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book reviews

81. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Jessica Logue

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82. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach

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83. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Lavender McKittrick-Sweitzer

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84. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Chris Jackson

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editor’s introduction

85. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Fanny del Rio, Amy Reed-Sandoval

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86. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Amy Reed-Sandoval, Fanny del Rio

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essays

87. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Stephanie Rivera Berruz

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Luisa Capetillo (1829-1922) has been heralded as the first feminist writer of Puerto Rico. She authored four books and embodied her emancipatory philosophical commitments, but has received scant philosophical attention. In this paper I recover the philosophy of Capetillo as part of a Latin American and Caribbean philosophical tradition centered on radical praxis places sexuality at the centerfold of class politics. At the intersection between gender equity and class emancipation Capetillo advocated for the liberatory possibilities of education, which served as the key to unlearning the social norms that engendered the marginalization of working people and working women.
88. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Fanny del Rio

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The histories of philosophy in Mexico published between 1943 and 2016 display gender inequality, as they include many more male than female authors. But are they a true and objective portrayal of women’s participation in, and contribution to, Mexican philosophy? In this essay I discuss why we should perform an ethical revision of the selection criteria used in the histories of philosophy in Mexico, and I will present some proposals that I believe could help repair the epistemic injustice that women have been historically subjected to in this field.
89. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Angela R. Boitano

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90. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
María Pía Lara

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The subject of gender violence is complex because our conceptions of what constitutes violence have historically evolved. Therefore, I propose that we should try to understand gender violence neither in abstract nor in essentialist ways, but within historical frameworks and through concrete examples. In this essay I will focus on a historical genealogy of our moral views about gender violence, and, in particular, on the figure of what we call today “rape.” The question of rape is but one example of the long history of gender violence. However, this example is important to understand how violence and gender violence are related to specific conceptions of political and sexual sovereignty. My claim is that we need to pay attention to how is it possible to understand the role of imagination to interpret gender violence nowadays. My conclusion is that the moral filters that configure our “feminist imaginary” have changed our views about rape.
91. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Ana Laura Ramírez Vázquez, Luis Rubén Díaz Cepeda

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Latin America is one of the most unequal continents in the world. This inequality translates into marked limitations in the possibilities of having a decent life for a high percentage of the population. Within the groups that are affected, women are undoubtedly even more so, because, in addition to shared economic and social inequalities with other vulnerable groups, they face discrimination based on gender. In Latin America, political protest has been undertaken by women who wish to denounce and abate the injustices of which they are victims. These struggles have been analyzed by different thinkers. For the most part, feminist theories deal with the struggle of women against the oppressive behavior of patriarchy from the State or society. Others highlight the ability of women to contribute to social changes from socially accepted roles such as mothers, daughters, wives. These approaches ignore the difficulties experienced by female activists within the political mobilization. In this essay then we seek to document, analyze, and theorize about the patriarchal practices suffered by women activists - qua women- within the social organizations in Ciudad Juárez, as well as the forms of resistance they have opposed.
92. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Ángeles Eraña

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El amanecer del año 1994 nos sorprendió con la aparición pública del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional. Más de dos décadas después empezamos a percibir la fuerza, dimensión e importancia que han tenido las mujeres -su voz, su lucha- no sólo en la organización del movimiento armado y civil que desde entonces sigue sin cesar; sino también en la articulación del pensamiento y la teoria en que sustentan y que sostiene su actuar. La política que se articula en las comunidades zapatistas, en este sentido (y otros aún por descubrir), ha reafirmado y cuestionado las luchas feministas del mundo y de América Latina. En particular, ha hecho visible lo prescindible que es la idea de las oposiciones, de las disyuntivas excluyentes. En vez de ello, ellas proponen pensar en dos nociones básicas: “todo está en par” y “el mundo parejo”. Como haré ver en este texto, estas dos cosas están a la base de su creación de una vida colectiva, de una política de lo común. Si esto es así y si pensamos que lo común es “la posibilidad de una política en femenino” entonces veremos que la zapatista es una subversión en femenino.The uprising of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional surprised us all in the dawn of 1994. More than two decades later, we are starting to fully appreciate the force, dimension, and importance that women —their voices, their struggle—has had not only in the organization of the social and armed movement that is still very vigorous in Chiapas, but also in the theoretical and practical articulation of their thinking and acting. The politics that are currently in play in the Zapatista communities has reinforced and questioned the feminist struggles all over the world and in Latin America. In particular, it has made visible how thinking in terms of oppositions or exclusive dilemmas is and should be dispensable. We should rather start thinking in terms of “everything being in pair” and “an even world”. I will contend that these two notions support their construction of a collective life, of a politics of what is common. If this is true and if we think that what is common opens the possibility of politics in feminine, then it makes sense to think of the Zapatistassubversion as feminine.

book reviews

93. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Jean Kazez

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94. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Colin Patrick

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95. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Valerie Soon

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96. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Steve Ross

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97. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Nicolas Delon

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editor’s introduction

98. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Krista Karbowski Thomason

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essays

99. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
MaryCatherine McDonald

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Coined by Jonathan Shay, a clinician who works with combat veterans, the term ‘moral injury’ refers to an injury that occurs when one’s moral beliefs are betrayed. Shay developed the term to capture the shame and guilt of veterans he saw in his clinical practice. Since then, debates about moral injury have centered around the ‘what’ (what kinds of actions count as morally injurious and why?) and the ‘who’ of moral injury (should moral injuries be restricted to the guilt and shame that I feel for what I do? Or is it possible to be morally injured by what I witness?). Clinicians universally acknowledge the challenge of treating moral injuries. I will argue that this is in part because there is an essential piece of the theoretical construct that has been left behind. Namely, when veterans are morally injured, they are not only haunted by what they have done (or failed to do) but also by the specter of a world without morals.
100. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Suzanne Dovi

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The realities of modern war provide lots of reasons for pessimism and despair. In this article, I identify ways pessimism cannot only undercut the types of political action needed to end war but also conflict with central democratic norms, e.g. equality and political autonomy. Contrary to the growing literature on pessimism, which stresses its resources for negotiating the moral chaos and disenchantment of modernity, I highlight the democratic costs of relying on pessimism to stop war. To do this, I clarify the meaning of despair, identify two sources of hope, and distinguish three different types of despair.