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41. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 53
Sean Kirkland

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42. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 53
Stefan Schmidt

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According to Hans Ruin, there are two ways to approach the examination of freedom in Heidegger’s writings: One can use the notion of freedom as a heuristic concept to interpret the entirety of Heidegger’s work as a philosophy of freedom, which was famously done by Günter Figal, or one can reconstruct Heidegger’s actual use of the notion of freedom. In my paper I’ll focus on the second approach and show that although “freedom” or, rather, “being-free” can already be found in Being and Time, his more elaborate concept of freedom as transcendence is developed in the years 1928-1930. These years are part of a time period in which Heidegger tried to develop his own positive concept of metaphysics. The main texts which show this development are the lecture course The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic and the essay On the Essence of Ground. Based on Aristotle’s twofold metaphysics—consisting of ontology and philosophical theology—Heidegger sketches his own concept of metaphysics. The fundamental ontology which plays the role of ontology is complemented by his cosmological interpretation of theology: metontology. Together, they form Heidegger’s novel notion of metaphysics: the metaphysics of Dasein. Whereas fundamental ontology is concerned with the question of Being, the main subject of metontology is world as beings as a whole. Heidegger develops his concept of transcendence, i.e., metontological freedom, which describes the connection between freedom and world, on the basis of the terms world-projection (Weltentwurf), world-view (Weltanschauung), and world-formation (Weltbildung), each describing an aspect of transcendence.

43. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 53
Jim Bahoh

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If we are to understand the conditions in which human existence or Dasein might be free, we must understand the conditions in which it is not free, that is, the nature of the conditions whereby Dasein’s freedom is constricted. In this paper I explore the idea that at best Heidegger’s ontology might support a picture of freedom somewhat akin to Spinozan freedom: in the right conditions we might to a greater or lesser degree act in a way aligned with our own being. In the post-Kehre Heidegger of the 1930s and early 40s, this would take the form of existing in a way properly grounded in – or rather, aligned with our ground in – beyng (Seyn) as event (Ereignis). If this is the case, to understand the conditions whereby we are not free – at least at an ontological level – means to understand the nature of our alienation from our ground in beyng as event. In this paper, I examine Heidegger’s account of the nature of this alienation in Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). In that text, this alienation is described in terms of our condition within an alienated configuration or ‘epoch’ of history – that of metaphysics – a configuration defined by ‘Seinsverlassenheit’ (‘abandonment by being’), expressed in terms of ‘Machenschaft’ (machination), ‘Vor-stellung’ (representation), and ‘Erlebnis’ (lived experience).

44. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 53
Trish Glazebrook

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45. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 53
Richard Polt Orcid-ID

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46. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 53
Daniela Vallega-Neu

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This paper is about my latest book on Heidegger’s non-public writings on the event. It begins with a discussion of Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) and ends with The Event, spanning roughly the years 1936 to 1941. I pay primary attention to shift of attunements, concepts, and movement of thought in these volumes. Thereby a narrative emerges that traces a shift from a more Nietzschean pathos emphasizing the power of beyng to a more mystical approach in which Heidegger thinks “the beingless,” “what is without power,” and speaks of originary thinking as a thanking rather than a questioning. The shift begins to happen in 1939, the year World War II broke out but becomes clearly visible in 1940 in the volume On Inception (GA 70). Heidegger’s path of thinking is one of downgoing into the most concealed dimension of the truth of beyng and an attempt at thinking more radically without primacy of the human being. Among the many questions my book engages, I am focusing especially on the articulation of both the difference and simultaneity of beyng and beings in relation to attunement, body, history, and Heidegger’s errancies.

47. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 53
Will McNeill

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Heidegger’s 1936 essay “The Origin of the Work of Art” is notoriously dense and difficult. In part this is because it appears to come almost from nowhere, given that Heidegger has relatively little to say about art in his earlier work. Yet the essay can only be adequately understood, I would argue, in concert with Heidegger’s essay on Hölderlin from the same year, “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetizing.” Without the Hölderlin essay, for instance, the central claim of “The Origin of the Work of Art” to the effect that all art is in essence poetizing, Dichtung, can hardly be appreciated in its philosophical significance without the discussions of both essence and poetizing that appear in the Hölderlin essay. This is true of other concepts also. The central concept of the rift (Riß)—the fissure or tear—that appears in “The Origin of the Work of Art” might readily be assumed to be adopted from Albrecht Dürer, whose use of the term Heidegger cites at a key point in the 1936 essay. Here, however, I argue that the real source of the concept for Heidegger is Hölderlin, and that the Riß is, moreover—quite literally—an inscription of originary, ekstatic temporality; that is, of temporality as the “origin” of Being and as the poetic or poetizing essence of art. I do so, first, by briefly considering Heidegger’s references to Dürer in “The Origin of the Work of Art” and other texts from the period, as well as his understanding of the Riß and of the tearing of the Riß in that essay and in its two earlier versions. I then turn to Heidegger’s 1936 Rome lecture “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetizing,” in order to show the Hölderlinian origins of this concept for Heidegger.

48. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 53
Khafiz Kerimov

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This essay focuses on Heidegger’s formula “that it is” (daß es ist) Being and Time and “The Origin of the Work of Art.” In spite of the substantial shift in philosophical vocabulary and subject matter (associated with the so-called “turn” in Heidegger’s philosophy) between the two works, the daß-formula is to be found (at important junctures) in both. In this essay I will show that the expression reveals not only a hitherto unthematized continuity between the two works but also Heidegger’s abiding philosophical concern that remain unaffected by the “turn”: to rethink possibility (potentiality) as no longer subordinate to actuality, to rethink possibility as freedom, whether in the human Dasein or in a work of art. For Heidegger it is only when we can say no more of Dasein (or the artwork) than that it is that freedom and possibility can be thought.

49. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 53
Renxiang Liu

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Heidegger’s notion of freedom depends on an original temporality more fundamental than world-time (the time of determinism). This paper asks whether freedom means a withdrawal from world-time or a releasement into it. Being and Time discloses Dasein’s drifting-along in world-time as inauthentic. In this way, it secures freedom from determinism, but also gives the impression that authenticity, as a resoluteness, entails a withdrawal from world-time. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics shows that Heidegger is well aware of the problem of withdrawal. He focuses on the attunement of boredom, which delivers Dasein back into world-time. The tension of the authentic moment of vision is too intense to endure, therefore Dasein has to remove this tension and thus to release itself into world-time. “The Origin of the Work of Art” extends the boredom of Dasein to a metaphysical boredom of Being in general. The earth, the undifferentiated ground of Being, cannot be given at once in totality. Instead, it bears an impulse toward the work, in which Being is individuated in world-time. “The Eternal Recurrence of the Same” refigures this tension in Nietzsche’s metaphysics between creative Becoming and fixated Being and concludes that Becoming, in order to create or subsist at all, has to be “infected” by Being, thus entering world-time. Freedom is better understood as a releasement into world-time. This is a tragic event, but it is also the only way freedom may overcome the bondage of world-time: by incorporating the latter as a transient stage of its own.

50. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 53
Hans Pedersen

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51. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 53
Justin Remhof

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In the Introduction to Being and Nothingness, Sartre provides what he calls an “ontological proof” that purports to undermine Heidegger’s idealist view that the existence of objects is constitutively dependent on our characteristically human mode of existence. In this paper, I introduce an interpretation of Heidegger’s idealism, develop Sartre’s criticism of Heidegger, and explore a promising way Heidegger might respond. It will emerge that Heidegger’s idealism, if understood correctly as embracing a modal commitment central to Kantian idealism, survives Sartre’s ontological proof.

52. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 52
Richard Colledge

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This talk approaches the closely inter-connected themes of nature and Vorhandenheit in the early Heidegger by initially distinguishing three internally complex senses of these terms (the theoretical, the intraworldly and the extraworldly,) before honing in on the last of these: i.e., nature understood as radical non-hermeneutical excess (Übermaß.) In what follows, a series of early Heideggerian texts are discussed in terms of the way that this theme emerges in his thought, and its ambiguous place as a locus of the incomprehensible “unworlded world” over against the major stream of Heideggerian ontology as a thinking about the clearing of meaning. It is in this context that the difficult question of the ontological status of unworlded nature is broached in the context of Richard Polt’s discussion of the theme of excess in Heidegger.

53. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 52
Matthew Kruger-Ross

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If, as Lovitt (1977) declares, “Heidegger is primarily a teacher,” then how can interpreting Heidegger’s thinking as acts of pedagogical relationality inform not only our understanding of his thinking but also who we are as teachers? Given the introduction of a new format for presentation, I am proposing an oral presentation and discussion to cultivate possible answers to this question. Attendees are profoundly teachers; it is a fundamental part of our scholarly lives. We teach who we are, and who we are has been influenced by our engaging with Heidegger’s thinking. In this conversation, we will share and reflect on our backgrounds as teachers and how we understand our teaching in connection to Heidegger’s philosophy and calls for a renewal in “thinking.”

54. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 52
Jessica Elkayam

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Sudden removal, transport, Entruckung, ekstasis. Time takes us and seizes us—we are finite and, thus, to some extent, impotent. But we must not fail to note that time takes us places. These places are landscapes that while virtual are no less real. This issue of the virtuality of landscape, of the reality of world(s) to which one travels is something of a mystery, a mystery that is shared in common between unlikely bedfellows: Heidegger and Latina feminist phenomenologists María Lugones and Mariana Ortega. As the first airing of a work long in progress, I hope to discuss Lugones’ provocative claim regarding the descriptive import of travel between worlds over and above the ontological justification of the reality thereof in light of both: 1) Ortega’s reading, which deploys tools from Heidegger’s Being and Time while leaving Lugones’ claim intact; and 2) a critical enrichment of the conversation Ortega opens that functions by linking her “multiple self” to Heidegger’s development of Dasein in the human being (GA 29/30), such that: a) “world travel” earns ontological distinction by way of radical finitude (and thus by way of time) and b) Heidegger’s myopic account of need circa 1929 can be diagnosed as such and extended beyond the limits of his intentions to make space for an ontico-ontological manifold that demands recognition.

55. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 52
Clayton Shoppa

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Heidegger’s National Socialist political sympathies are plainer and more troubling to contemporary readers than ever before. This paper examines the relation of leader to society Heidegger uses to ground his account of the state. Heidegger draws on Aristotle and Kant to make his case in the 1930s. But breakthroughs in the previous decade, in Being and Time in particular, make the political ontology he endorses less than compelling. The power of the leader over the society he or she leads cannot repeat the relation of Being over entities. The ontological difference is different from, and incompatible with, all possible statements of political community. Ontologically speaking, totalitarianism is a category mistake. Confusing the transcendental domain for its ontic content, Heidegger refuses to learn his own lesson in ways Eric Voegelin helps us detect.

56. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 52
Daniel Herskowitz

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In this paper I focus on the specific communal setting within which Heidegger places Dasein’s authentic co-historicizing, namely, the Volk. Section §74 of Being and Time, with its invocation of the charged Volkish notions of fate, destiny, heritage, and struggle, has long been in the center of the debates over the possible connections between Heidegger’s philosophy and his early affiliation with National Socialism. In my paper I wish to intervene in this debate by looking at the early Jewish receptions of Heidegger’s philosophy in the 1930s and expose a strand in this reception that did not disapprove of the Volkish terminology put to use in the Dasein analytic, and at times even found it particularly fitting for the Jewish case. Exposing this strand allows for a better understanding of the historical and conceptual context within which Heidegger’s Volkish terminology was put to use, indicating that claims regarding a necessary ‘cause and effect’ connection between his early philosophy and fascist politics are simplistic.

57. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 52
Michael Steinmann

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58. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 52
Michael Sigrist

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It is often alleged that there is no substantial possibility for authentic community in Heidegger. This is encouraged by Heidegger’s frequent disparaging remarks about the public and public life. However, there are also several substantial passages, both in Being and Time and elsewhere, where Heidegger seems to endorse a notion of communal and historical being together. In this paper I try to work out this apparent inconsistency in a way that favors the possibility of authentic community. First, I explain the reasoning behind several influential accounts which argue that authenticity and community are essentially in tension. I argue that these interpretations mistakenly attribute a thesis about language and intelligibility—conflating Heidegger’s phenomenology of language with linguistic pragmatism or conventionalism—that Heidegger almost certainly did not share. Disabused of this mistaken attribution, the purported essential tension between authenticity and community is dissolved. Still, it’s true that public life can be and usually is at odds with authentic existence, and so there is a difference between ‘the public’ and an authentic community. I examine Heidegger’s early lectures on Paul’s attempt to maintain an authentic community among early Christian congregations to illustrate and explain this inherent tension or ambiguity.

59. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 52
Micah Trautman

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This essay begins to investigate the possibility of a Heideggerian sense of hospitality. By drawing out the concern for home at the center of Heidegger’s analysis of uncanniness and attending carefully to its ethical resonances, I believe we find an opening to just such a possibility. Heidegger’s thinking of uncanniness, of an essential uncanniness that defines human-being as both unhomely and becoming homely, opens us to an ethicality understood in terms of home, an authentic being-with that finds its origin in the uncanny opening of human-being to Being, and thus, to beings.

60. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 52
Suraj Chaudhary

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Interpretations of Heidegger’s discussion of space in Being and Time have predominantly focused on two related themes: Heidegger’s attempt to ground spatiality in temporality and the problem of embodiment. Little direct attention, however, has been given to the role Heidegger’s discussion of spatiality plays in his analysis of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. This paper pursues the thesis that Heidegger’s account of Being-in-the-world, which is meant to avoid a subject-object dichotomy by representing a unitary phenomenon, falls prey to a charge of subjectivism lacking an adequate account of spatiality. I support this claim in three steps. In the first section, I show how Heidegger’s discussion of spatiality is aimed at deflecting a charge of subjectivism. The second section argues that Heidegger’s account of spatiality fails to go beyond the system of relations that defines worldhood and Being-in. In the final section, I will define what I consider to be a necessary condition for a non-subjectivist system of relations: an encounter between Dasein and entities in which the latter are not determined entirely according to the system of relations. I discuss the two instances where Heidegger discusses the idea of encounter, arguing that his account falls short of the criterion I propose.