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critical notices

41. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
Evan Fales

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42. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
A.W. Moore

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contents

43. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2

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articles

44. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
John Earman, John T. Roberts

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This is the first part of a two-part article in which we defend the thesis of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature (HS). According to this thesis, two possible worlds cannot differ on what is a law of nature unless they also differ on the Humean base. The Humean base is easy to characterize intuitively, but there is no consensus on how, precisely, it should be defined. Here in Part I, we present and motivate a characterization of the Humean base that, we argue, enables HS to capture what is really stake in the debate, without taking on extraneous commitments.
45. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
Uriah Kriegel

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When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this “bluish way it is like for me”: (i) the bluish aspect and (ii) the for-me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for-me aspect its subjective character. What is this elusive for-me-ness, or subjective character, of conscious experience? In this paper, I examine six different attempts to account for subjective character in terms of the functional and representational properties of conscious experiences. After arguing against the first five, I defend the sixth.
46. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
Graham Oppy

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Recently, many philosophers have supposed that the divine attribute of omnipotence is properly understood as some kind of maximal power. I argue that all of the best known attempts to analyse omnipotence in terms of maximal power are multiply flawed. Moreover, I argue that there are compelling reasons for supposing that, on orthodox theistic conceptions, maximal power is not one of the divine attributes.
47. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
Kathrin Koslicki

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This paper concerns a fundamental dispute in ontology between the “Foundational Ontologist”, who believes that there is only one correct way of characterizing what there is, and the ontological “Skeptic”, who believes that there are viable alternative characterizations of what there is. I examine in detail an intriguing recent proposal in Dorr (2005), which promises to yield (i) a way of interpreting the Skeptic by means of a counterfactual semantics; and (ii) a way of converting the Skeptic to a position within Foundational Ontology, viz., that of Nihilism (according to which nothing composes anything and the world consists of mereological simples); this alleged conversion crucially turns on a novel notion of “metaphysical analyticity”. I argue that both components of Dorr’s proposal are problematic in central ways: as a result, the Foundational Ontologist gains an indirect argument against the coherence of the Skeptic’s position; and the non-Nihilist Foundational Ontologist may feel confirmed in his doubts towards the Nihilist outlook.
48. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
Timothy Schroeder

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Philosophers generally assume that individuals with Tourette syndrome are not responsible for their Tourettic tics, and so not blameworthy for any harm their tics might cause. Yet this assumption is based largely on ignorance of the lived experience of Tourette syndrome. Individuals with Tourette syndrome often experience their tics as freely chosen and reason-responsive. Yet it still seems wrong to treat a Tourettic individual’s tic as on a moral par with others’ actions. In this paper, I examine the options and argue that, if this is correct, then a surprising consequence follows: the standard, motivation-basedtheory of desire must be false. I go on to argue that, given what is known about the neurological basis of Tourette syndrome, this is a reasonable conclusion to draw.
49. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
E. J. Bond

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In this paper I attempt to show, by considering a number of sources, including Wittgenstein, Sartre, Thomas Nagel and Spinoza, but also adding something crucial of my own, that it is impossible to construe the subject of experience as an object among other objects in the world. My own added argument is the following. The subject of experience cannot move in time along with material events and processes or it could not be aware of the passage of time, hence neither of change nor of motion. The subject cannot therefore be identified with any neural process, function, or location since whatever goes on in the CNS is necessarily objective and part of the temporal flux. However this does not imply any form of dualism for experiences exist only for the subject whose experiences they are and hence they have no objective reality.

discussion

50. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
Baron Reed

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Knowledge is standardly taken to be belief that is both true and justified (and perhaps meets other conditions as well). Timothy Williamson rejects the standard epistemology for its inability to solve the Gettier problem. The moral of this failure, he argues, is that knowledge does not factor into a combination that includes a mental state (belief) and an external condition (truth), but is itself a type of mental state. Knowledge is, according to his preferred account, the most general factive mental state. I argue, however, that Gettier cases pose a serious problem for Williamson’s epistemology: in these cases, thesubject may have a factive mental state that fails to be cognitive. Hence, knowledge cannot be the most general factive mental state.

book symposia

51. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
David Papineau

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52. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
Christopher S. Hill

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53. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
Tim Crane

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54. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
Diana Raffman

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55. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
David Papineau

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56. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
Henry S. Richardson

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57. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
Philip Pettit

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58. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
David Estlund

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59. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
Thomas Christiano

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60. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
Henry S. Richardson

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