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discussion

61. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 2
Ruth Garrett Millikan

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book symposium

62. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 2
Richard Kraut

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63. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 2
Sarah Stroud

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64. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 2
Judith Jarvis Thomson

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65. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 2
Roger Crisp

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66. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 2
Richard Kraut

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67. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 2

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articles

68. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
Mark Kaplan

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69. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
Michael Williams

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70. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
Alfred R. Mele

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71. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
David Yates

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72. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
Lieven Decock, Igor Douven

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Color qualia inversion scenarios have played a key role in various philosophical debates. Most notably perhaps, they have figured in skeptical arguments for thefundamental unknowability of other persons' color experiences. For these arguments to succeed, it must be assumed that a person's having inverted color qualiamay go forever unnoticed. This assumption is now generally deemed to be implausible. The present paper defines a variant of color qualia inversion—termed "color qualia compression"—and argues that the possibility of undetectable color qualia compression is immune to the objections that have been levelled against color qualia inversion arguments, and that color qualia compression scenarios support full-blown skepticism regarding other people's color experiences.

special symposium

73. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
Stephen Stich

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74. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
Jennifer Nagel

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book symposium

75. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
Patricia Kitcher

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76. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
Sebastian Rödl

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77. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
Hannah Ginsborg

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78. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
Lucy Allais

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79. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
Patricia Kitcher

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80. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1

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