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41.
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Max Baker-Hytch
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42.
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Donald J. Bungum
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43.
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Martijn Blaauw,
Jeroen de Ridder
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44.
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Logan Paul Gage
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45.
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Lydia McGrew
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46.
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Timothy McGrew
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47.
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Tyler Dalton McNabb
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48.
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Calum Miller
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49.
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Joshue Orozco
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50.
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Patrick Toner
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51.
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M. T. Lu
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52.
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John J. Davenport
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53.
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Charles Taliaferro
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54.
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J. Cuddeback
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55.
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Patrick Toner
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56.
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Chris Tollefsen
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57.
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Charles Joshua Horn
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58.
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Christopher P. Noble
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This paper analyzes Leibniz’s use of analogies in both natural philosophical and metaphysical contexts. Through an examination of Leibniz’s notes on scientific methodology, I show that Leibniz explicitly recognizes the utility of analogies as heuristic tools that aid us in conceiving unfamiliar theoretical domains. I further argue that Leibniz uses the notion of a self-moving machine or automaton to help capture the activities of the immaterial soul. My account helps resist the conventional image of Leibniz as an arch-rationalist unconcerned with methods of empirical discovery and contributes to ongoing discussions on the nature of immaterial substance and mind in Leibniz.
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Stephen Napier
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Most philosophers will grant that on some issues and in some circumstances, we can acquire knowledge from another. But when it comes to moral knowledge, the presumption is on the side of autonomy; we must not rely on others for our moral beliefs. I argue here for the surprising thesis that in some circumstances we must rely on others in order to acquire moral knowledge. I believe that this, or something trivially different, is a position that Leibniz would hold. When woven together, his comments on teaching, authority, errors of conscience, and testimony provide concrescent support for this surprising thesis.
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Saša Stanković
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Leibniz argues in the Theodicy that three conditions must be satisfied for a human being to be free. These are intelligence, spontaneity and contingency. While both intelligence and spontaneity present their own unique issues, the condition of contingency constitutes the most difficult problem in Leibniz’s metaphysical corpus. In this paper, I focus on this problem. I argue that Leibniz offers a successful account of contingency. First, I explain what Leibniz means by contingency in the context of his discussion of freedom. Second, I argue that the standard interpretation of the problem of contingency, the theory of internal possibility, is unsuccessful. Third, I offer an original interpretation of contingency in terms of Leibniz’s ideas about simple imperfection and original limitation of all creatures. Finally, I demonstrate that Leibniz relies on the latter notion of contingency in his understanding of moral agency.
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