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81. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
Ilana Maymind

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82. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
Michael Yudanin

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Morality is traditionally understood as comprised of two components: justice and mercy. The first component, justice, the universal component of the form, is frequently seen as foundational for any moral system . which poses a challenge of explaining the second component, mercy, the particular component of content. Kantian ethics provides an example of this approach. After formulating his universalist theory of ethics in the Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals and further developing it in the Critique of practical reason, he attempts to use it in order to establish the morality of mercy in the Metaphysics of morals. Yet can universal morality of justice necessitate particular ethics of mercy? Using the example of competitive games, the relations between the ethics of justice and that of mercy are demonstrated, and it is shown that the former does not lead to the latter. Moreover, the universality of the rules of moral behavior can serve as a form for blatant brutality. Analyzing the characteristics of particular morality, we can conclude that physical humanity of the moral object, perceived as such by the subject, is a required condition for mercy. Removal of object.s humanity is a necessary step toward an ethical system that allows cruelty . a system that can still be based on universal moral rules. Bhagavad Gîtâ, on the other hand, can be seen as an example of combining nî?kâmakarma, the formal, universal ethics of desireless action, with a variety of particular motivations originating in the nature and social context of the moral agent.

83. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
Samta P. Pandya

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In this paper I have examined the Saibaba phenomenon which originated in India and now has a global influence. Through fieldwork, I build on the life and works of three faith teachers (gurus) who have contributed to the Sai movement to forward my thesis that sociality and hence tangible social service is an important means to gain legitimacy, social standing and as a response to late modernity. I begin by giving an overview of the Sai phenomena and its peculiarities in terms of syncretism, bricolage and aspects of global proliferation. I then discuss how sociality is a strategy for this genre of faith movement and its implications. Finally I propose that sociality has become a metaphor of Sai sacrality.

84. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
Kisor K. Chakrabarti

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85. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
Theodore L. Kneupper

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86. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
Payal Doctor

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In the Nyāya school of Classical Indian Philosophy, the concept of word meaning is described in detail; however, the theory of metaphor seems to clash with the theory of word meaning. This paper explores the theory of meaning in the early Nyāya theory and whether metaphor is compatible with it. The Nyāya theory of meaning is a 'basis for application' (pravrttinimitta) model: words pick out references because of the conventions and practices of use. Yet, these words can come to refer to something completely different by pushing off its conventional usage and taking on a metaphorical meaning. If the referent is determined on the basis of the properties it possesses, how it is possible that only some properties are applied to a referent in metaphorical cases when, conventionally, a referent must possess all of the properties before the word is applied to it? This paper will investigate three main questions: 1) what is the nature of a referent according to the Nyāya?; 2) what is the mechanism for metaphorical transfer that allow some properties to transfer and not others?; and 3) what are the philosophical implications of the Naiyāyikas understanding of meaning?

87. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
Barbara A. Amodio

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88. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
Linda K. Mackey

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89. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
Don Habibi

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This essay presents a critical analysis of Sen's theory of human rights. I pay particular attention to his attack on Jeremy Bentham's denunciation of natural rights and the charge that preexisting universal rights are without foundation. I begin by providing some context for understanding Sen's approach to the debate about human rights. I then present a brief overview of rights theory and define the important terms, and also present Bentham's understanding of the 'foundational problem' and why he regards it as a dangerous problem. I offer a short overview of the human rights movement that covers its progress since Bentham's time. I then present a critique of Sen's defense of human rights and conclude that Sen's efforts to invalidate Bentham do not succeed. Bentham's contribution to the debate over human rights remains relevant.

90. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
David W. Long

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This cross-disciplinary, cross-cultural paper explores and critiques scientific, philosophical, and psychological concepts of consciousness. It embodies many of the ideas I presented at the First International Conference for the Study of Consciousness Within Science in 1990, a gathering of physicists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers, all of whom were trying to come to grips with both the experience and the idea of consciousness in their work.

91. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
Kisor K. Chakrabarti

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book review

92. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
Chandana Chakrabarti

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93. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Fabio Gironi

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94. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Barbara A. Amodio

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95. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Gordon Haist

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96. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Song-Chong Lee Orcid-ID

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97. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Scott R. Stroud

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98. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Joshua Anderson

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When discussing Eastern philosophy there is often a difficulty since characteristically Eastern ways of thinking do not map well onto Western philosophic categories. Yet, P. J. Ivanhoe suggests that a careful reading of Confucianism can illuminate and expand Western approaches to ethics. Ivanhoe maintains that the best way to understand Confucian ethics is as a hybrid of virtue ethics and consequentialism, a view he calls character consequentialism (CC). The paper will progress in the following way. First, I present Ivanhoe's conception of character consequentialism. Second, I discuss how C C , particularly as it is developed by Charles Goodman as a way to interpret Mahayana Buddhist ethics, relates to aspects of Mill's utilitarianism. This suggests that there is nothing especially new about CC. However, the similarities actually underscore the ways that Eastern and Western ethical theories can illuminate each other. Finally, I respond to Damien Keown's concern that CC is hopelessly confused.

99. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Panos Eliopoulos

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100. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Kisor K. Chakrabarti

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