Maynooth Philosophical Papers

This is part of a forthcoming book analysing Plato’s Politeia as a philosophical drama, in which the participants turn out to be models of various types of psychic constitution, and nothing is said by them which may be considered to be an opinion of Plato himself (with all that that entails for Platonism). The debate in Book I between Socrates and Thrasymachus serves as a test case for the assumptions that the Socratic method involves searching for truth or examining the opinions of interlocutors and that Socrates is the mouthpiece of Plato. Socrates and Thrasymachus are usually assumed to be arguing about justice. In fact, they are going through the motions of an eristic debate, where the aim is not to discover the truth about the matter under discussion but to defeat the opponent by fair means or foul, but especially foul. The outrageous wordplay used by both men is not so obvious in translation, and in any case tends to be ignored or explained away by scholars who assume that Plato the philosopher was writing a philosophical treatise (an exposition of philosophical ideas) and not a philosophical drama (a presentation of philosophically interesting models, to be compared and contrasted by the reader).

This paper criticizes one of Vlastos’ well-known articles, in which he purports to reveal what he takes to be one of Socrates’ great achievements in ethics. By using what I take to be a more appropriate way of analysing Plato’s dialogues, I show how the same paragraph which is used by Vlastos to corroborate his case proves, in fact, the opposite. What Vlastos regards as “Socrates’ Rejection of Retaliation” turns out to be nothing but an instrument used by Socrates to make Crito look at his own behavior towards the polis. In a wider context, Plato’s Crito is shown to be a severe criticism of democracy, where the lex talionis is rather one of its dominant tools used both by the state and its citizens.

Contrary to the opinion that considers the study of the history of philosophy to be useless, or sees it prevalently as subservient to today’s philosophical problems, the author maintains that a formative, not purely informative, insight is to be gained by such a study, because it helps us understand that past theories are something “other” than our contemporary view of man and the world. The history of philosophy thus reveals itself as a valuable tool for broadening and enriching our intellectual – and therefore human – experience, avoiding the risk of intellectual conformism.

This article first outlines the importance of Brentano’s doctrine of inner perception both to his understanding of the science of psychology in general in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874) and to his new science of descriptive psychology in particular which he later advances in his lecture courses on ‘Descriptive Psychology’ at the University of Vienna in the 1880s and early 1890s. It then examines Husserl’s critique of that doctrine in an ‘Appendix: Inner and Outer Perception: Physical and Psychical Phenomena’, which Husserl added to the 1913 re-issue of his Logical Investigations (1900–01). This article argues that, though Husserl promotes a very different method in phenomenology to the method of ‘inner perception’ which Brentano designs for descriptive psychology, one cannot fully understand the significance of the method that Husserl advocates in phenomenology, both in the Logical Investigations and in Ideas I (1913), without (1) distinguishing four different meanings for ‘inner perception’ (as accompanying inner percept, inner reflection, incidental awareness, immanent perception) in Brentano’s thought and addressing (2) the problematic issue of the particular kind of scientific method for his new science of descriptive psychology which Brentano bequeaths to Husserl.

When John Duns Scotus died at the young age of 42, seven centuries ago in 1308, he did not leave behind a completed body of work which would present his mature philosophical thought. Thus, the followers of Scotus were faced with the challenging task of interpreting the texts of the Subtle Docotr. Since Scotism became one of the most important schools of thought by the early modern period, the synthesis elaborated by the most famous of the commentators on Scotus’s philosophy Hugo Cavellus (1571-1626), Irish Franciscan and Archbishop of Armagh is of capital importance. Cavellus dedicated a considerable part of his commentary on the De Anima of Duns Scotus to the problems relating to the theory of the knowledge. Because of Cavellus’s central importance in seventeenth-century Scotism, his writings on doubt, evidence and certitude are noteworthy in terms of developments in modern thought.

Philippa Foot, with the help of her friend and colleague Elizabeth Anscombe, discovered that Summa Theologiae, II-II of Thomas Aquinas was a powerful resource in seeking objectivism in ethics. Foot’s aim was to produce an ethics of natural goodness, in which moral evil, for example, came to be seen as a ‘natural defect’ rather than the expression of a taste or preference. This brought her to develop a concrete ethics of virtue with a broad sweep, dealing with the individual and communal needs and goods of human beings, and particularly with their central moral quality of acting for a reason, with a practical rationality. This has helped her to return to an Aristotelian meaning of virtue, as simply one kind of excellence among others.

Stein’s phenomenology is one that is particularly sensitive to intersubjective constitution, and thus her constitutional analysis of the body is one that allows for an analysis of the body as ‘socially constructed’ (in so far as one understands this term to mean the same as ‘inter-subjectively constituted’). The purpose of this paper is to give an account of Stein’s phenomenology of the body as it appears in On the Problem of Empathy, her constitutional analysis being explicitly articulated in this work as including both subjective and intersubjective layers.

There is general acceptance that those who break the law must be punished; however, not all agree as to why this is necessary. Some argue punishment is necessary to reform criminals, others to deter criminals, and others because you deserve it, whether punishment reforms or deters. Stripped of metaphors, this paper argues that punishment is retribution, but that a distinction must be made between the definition of punishment as retribution and its justification, if a case is to be made for its moral justification. Thus the most important question the paper raises relates to the justification of punishment as retribution.

Gerard of Bologna (d. 1317) was the first Carmelite master at the University of Paris in the Middle Ages. In Quaestio 6, article 1 of his incomplete Summa theologiae, Gerard discusses the issue of teaching and learning. During the course of his discussion he summarises his understanding of the process of cognition in human beings and he considers God, angels and human beings as teachers. Gerard insists on the necessity of the teacher-student relationship in the handing on of human knowledge.

I situate historically, analyze, and examine some of the implications of Kant’s thesis that the analytic unity of apperception — the representation of the identity of the I think — is what transforms any representation to which it is attached into a universal (conceptus communis).

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s systematic rejection of cognitive analysis undoubtedly leads one to interpret his work as being fundamentally influenced by behaviourism. However, despite his private language argument, his views on ostensive definition, and his investigation into psychological concepts and psychology as an empirical science, this paper will show that Wittgenstein’s behaviourist influences were both relevant and limited and thus his tentative link to methodological behaviourism should not facilitate any distortion or misrepresentation of his philosophy or be confused with his own assertions as a logical behaviourist.

In this article Aquinas’s three accounts of how the elements combine — those of Avicenna, Averroes and Aquinas himself — are considered. An attempt is then made to reinterpret these accounts in the light of our contemporary understanding of the manner in which the modern elements behave in combination. This follows Bobik’s lead in restating Aquinas’s own account of how the Aristotelian elements combine, using present-day insights into the behaviour of the modern elements.