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Displaying: 201-220 of 1166 documents


201. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1
Andrew Alexander Davis

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Immanuel Kant’s “Schema” and J. G. Fichte’s “Bild” are parallel figures of activity that serve as bridges. For both Kant and Fichte, it is not the image/schema taken as product that is primary, but the act of imaging. I show how Fichte leans on the Kantian argumentation of the schematism in order to attempt bridging the gulf critical philosophy leaves between theoretical and practical philosophy. My broader purpose is to indicate how two German Idealists emphasize activity as a way of solving philosophical problems.

202. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1
William J. Mander

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Scholars have remained undecided how much the British Idealists owe to Hegel, how much to Kant, and how much they may be credited with minting a new intellectual coinage of their own. By way of a detailed examination of T. H. Green’s metaphysics of free will and how it stands to both its Kantian and its Hegelian predecessors, this paper attempts to make some headway on that longstanding question of pedigree. It is argued that by translating previously naturalistic considerations about free will into Kantian or atemporalist terms, Green makes some useful and important advances. But he still remains subject to the tension between libertarian and autonomous approaches to the issue. It might be wondered whether any theory could ever reconcile these two approaches, but it is argued that by filtering his Kantianism through a more Hegelian lens, Green manages somewhat to reduce the friction between these two perspectives and to get closer to his ideal of a unified theory of human free will.

203. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1
David A. Shikiar

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In this essay I attempt to clarify Hegel’s conception of reconciliation in objective spirit. I advance the view that it involves adopting one’s institutional structure as an end of one’s will and then proceed to explain how the resulting structure is to be thought of as ‘the mutual interpenetration of particular and universal.’ The structure in question involves the mutual affirmation and fulfillment of both individual and institutional rights, as well as individual and institutional freedom. Focusing particularly on freedom, I explain how the individual receives an institutionally mediated Bildung resulting in an individual who can be free and know herself as such. I conclude by arguing that the fully free individual must indeed come to serve as a locus for the collective subjectivity of her community by fully identifying with the process of, and the values embedded in, necessarily public parliamentary deliberation.

204. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1

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205. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 3
Nicholas Rescher

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The paper argues that the idea that immediate (i.e., self-contained, supposedly cognitively unmediated) experience of itself suffices to provide for “evident” knowledge is an illusion. The step from experiential subjectivity to objective fact always presupposes some suppositionally “taken” (rather than experientially given) linkage of an objectively trans-experiential nature. The deployment of idealistically mind-postulated resources is always needed to underwrite the step from personal experience to putatively objective knowledge.

206. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 3
Richard Dien Winfield

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Logic, as a thinking of thinking, in which method and subject matter are indistinguishable, cannot begin with any determinate form or content without question begging. The essay examines how logic can proceed from such an indeterminate starting point and achieve closure as a valid thinking of valid thinking. Drawing upon the final chapter of Hegel’s Science of Logic, the essay examines the nature of the end of logic and the significance this termination has for both philosophical method, the difference between truth and correctness, and the possibility of thinking what is other than thought.

207. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 3
Joshua Ben David Nichols

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Hegel’s account of international relations in the closing sections of the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1820) has been the source of considerable philosophical confusion and anxiety. This is primarily due to the fact that Hegel leaves international law at the stage of abstract right and thus, argues that an international moral order is impossible. In his essay ‘Hegel Contra Hegel in his Philosophy of Right’ (1994) and again in his systematic commentary on the Grundlinien Modern Freedom (2001) Adriaan Peperzack puts forward an innovative solution to this problem. He argues that Hegel failed to see that his own account of the transition from Abstract Right to Morality contains the solution (i.e., the appearance of the judge). In this paper I question this solution by closely examining the transition from Abstract Right to Morality. On the basis of this examination I argue that the attempt to apply this transition to Hegel’s account of international relations runs aground on the problem of punishment.

208. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 3
Victoria I. Burke

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A lexical unit of meaning, or the concept, involves not just two moments, the rule and the following of the rule, but two reciprocally dependent moments. I argue that this links meaning to value. As a reciprocal relation, truth as normative is constituted by what Hegel calls ethical substance, which exists only between more than one consciousness, or, as Hegel would say, moments of consciousness. I read these two moments as the two shapes of consciousness that Hegel calls the master and slave in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

209. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 3
Chong-Fuk Lau

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This paper aims to make better sense of Hegel’s Philosophy of Objective Spirit and defend it against the charge of political conservatism and optimism. I will argue for the left Hegelian position in the theological-philosophical respect, thereby leaving the left-right divide in the social-political respect largely open. I will explain that Hegel’s commitment to the inherent rationality of the state and the course of human history as the progress of freedom does not imply blind optimism, since his thesis is not to be taken as a factual description. Hegel’s point is rather a conceptual one: to comprehend the human world means to comprehend it as a holistically rational entity and process, which is the essential nature of comprehending in the context of the humanities. I will further clarify Hegel’s point by introducing relevant ideas from contemporary philosophy of mind and language, comparing it in particular with Davidson’s principle of charity.

210. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 3
Robert Piercey

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Paul Ricoeur sharply distinguishes his hermeneutics from Heidegger’s ‘ontological’ hermeneutics. An ontological hermeneutics, Ricoeur claims, is bound to be insufficiently critical. Yet this cannot be the whole story, since Ricoeur himself engages in ontological hermeneutics. What really distinguishes Heidegger’s hermeneutics from Ricoeur’s? I seek an answer to this question in the two thinkers’ appropriations of Kant. More specifically, I examine their appropriations of Kant’s view of the productive imagination, as conveyed in the Transcendental Schematism. Heidegger sees the productive imagination as a ‘third basic faculty’ prior to sensibility and understanding. Conceived in this way, the imagination is so primordial that it must be characterized in a highly abstract way. Ricoeur sees this move as dangerous, and tries to avoid it by reinterpreting the imagination as a faculty that requires the mediation of concrete symbols. In doing so, he hopes to preserve Kant’s insights while leaving room for critique.

211. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 3
Ezequiel Posesorski

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August Ludwig Hülsen’s virtually forgotten “Prüfung der von der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin aufgestellten Preisfrage: Was hat die Metaphysik seit Leibniz und Wolf für Progressen gemacht?” (1796, J. F. Hammerich, Altona) is the first German post-Kantian system in which reason is conceived as developing in history according to speculative rule based on the logical resolving of contradictions. Notwithstanding, Hülsen’s system is up to this day almost entirely unknown to most scholars in the field. This paper outlines the fundamental aspects of Hülsen’s system and discusses two of its main innovations: (1) the deduction of the transcendental possibility of rational historicity, and (2) the systematic historization of Fichte’s concept of judging activity; the constitutive equivalent of consciousness’s logical-temporal substrate.

212. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
James R. Mensch

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Jan Patočka appears as a paradoxical figure. A champion of human rights, he often presents his philosophy in quite traditional terms. He speaks of the “soul,” its “care,” and of “living in truth.” Yet, in his proposal for an “asubjective” phenomenology, he undermines the traditional notion of the self that has such rights. The question that thus confronts a reader of Patočka is how to reconcile the Patočka who was a spokesman of the Charter 77 movement with the proponent of asubjective phenomenology. What, in fact, is the conception of selfhood that allows him both to affirm human rights and to deny what has been traditionally conceived as the subject of such rights? This conception, I argue, is that of the self as a specific “motion of existence.” By focusing on how, through motion, we actualize our humanity, he avoids both the naturalistic and the idealistic (subjective) conceptions of the self.

213. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Tsarina Doyle

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This paper examines how Nietzsche’s view of the mind and its relationship to nature informs his account of human agency. In particular, it focuses on his approach to the causal efficacy of conscious mental states. By examining the Leibnizean and Kantian background to this approach, I contend that Nietzsche proposes a naturalist but non-eliminativist account of mind, central to which is his anti-Cartesian denial that consciousness is intrinsic to the mental. However, Nietzsche ultimately oscillates between two accounts: the first, which I call the ‘enchantment thesis,’ sacrifices the extrinsicality of consciousness but secures the causal efficacy of conscious mental states, whilst the second avoids enchanting nature, securing the extrinsicality of consciousness but sacrificing its causal efficacy. I argue that it is possible to reconstruct his arguments to combine elements of the conflicting accounts and to successfully hold together his anti-Cartesian account of mind with the possibility of autonomous human action.

214. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Junichi Kasuga

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This paper aims to analyze R. G. Collingwood’s maiden work in philosophy, Religion and Philosophy, in the light of the realism/idealism dispute in early twentieth-century British philosophy. Due to scholars’ narrow scopes of interests, this book has suffered divided and unsettled understandings in literature that find only either realist or idealist character in it. By contrast, I comprehensively examine various aspects of the work on which both readings rest in turn—his conception of history and metaphysics. Consequently, I find out that Collingwood implicitly elaborates a series of negative doctrines attempting to overcome dualismspervading at both poles of the dispute, namely abstract/concrete, subject/object, and theory/action. Since this framework is to be more explicitly present in his subsequent philosophizing, I demonstrate that Religion and Philosophy was, against its underestimated status in literature, not mere juvenilia, but a substantialstarting-point for Collingwood’s philosophy constructively grounded in the contemporary debate.

215. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Timothy C. Lord

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Aaron Ridley has concluded that “Collingwood’s global Idealism is really only a distraction from the much more important and interesting ideas that constitute his aesthetics.” My paper takes issue with this conclusion. Collingwood’s idealism is an integral part of his aesthetics, and it simply cannot be shucked off, leaving his aesthetics untouched and intact. A careful reading of Collingwood’s oeuvre in aesthetics reveals that it is his long-standing antipathy to realism that grounds both his critique of pseudo-art and his own theory of art, particularly his idealist theory of the imagination. If Collingwood’s aesthetics are interesting and important, so is the idealism that grounds them.

216. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
F. Scott Scribner

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This paper uses Maurice Blanchot’s image of the corpse as a trope by which to offer a unique quasi-material reading of the German Idealist notion of speculative suicide. And its method of interpretative retrieval, like these idealists, works to think the relevance of idealism today by affirming the spirit against the letter. The paradox of suicide—that we aspire to be witness to our own death—presents itself as a double, as interpreted in works of Fichte and Schelling. This double, the very core of speculative aspiration, is essentially a temporal other whose prosthetic character suggests that the speculative power of spirit is simultaneously technological, and that the limit-condition of suicide be found not in an ethereal speculative unity but rather in the intractable materiality of our own corporeal remains.

217. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Alessandro Medri

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In this article I show how Schelling elaborates the fundamental topic of the ontological proof, from the first phase of his philosophy on. I make clear how he keenly penetrates the formulation of Descartes, establishing that it is insuf­ficient in order to demonstrate the existence of God. The fact is, Descartes says that it would be contradictory with the nature of the perfect being that he existed only accidentally; so that it can exist only necessarily. But it is different to say that God can exist only necessarily, and to say that He in fact exists necessarily. From the first sentence, descends only that He exists necessarily if He exists, but this does not imply that He exists in fact. To arrive to the existence, the only possible way is through experience: the reason gives the concept, the experience gives the existence. On this difference is based the hendiadys between negative and positive philosophy, the nature of which I cleared up in the last part of the article.

218. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Kristi Sweet

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Kant’s elevation of practical reason to a position of primacy in relation to theoretical reason is certainly well known. With this, though, comes also a new articulation of what the task of philosophy is. This paper addresses how Kant thinks that philosophy must actively promote and work to bring about the essential ends of human life, namely, moral goodness and a just society. This means that philosophers must direct the use of their reason to the public sphere. In this, the primary occupations of philosophy for Kant can be seen to be moral education, which aims at the moral goodness of individuals, and political critique, which seeks to bring about a society in accord with universal law.

219. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Gertrudis Van de Vijver, Eli Noé

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A reading of Kant’s viewpoint on objectivity is suggested that finds inspiration in the second part of the third Critique, on living systems. It develops the idea that the need to articulate the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity only emerges to the extent that something resists the anticipative procedures of a living, actively engaged being. The possibility of objective knowledge, so it is argued, rests on the possibility of developing an adequate orientation in a phenomenal world, i.e., the possibility of actively distinguishing an “outside” from an “inside”—this not on the basis of an a priori principle, but by taking into account the punctual resistances and disappointments that appear within contingent encounters leading to pleasure and displeasure. We consider negation as a constitutive factor in the emergence of this very basic distinction, as well as in more elaborate and complex differentiations between objectivity and subjectivity.

220. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Erich Fuchs

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In an analysis of Fichte’s theoretical reflections read in the light of decisive biographical events, the present paper examines the following question: to what extent are we to assent to Fichte’s own assertion that his system is from the very outset a system of freedom? Kant’s philosophy provided the catalyst for the young Fichte because it promised a way out of the impasse of determinism. I will argue that the ultimate goal of Fichte’s lifelong struggle was to furnish a foundation for genuine freedom. In reaction to both Jacobi and Schelling, Fichte’s philosophical and political investigations pursue at once the problem of grounding the “Absolute” and the relationship between individual freedom and reason as a whole.—These tensions are especially visible in Fichte’s path from the Addresses To the German Nation to the virtually unknown “Philosophical Diaries” of the final days of his life.