Dialogue and Universalism

The proposition I elucidate and defend in this paper is that the explanatory power of Malgorzata Czarnocka’s conception of symbolic truth extends beyond our knowledge of empirical reality and includes our knowledge of human nature and human values. The paper is composed of two parts. In the first part I present a detailed analysis of the conception of symbolic truth. The focus in this analysis is on the nature of the correspondence relation which connects a true statement and the cognitive object. Czarnocka persuasively argues that this relation is neither isomorphic nor homomorphic in character. She advances a detailed analysis of sensual perception as the locus of the cognitive act. The outcome of this analysis is that the structure of the statement which is articulated in this act does not copy or mirror the structure of the object but is a linguistic representation. In the second part of the paper I argue that empirical reality is not the paradigm of reality and that scientific knowledge is not the paradigm of knowledge. The domain of humanity is as real as the domain of empirical reality, and our knowledge of this domain is as central to our life as scientific knowledge is. Moreover, I argue that Czarnocka’s conception of symbolic truth functions adequately in explaining the possibility of knowledge of human nature and human values with special focus on the literary work of art.

The proposition I elucidates and defend in this paper is that the Transcendent can be an object of genuine knowledge and that the knowledge the philosophical mystic claims of it is symbolic in nature. In my endeavor to achieve this aim I rely on Małgorzata Czarnocka’s conception of symbolic truth as a model of explanation. I am inclined to think that, as a model of explanation, this conception sheds ample light on the possibility of having a cognitive experience of the Transcendent. The paper is composed of four parts. The first part raises the question of the Transcendent as an object of knowledge. The second part advances a brief analysis of the main elements of Czarnozka’s conception of symbolic truth with special emphasis on her view of human nature. The third part explicates the sense in which the conception of symbolic truth functions as a model of explanation. The fourth part analyzes the conditions under which the Transcendent can be an object of knowledge.

I investigate the universality of science as perceived in epistemological conceptions and in sociology of science, as well as claims about the anti-universal character of science. In this, I distinguish two kinds of universality of science: epistemic and global cultural/social, and in the latter also the global universality of the basic level of science. I attempt to show that epistemology views science as universal in its basic aspects relating to knowledge, its object, subject and cognitive values as well as methods, which, according to the epistemological meta-theses, are necessary for scientific validity and autonomy. I also draw attention to the fact that sociologised, multiculturally-oriented approaches to science are wrong to hold it for irrevocably anti-universal and exclusively a part of Western culture. I suggest instead the perspective of basic-level global universalism, where science is seen to grow out of a cultural base common to all cultures, which provides the criteria for weak rationality, weak empiricism and methodology and determines the nomological character of cognition. Finally, I trace the evolution of universality from a property of science to a value, and ask about the meaning of this property-cum-value for the human world.

Deep disagreement is a disagreement about epistemic principles, pertaining to the methods of justification and argumentation. Relying on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conceptual metaphor of “hinges,” researchers arrive at the conclusion that deep disagreement cannot be resolved. This conclusion leads to relativism in the theory of argumentation. The aim of the article is to show that in the situation of deep disagreement it is theoretically possible to ascertain which of the positions of the participants of the argument has a better epistemic status, and hence, is argumentatively virtuous.

Neither for today’s Russia, nor for the whole of the contemporary world is there, perhaps, a more important issue than the possibility of a civilized, peaceful dialogue between cultures, peoples, governments and individuals. The International Society for Universal Dialogue is one among other philosophical schools, societies and organizations which promote the idea of universal dialogue. It tries to solve problems associated with language and ideological barriers, strengthening professional and friendly ties and implementation, through joint efforts, of a peaceful and fair world order.

This paper argues that the contemporary challenge for ISUD and philosophy itself is to repair and replenish our shared and overlapping lifeworlds through the recovery, critique, clarification, and renewal of authentic values, insights, and achievements from the widest possible plurality of traditions, cultures, and philosophical visions. We must liberate the life world from the snares of creeping nihilism. We must repair and replenish the life world through open and honest communication, through philosophical dialogue among an ever-greater plurality of perspectives and points of view.

In this essay, I argue that the contemporary world scene is characterized by a growing sense of conflict, disorganization, and fragmentation of previous unities and alliances. I also argue that any serious attempt to address these issues would have to focus on the following broad areas of concern: (1) the challenge of global political instability; (2) the challenge of promoting a more positive approach to regionalism; (3) the challenge of global poverty and inequality; (4) the challenge of human displacement; and (5) the challenge of climate change and environmental degradation.

This paper considers the extent to which we already live in a cosmopolitan era. Resurgent nationalism is explained as a reactionary response to the success of cosmopolitanization. Cosmopolitanization is further explained as a dialectical process. Contemporary cosmopolitanism emerges against the backdrop of Eurocentric globalization associated with the colonial era. While the Eurocentric legacy must be rejected, it has left us with a cosmopolitan world. Other dialectical processes emerge in consideration of the importance of local and multicultural issues. Cosmopolitanization is a process that must work to connect global processes with local concerns. The paper situates this argument in consideration of events in Peru, in connection with the rise of Donald Trump in the United States, and in relation to several examples of the cosmopolitan dialectic. Despite some dialectical setbacks, the paper concludes that we are already operating in a world in which globally diverse ideas and practices are already in dialogue. The challenge is to continue the cosmpolitanizing conversation, while remaining responsive to the needs of local communities.

The concern of this paper is to critique the political conception of nationalism as a theory of the nation-state. The basic point of the critique is that when the interests of the nation and the principles of the state coincide there emerges a fierce sense of national identity which endangers moral indifference to outsiders, the people within and outside the national boundary, without remorse. Here the attempt to uphold national identity is something more than nationhood. Besides involving territorial identity, common language, custom and culture essential to the idea of a “nation,” it also upholds the consciousness of these as determining separate rights and allegiances, the idea of attachment to a nation and its interests. Such a consciousness can emerge only on the adoption of certain populist ideas such as racism, ethnicity and even such popular elusive myths as the “greatness” of a nation, the urge for the maintenance of “national character,” etc. Such “nationalist xenophobia” leads to the intensification of the distinction between the “own” and the “other,” “national” and the “alien,” the “citizen” and the “migrant” leading to “ethnic disharmony,” “colour bias,” hatred and suspicion of persons with whom one has lived closely as neighbours for decades. The most popular is the economic discourse of the “migrants” putting the “nationals” out of work. All this has its toll on multi-culturalism and humanitarian concerns. Many affluent nations have become cold to human misery, suffering and deaths from wars, terrorism, acute poverty, political persecution, environmental degradation, etc. This has created an “existential” crisis for millions of people on earth.

Over the past couple of decades, both the news media and mainstream literature have been awash with stories of some sort of renascent nationalism and populism. Some citizens have begun to express lack of confidence in core representative institutions, accusing politicians and entrepreneurs of having lost touch with the concerns of ordinary people. They demand protection from transnational economic forces undercutting their access to jobs, wages, and benefits, and in addition, from the threats of terrorism associated with Islamic extremism. In this piece, their questioning of liberal civil rights was reviewed. Efforts at liberal homogenization were examined, and the charge that conservative views trivialize the ethics of universal human care, love and collaboration, which are at the heart of creating enduring peace in the world, was considered.

In the history of political thought a major problem has been to determine if philosophers should get involved in political affairs. From Aristotle to Antonio Gramsci, a wide variety of positions have been presented on this topic. Today academics often choose to isolate themselves in the ivory tower of the university. Although there are many exceptions to this general rule there is no consensus about how philosophers should relate to politics. We hope that this article which explores the relation of Aristotle to Machiavelli can shed some light on this very relevant issue.

The essay characterizes an anthropological impasse of political philosophy dividing those in a more liberal tradition from those in a more Hegelian tradition, and then it proceeds to sketch a political philosophy without any human or anthropological content. I rely on Foucault’s notion of parrhesia to activate such a political philosophy, and I rely on the philosophical life of the Cynic to make parrhesia possible. Finally by invoking exercises of ascent and of descent, I suggest that this kind of political philosophy can not only solve the anthropological impasse of political philosophy, but also in practice, it can cool hateful passions and warm cold hearts.

I have chosen to approach the Marxian alienation theory from a historical angle and recount its evolution in Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the Grundrisse (Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy), wherein it develops into a theory regulating the co-creation of conditions for “freedom” in the choice of processes that lead to de-alienation. I will attempt to present the alienation theory as an aspect of a broader anti-metaphysical critique of all substantialism, According to Marx, the substantialist approach to history could at most only pretend to be dynamic and ignored the structural complexity of being, whereas the true idea was to notice and keep track of the structural and qualitative changes brought to being by the genetic, structural, social, economic, class and institutional conditionings of human history.

The aim of this essay is to examine the long-term evolution of the material reproductive vehicles of society. The fairly continuous trend of economic integration and progressive enfranchisement of the world’s people is indicated, ascertainable even with the emergence from general slavery of ancient times, through feudalism to the modern stage of industrialism and widespread national sovereignties. With greater political expression has come higher degrees and penetration of economic prosperity. Both vicious and virtuous tendencies of automation are considered. The necessary foundation of living labor is recognized.

The issue of safety, especially in the contemporary globalised world, requires an interdisciplinary approach, which takes into account insights offered by such disciplines as philosophy, sociology, economics, or political sciences, with a special consideration of international relationships. The aim of this paper is to introduce safety as a moral dilemma with regard to the safety-freedom dichotomy. In the first part, the humanistic aspect of safety will be depicted, especially in its axiological dimension. The analysis of safety will be carried out in the context of the intersubjective existence. The intersubjective existence of safety is formulated on two levels: the real and unreal intersubjective existence. In the second part of the paper, the institutional aspect of safety will be presented. Here, the discussion will proceed in the context of non-independence of the existence of structural safety. Among others, the following phenomena posing a threat to safety in a global world will undergo analyses in the context of the objectivity of existence (real and unreal objective existence) and non-independence of existence: terrorism, cyberterrorism, mass migration, various conflicts, development disparities between countries, and the protection of the natural environment.

Hobbes postulates a social contract to formalize our collective transition from the state of nature to civil society. The prisoner’s dilemma challenges both the mechanics and the outcome of that thought experiment. The incentives for reneging are supposedly strong enough to keep rational persons from cooperating. This paper argues that the prisoner’s dilemma undermines a position Hobbes does not hold. The context and parameters of the social contract steer it safely between the horns of the dilemma. Specifically, in a setting as hostile as the state of nature, Hobbes’s emphasis on self-interest places a premium on survival, and thereby on adaptability, which then promotes progressive concessions toward peaceful coexistence. This transforms the relevant model of rationality from utility maximization to utility satisficing, thus favoring the pursuit of a mutually satisfactory outcome over that of the best personal outcome. The difference not only obviates the prisoner’s dilemma but also better approximates the state of nature while leaving a viable way out.

As of 2017, 65.6 million individuals have been displaced from their homes, fleeing their homelands in search of refuge from the violence, oppression, and chaos of civil war. The mass movement of people across internal and external borders only proves that there are certain aspects of the human condition that cannot be confined within the strict idea of territories and nation-states, that the political and legal approach in organising the interaction and relationships between people is deficient. I argue that there is a need to recalibrate all existing ideologies in relation to the interactions and relationships between peoples coming from different parts of the world. In order to do this, I intend to examine the current legal norm and connect it to cosmopolitan ethics that are grounded on the idea of spatiality. Elucidating on the ideas presented by thinkers such as Seyla Benhabib, Anthony Kwame Appiah, Gloria Anzaldua, and Tetsuro Watsuji, I argue that to fully actualise cosmopolitan ethics we must investigate how space operates in the existence of man—a deterritorialised existence found in the borders.

This paper revisits the perennial crisis of African development. The authors, unoblivious of theories that have been put forward for ending this crisis, delimit their intervention to the political and economic aspects. They review the dominant approaches to African development, that is, capitalism and Marxism. Following this review and a critical reading of the reigning orthodoxies of economic mobilization and statecraft inherent in pre-colonial Africa, the authors propose a liberal-paternalistic theory of development rooted in the idea of African socialism/communalism. They argue that this idea provides a veritable basis for Africa’s development.

This article discusses the character of hegemonic subjectification as it is seen by Ernesto Laclau. By explaining the concepts of the constitutive features and form of a hegemonically acquired political identity, such as antagonism, undecidability, overdetermination and decision, I define the social fields and dynamics of subjectification. At the same time, I adopt that such subjectification occurs within the boundaries of the particular (demand)–universal, i.e., the ideologically assigned view of identity as totality. Besides, in contrast to Laclau, I juxtapose the dialectically conceived form of the particular–universal relation with its poststructuralist Laclau’s version, and I try to prove that—contrary to Laclau—the idea of hegemony enjoys its vitality thanks to Theodor W. Adorno’s concept of negative dialectics. To determine the points of similarity of the two methods of constructing and deconstructing identity and subjectivity, I reject Elmar Flatschart’s incomparability argument. Lastly, I point out the earlier mentioned points of convergence: on Adorno’s part—the concept of proper names and the concept of constellation; on Laclau’s part—the concept of undecidability and decision which keep discourse ontologically and epistemologically open.