Sententiae

Meister Eckhart’s mysticism of the ground of the soul is considered as the inner connection between God and man. The ground of the soul and the ground of God are in reality one ground. Author argues that the term “Ground” for Meister Eckhart, refers to the uncreated and eternal in the soul, which is also called the divine spark. In this detachment and in this Ground, the birth of God takes place, the unio mystica, which denotes the divinisation of the human being. Meister Eckhart describes the path into this mystical unio as a path of detachment and abandonment or cutting off. Finally, Eckhart’s famous poem Granum Sinapis (mustard seed) is presented as a poetic summary of his mysticism of union with the highest reality of God.

The article is devoted to Gödel’s ontological argument, its place in the history of philosophy, and the current debate over the validity of ontological proof. First, we argue that Gödel's argument is a necessary step in the history of the development of ontological proof. Second, we show that Gödel’s argument (namely, its core concept of “positive property”) is based on implausible axiological principles (this fact raises many objections like Hajek’s counter-argument), but can be appropriately reformulated in terms of plausible axiological principles (Gustafsson’s argument). Also, we consider the debate over the validity of Gödel’s argument between contemporary neo-Gaunilist Graham Oppy and the advocate of Gödel’s ontological proof Michael Gettings. We conclude that Gödel’s ontological argument is immune to Oppy’s neo-Gaunilism. Finally, given the fact that Oppy’s parody is arguably the most fine-grained Gaunilo-style argument in the history of philosophy, we conclude that Gaunilist line of argumentation, even if successful in refuting Anselm’s ontological proof of God’s existence, does not work against Gödel’s ontological argument (what is evidenced by the results of the debate between Oppy and Gettings).

The author of the article focuses on the matter of Wittgenstein's philosophy reception in France. The reception of Wittgenstein's philosophy was quite late and led to different, sometimes opposite interpretations of his thought, even among French analytical philosophers. Applying a sociological approach to the problem of reception, the author identifies factors that hindered the penetration of the ideas of analytical philosophy in France, including the powerful institutionalization of philosophy in France with its inherent traditionalism and conservatism, fully expressed national character of French philosophy, as well as the extremely polemical character of French analytical philosophy, the transformation of the choice of this tradition of philosophizing into an ethical and political choice. These factors are illustrated by an analysis of Wittgenstein's conflicting interpretation of Jacques Bouveresse and Sandra Laugier. If the first creates an image of Wittgenstein as Anti-Husserl, blaming the phenomenologist for ignoring ordinary language, the second proposes a phenomenological reading of Wittgenstein's ideas using the philosophy of ordinary language. The article shows how opposing interpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy reproduce the internal conflicts of the French philosophical field.

The author of the article considers the conditions and principles of the future Ukrainian translation of Heidegger’s “Being and Time.” First, he defines the principles of proper translation, then makes suggestions on how “Being and Time” should be translated in accordance with these principles. The governing principle of proper translation is defined as translation equivalence, which is contrasted with the principle of translation adequacy. To clarify the conditions for the equivalent Ukrainian translation of “Being and Time,” the author explores the fundamental concepts of this work. Among others, he justifies the translation of Heidegger’s Dasein as єство, and Heidegger’s Angst as тривога.