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161. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Ross Cogan

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162. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2

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163. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2

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book review

164. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Patrick Enfield

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165. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Anthony Rudd

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166. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Christopher Bertram

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167. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2

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article

168. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2

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169. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2

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170. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2

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171. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1

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172. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Enrique Chávez-Arvizo

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173. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Jordan Howard Sobel

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Speaking rather grandly, Egoism is the philosophy of self interest. It says that actions are ‘ruled’ by self interest which makes it prima facie a philosophy of selfishness. Whether this is its real character needs to be looked into. But first a complication intrudes, for only a little reflection reveals that egoism as here characterized is not one philosophy, but two. These want to be distinguished, and once distinguished, their relations understood. These preliminaries to investigating the merits of forms of egoism and connections with ordinary ideas of selfishness make the business of the present paper.
174. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Stephen Thornton

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175. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
David Garr

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In fairly recent times there has been an enormous growth of interest, especially from ethical theorists generally under the speIl of Aristotle, in both the moral virtues and the central significance of the notion of a virtue for an adequate grasp of the character of moral life. In the light of this it may weIl appear a useful exercise to sketch in very broad terms how a virtue-theoretical account of moral life and the nature of our moral responses stands in relation to other ethical views and to present the general outline of a case for regarding such an approach as preferable to others. In the first part of this article, then, I tried to prepare the ground for a virtue-theoretical account by showing how a safe conceptual course needs to be steered between the Scylla of ethical realism and the Charybdis of non-cognitivism. In this second part, however, I shall endeavour to develop a more positive view of the way in which a virtue-theoretical approach may successfully steer this course.
176. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Alan Carter

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177. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Mike Fuller

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This last of three articles on Structuralism and Post-structuralism attempts to do four things: (1) to summarize the dispute between Structuralism and Post-structuralism about the stability of meaning; (2) to present three criticisms of Derrida’s dissemination; (3) to assess the worth of these criticisms; and (4) to offer some concluding remarks on Structuralism and Post-structuralism.
178. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Antony Flew

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179. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
John Wilson

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180. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
John Lippitt

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