Filosofska Dumka

Within the article the attempt is made to study the perception of the XVIII century philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda’s image and its philosophy through the prism of the later national identities. The fact is stressed that the statement of the issue concerning the Hryhorii Skovoroda’s image Ukrainization and the history of its solution turns out to be the consequence of the process of establishing the Ukrainian modern self-identity which started in the ХІХ century. The situation is emphasized that within “all-Russian” identity one can come across its three variations: Skovoroda is a “Russian” (meaning “all-Russian”); Skovoroda is a “Malorussian” (meaning a representative of a regional variant of a “Russian” identity) and Skovoroda is a “Ukrainian” (meaning a native from the land that is called Ukraine). At the end of the ХІХ century Skovoroda’s image was interpreted within Ukrainian personal identity. The conclusion is made that during ХІХ—ХХ centuries and even nowadays two national identities for Skovoroda’s personality remain relevant: Ukrainian and Russian. The Russian one is a result of the XVIII—XIX centuries “all-Russian” syncretism state being transferred into the modern particular Russian national self-identity. The process of Hryhorii Skovoroda’s image Ukrainization (in other words its extraction from the “all-Russian” context) developed through several stages. At the beginning of the ХІХ century he was “Ukrainian” because he had a Ukrainian territorial identity and was related to Slobidska-Ukrainian province. Later he became “Ukrainian” because he represented “simple” Ukrainian people. Finally he is “Ukrainian” because he belongs to the Ukrainian ethnic nation and therefore his philosophy belongs to Ukrainian philosophical culture.

Round Table Discussion of “Philosophical Thought” (Nechyporenko, V. (moderator), Kozachynska, V., Aristova, A., Pavlenko, P., Kokhan, Ya., Buchma, O., Sytnychenko, L., Loznytsia, S., Nedavnya, O., Dobronosova, Yu., Volkovskyi, V., Kulagina-Stadnichenko, G., Smorzhevska, O., Bondaruk, T.)

The article deals with the role of Russian culture in the period of the RF war against Ukraine. The history is considered as the basic structure that shapes the discursive foundation of identity. Historical narratives as well as the cultural background of imperial identity and risks of the full scale representation of Russian culture in the Ukrainian social consciousness are analyzed. The two tendencies are also comprehended — junk science foundation of geopolitical projects and devaluation of the historically formed senses. So the communicative action is penetrated by the strategic action bazed on the false reality fundament, this significant element of the war of the world. The vi vid example of junk science is the neoeurasian ideology, that defines the strategy of Kremlin informational attack on the Ukrainian identity. Standoff between the identities takes place in the course of the imperial mobilization project development. The symbiosis of governmental authorities and artists plays the key role in its realization. The author outlines the main features of the strategic effect of penetration into the core of communicative process and the false reality building. Also the author develops the thought that the heartbreaking and impetuous change of contradictory narratives are the one of the fundamental resources of information war. In particular it deals with the great Russian Simulacrum as the vivid example of the instrumental reason that is in the base of the information war against Ukraine. It is also defined the historical origin of the simulacra as the instrument of the Russian special services and the role of their partners — the iconic figures of the Russian literature — in the projects of the public opinion manipulation.

Round Table Discussion of “Philosophical Thought” (Yermolenko, A. (moderator), Nechyporenko, V., Ho lovakha, E., Kyrychok, O., Maiboroda, O., Bystrytskyi, E., Karpitskyi, M., Zagorodniuk, V.,Fadeev, V., Hardashuk, T., Stegnii, O., Sagan, O., Tsymbal, T., Khamitov, N., Filipovych, L.,Horkusha, O., Bily, O., Omelyanchyk, V., Gomilko, O.

The article is a philosophical response to the op-ed of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas Krieg und Empörung, published by him in the Süddeutsche Zeitung in April 2022. The op-ed demonstrates the philosopher’s view on ideological disputes and political debates or “indignation” (Empörung) in public sphere in both Germany and the EU concerning an attempt to develop a unanimous policy to help Ukraine with weapons against Russia’s military aggression. The authors presume that Habermas published the accountable message of a responsible citizen that means it should be also taken as based on his theoretical achievements. The article consists of two parts. The first part sets out the main arguments of the philosopher’s newspaper article, which ends with a recommendation of compromise and partnership negotiations with the aggressor de facto due to the losses of Ukraine. The second part is an attempt by the authors to clarify the main preconditions and premises of Habermas’s communicative philosophy, which demonstrate the fundamental limitation of its explanatory power for this type of radical dissent, which is war. First of all, the authors suggest, it is the idea of pacification in interethnic relations, which forms the intellectual mood after World War II and finds its philosophical expression in the discovery of a priori foundations of understanding (Apel, Habermas) and ideas of developing formal pragmatics of communication. Attention to the latter allows the authors to demonstrate how consistent analysis of a priori (counterfactual) conditions of communication is considered by Habermas primarily in the historical perspective of positive dimensions of social integration - democratic equality, freedom, justice for participants of communicative interaction. The article concludes with a detailed analysis of the significance of the concept “lifeworld” as one of the central concepts within communicative theory and an analogue of “form of life” and “culture”. The authors argue the idea of perspective creating a common lifeworld for all in the processes of communication is fundamental to the works of the philosopher. The article concludes that the regulative idea of the single world as a basic ontological assumption of communicative theory does limit its explanatory capacity in terms of a war situation as a clash of different cultural worlds.

The paper describes the historical and intellectual foundations on which the European political system was built after the Second World War; this system pursued the goal to prevent any war in Europe, but proved unable to prevent the russian-Ukrainian war. The paper shows that this system was built not only because of the trauma of the First and Second World Wars, but also in accordance with the liberal attitude to war, which M. Vatter called «war with “war”»; at the same time, such a clear attitude does not refer to real wars, but to an imaginary «war of all against all». Based on the analysis of the principles and results of the research project “War and Society” under the direction of J. Baechler, the author outlines the principles of liberal Realpolitik as the implementation of the mentioned attitude in the realm of wars: it consists in their rationalization both at the level of goals and at the level of means of warfare; such a rationalization finally makes war irrational and unacceptable. From the point of view of such Realpolitik, war is only an extraordinary means of politics, and the russian-Ukrainian war is only an excess of violence, while in the opinion of the author, it is an inevitable consequence of the irrational and violent russian-Ukrainian extrapolitical conflict, whose stakes is the existence self of Ukraine. The author believes that one of the reasons for the inability of the European political system to prevent the russian-Ukrainian war is the belief that with the end of the Cold War, the “century of total war” in Europe also ended, and that the economic and cultural integration of post-communist countries into the European space makes such conflicts impossible. The author refers to the description of the own logic of wars of the 20th century, proposed in R. Aron’s book «The century of total war», and suggests considering the russian-Ukrainian war as a continuation of these wars. In the perspective proposed by R. Aron, the mentioned «century of total war» can be considered as a «long 20th century», which continues to this day.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the phenomenon of hatred in philosophic, psychological, and ethical aspects, and of its motivating role during the war. Explicating the philosophical understanding of hatred, the author analyzes the “Treatise of Human Nature” by Hume and explains the structure of hatred as the unity of the elements “cause-object-end” as well as the role of empathy in their genesis. In the article, the author proves that hatred as a passion is not a human instinct or only an emotion, while having an intention towards the understanding of another person and ethical evaluation of his or her motives and actions. The author analyzes the psychological structure of hatred as a durable complex of negative attitudes, motives, emotions, and dis positions of a person formed in individual and social existence. The multilevel way of experience and content of hatred explicated by the range from simple negation of other beings to the expression of moral judgement and demand of the retribution of hurt and struggle against evil. The author analyzes the concept of hatred by R. and K. Sternberg as a negation of intimacy of the other combined with various emotions and commitments of a person to act. Based on that, the article discusses the possibilities of the acquisition of ethical content by hatred and analyzes the typology of hatred by J. Gee (simple hatred, prejudicial hatred, malice and spite, retributive hatred, and moral hatred). The author of the article argues that the higher forms of conscious and controlled hatred possess rational components and moral content. The author concludes that the retributive hatred as a reactive moral attitude towards the blame of the wrongdoer and the demand of holding him responsible is an appropriate form of motivation for the resistance during the war and the establishment of peace. This kind of hatred plays a legitimate role in a mature person’s moral life and can be ethically justified.

The most influential thinker of the Age of Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant, is the author of the treatise on war and peace, “To Eternal Peace”, which is still unsurpassed in the realm of political and legal philosophy. Even today, this work helps to better understand the problem of the current war, as well as to answer the radical question: why should there be peace between people, and not war? Based on the thoughts of Kant, who builds his theory of peace primarily on reasonable, “reciprocal” egoism, the author of the essay makes the following conclusions in response to this Kant’s question. First, war not only destroys people’s well-being. It does violate justice. Secondly, the state, as an institution characterized by sovereignty, does not belong to anyone. Therefore, no one, like the president of Russia as of today, can demand, as he is doing, from the president of Ukraine to hand over the country or some part of it to him. Third, authoritarian states like Russia must allow their people what is called democracy. Namely, to recognize basic human rights in combination with the separation of public powers so that citizens could be able to act and work without intimidation and corruption.

The essay shows that the empire is not only about territories seized, but also about the reliable power established and exercised. This involves whole networks, first of all, those of transport and trade, finance and information. Certain languages and ‘technologies of power’ (Foucault) became widely used. Notably, it primarily concerned the West. Eventually, these technologies spread around the world and ensured the reliable exercise of power, making any empire and territory conquest obsolete and unnecessary.

The article deals with a role of mass culture in term of the theory of the culture industry by M. Hork heimer and T. Adorno and the theory of communicative action by J. Habermas, who continues research of the Frankfurt school. It is known that Habermas says about two types of rationality — communicative and structural. The lifeworld and the system correspond them. Usually, culture correspond to lifeworld because it helps people`s socialization. Also it is a place for communication and finding new meanings. However, a place of mass culture is very controversial. In particular, it is necessary to distinguish between popular and mass culture, because these definitions have been used as interchangeable for a long time. Popular culture is still an area of meanings. Moreover, it has the potential for protest. From this point of view, it is clearly part of the life world. But mass culture as a «cultural industry» is not so unambiguous. It is worth considering its characteristics and role in people’s life more detail. Above all, one cannot help paying attention to masses. Already in the last century, H. Arendt characterized them as an ato mized and isolated group of people, and they are not united by any common ideas. After all, even in the modern world it is possible to see that they do not have and do not want to search for any ideas or meanings. Masses are a direct consumers of mass culture. It is consumerism that the characteristic feature of modernity. Therefore, mass culture is inseparably connected with the market. On the one hand, it sells entertainments, and on the other hand, it generates new consumers, because it is related to advertising. In the same way, mass culture is connected with agitation and propaganda. Thus, it is possible to speak about its connection with politics. The market and po litics correspond to the system and are guided by strategic rationality. This fact gives reason to talk about mass culture as a strategic tool. Such culture with no meanings leads to a crisis in society.

Virtue epistemology is one of the most popular approaches to epistemological research in An g lophone philosophy. However, it is little known in Ukraine. The article aims to familiarize its readers with the making of virtue epistemology, presenting parallels with virtue ethics. The author makes an attempt to determine the place that virtue epistemology holds in modern philosophical discourse. The article provides a brief overview of the main research topics, the biggest controversies within the field, and the systematisation of classification types within the field. The author considers responsibilist and reliabilist approaches to the definition of intellectual virtue. Fur thermore, she demonstrates the importance of the Gettier problem for the formation and development of virtue epistemology theories. The article serves as a preliminary sketch of the current state of the Anglophone epistemological discussion presenting research in the field of virtue epistemology from its appearance to the present day. The overview nature of the article is used to test proposed translations of modern epistemological terminology in Ukrainian. The primary goal of the article is to introduce virtue epistemology to the Ukrainian philosophical discourse.