enneads concludes that the description of eternity as the life of being is neither metaphorical nor analogical. It should be understood in a technical philosophical sense, which contains direct metaphysical and phenomenological implications. Life is not an effect of intelligible reality but an ontological condition, the limit, source of activity, background for the identity of Intellect. The life of being is not identical with partial aspects of the intelligible universe, but is implied and covered by them. In the context of the Plotinian noetics, the notion of life expresses the wholeness of being in its totality—this is applicable not only to the life of intelligible being, but also true for the life of Soul, which assumes the totality of Soul’s time. Life is recognizable and experienced by living and existing beings on the basis of common liveliness and their common ontological status, so life establishes, develops and intensifies the connection of our own being with eternity via eternal in us. There are notable functional similarities between the Plotinian concept of eternity as the life of being and the image of Aion as reconstructed from fragments of Chaldean oracles—a mystical philosophical text widely read by later Neoplatonic philosophers, albeit never openly referred to by Plotinus. The comparative analysis and philosophical interpretation of the Plotinian and Chaldean concepts and images related to eternity suggest that both the sources maintain similar metaphysical roles of mediation, the transfer of unifying and animating light, causing the motion of reality. It is also significant that the Plotinian parallelism of eternity and “eternal in us” is comparable to the Chaldean image of “flower of the mind,” which is described both as a metaphysical attribute of Aion and as a specific power of Soul, which could be used by a person to acquire knowledge of divine reality.

159. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Hidemichi Tanaka

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Motoori (1730–1801) often criticized China, saying “Adashi Michi (alien way)” or “Kara Gokoro (Chinese mind).”“In China, they often say heaven’s way, heaven’s order or heaven’s reason and regard them as the most reverential and awesome things … firstly heaven is … not a thing with the mind, there cannot be such a thing as heaven’s order …” He concludes that there is no “way of nature” in China. He also mentions in his essay Tamakatsuma [Beautiful Bamboo Basket]: “We think that heaven and earth grow all things, but this is not true. It is the deed of Kami that all things grow. Heaven and earth is only the place where Kami grows all things. It is not heaven and earth that grow them.” Kami in this case seems to be different from heaven and earth, but this Kami is one with “nature” and he does not mean that Kami is above “nature.” I think that Motori resumes the essence of Shinto, comparing the thoughts of China.

160. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Stanislovas Juknevičius

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The article analyses Swami Vivekananda’s views on differences between civilisations and how they can be overcome. It focuses on the role of religion in the process of the coming together of the civilisations of the East and West. Vivekananda treats various religions as a manifestation of one universal religion and considered the morality of the individual as the main criterion of religion. Depending on the moral requirements, Vivekananda distinguishes three basic religious steps. The simplest and most common form of religion is the fulfilment of the historically-formed religious moral requirements. Individuals with a higher need for improvement can practice meditation. People at the highest stage of moral evolution perceive their lives as a constant and tireless service to others. Vivekananda’s life and creative work is the theoretical and practical basis for these fundamental claims of universal religion.