Individuation investigates what is the principle that makes things individual and distinguishes them from others. Although the individual is a contemporary notion, it has been used in the sense of entity and individuation has been discussed together with the problem of identity since middle ages philosophers. In this article, while investigating Aristotle’s approach to the individuation problem, we will first discuss matter theory that generally accepted. Defending matter as a principle of individuatian can be clarified by its divisibility or identity. But divisibility itself makes individuation impossible and contradicts Aristotle’s viwes. The identity of matter needs a content because it is not clear enough; here, we will include Leibniz’s principle of identity of indiscernibles into the discussion, and we will designate this content as the unshareable of matter. However, we encounter the problem of becoming, which we will also refer the example of the Thesus ship. On the other hand, stating Aristotle’s individuation principle as form means defending individual forms; it is not clear what is meant by individual forms therefore we will offer accidental properties for individuation. Though, Lebniz and Aristotle seem impossible to agree on this issue and for Aristotle, individuation with accidental properties is unacceptable; individuation by non-essential properties means that things are not individual by nature. Then, pointing out the opinion of individuation with position through Aristotle, we will discuss that matter in the meaning of position is the principle of individution. Finally, we will indicate that individuation by position requires absolute space, and we will refer to Black’s thought experiment, which logically invalidates Leibniz’s the principle of identity of indiscernibles.

This article argues that feminism has to defend the right to live freely and autonomously for nonhuman animals in general, and for farm animals in particular. Production processes of animal products involve not only serial production and consumption of the bodies of farm animals for the pleasure and profit of humans, but also infliction of constant pain throughout their lives that arises from being forced to live under adverse conditions. Moreover, present practices subject female nonhuman animals to extra torment to be able to profit from their biological reproductive power, especially in dairy and egg industries. Four arguments are proposed to support this main thesis by drawing from the works of writers such as bell hooks and Carol J. Adams. Also, a possible criticism that challenges the notion of defining sex by biological traits is discussed and a response inspired by Wittgensteinian thought is developed with the intention to demonstrate that although we define the sex of nonhuman animals according to their biological traits, this does not have to be the sole or sufficient criterion for defining femaleness in general.

Ockhamist solutions concerning the problem of divine foreknowledge and free will had an important place between 1960’s and 1990’s in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion circles. In this work, after briefly presenting William of Ockham’s (1287-1347) views on future contingent propositions and on the problem of divine foreknowledge and free will, Ockhamist solutions to the problem of divine foreknowledge and free will in the contemporary analytic philosophy of religion and contentions about them will be discussed. Within this framework, it will be demonstrated that Ockhamist solutions fail to reconcile divine foreknowledge and human free will. Moreover, metaphysical problem encountered by the view on the future contingents which is presupposed by Ockhamist solutions will be presented, and it will be emphasized that this problem poses a challenge to any attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge and free will.

Mengzi was the first intellectual who built the theory of moral psychology on the school of thought based upon the synthesis of sageness and virtuousness explained through a normative context by Confucius in the 6th century BC. Mengzi has made all the difference to Chinese philosophy, giving reference to the coherence among feelings, thoughts and actions for self-awareness with the thesis of innate goodness of human beings. Even though this thesis was held by intuitive learning method enhanced at the hands of Neo-Confucian philosopher Cheng Hao in the 11th century, Wang Yangming, who was a politician, calligrapher and military general of the Ming period, essentially contributed the expanding of this thesis to the lands of East Asia. Wang Yangming excludes the rational in the process of behavioral response of inborn knowledge and virtue, owing to the mental-spiritual integrity brought from Mengzi into his teaching. In this intuitive-centered theory questioning, observing and experiencing phases have no need to been practiced as well as feelings and thoughts are inseparable whole. Since the individual has the inherent ability to distinguish between right and wrong, everything can be perceived with insight and foresight. Since the individual can perceives before, acting is motivated simultaneously with knowing. In this paper, the Western equivalent of the personal growth assumed by intuitive knowledge theory of Wang Yangming and its identified feature in modern psychology will be examined.

The problem of human value has a deep rooted philosophical and historical backround, reaching today from Ancient Age. Immanuel Kant was an important philosopher to have systematized this problem on the logical platform. Because Kant illustrated a consider position in the name of the independent, without content law, free will and act activity of pure reason in terms of the value of human. In this context, two main characteristics come to forefront in his ethical doctrine. The first characteristic is that freedom is to be a condition of the moral law and moral law caused to be known of freedom. The second characteristic is related to the fact that a relation between the value of human and moral law provide a framework that constructs the principles of practical reason giving the criteria for ethical actions of human. According to Kant good will is in accordance with moral law. The value of human can be preserved only with will according to general and contextless moral law. Accordingly, first of all in this article was debated with relation between freedom and moral law, and from this point of view, it was remarked that the revealer of the human value is to act with willing according to the moral law.

Archaeology is a discipline that takes an interdisciplinary approach and use interdisciplinary methods in investigating products of human thought such as material remains and material culture by which it tries to explain what all of those bears on the meaning, cultural changes and cultural exchanges for those societies in cause-effect relationships. Although it is a shared point of view that archaeology is in a constant reciprocal relationship with the other disciplines, studies on the nature of explanations provided in archaeology seems to be rather limited. Many epistemological strategies have been adopted in archaeology to eliminate speculation in favor of proof and certainty. These strategies range from the inductivism of traditional archaeology to the deductivism of the New Archaeology, and more recently to views of archaeological reasoning as inference to the best explanation. In this article, from the perspective of philosophy of science, by making an examination of how these epistemic strategies used in the context of tradition of Anglo-Saxon archaeology, I claim that if the aim is to explain archaeological phenomenon then the discussions revolving around the new archeology approach should focus on model-based explanations. On the other hand, if the discussions on explanations in archaeology aim to focus on understanding of the archaeological phenomenon rather than explanation of it, post-processual archeology should be in focus.

In the present paper we try to show broadly why we cannot consider Husserlian phenomenology as a representationalist theory, and why phenomenological analysis should make us cautious against the following two views: i- experience is transparent and ii- representational intentionality is the defining feature of consciousness. Accordingly: 1-Whereas it is always possible to analyze conscious experience on the basis of intentional activity that belongs to it, there is more to consciousness than intentionality. Thus, not only are certain real components of the streaming consciousness constituted by non-intentional experiences, the self-consciousness itself has a non-intentional structure. 2- It is not necessary for all the real conscious contents given in an experience to participate in the representational content of that experience.3- We can represent two different objects, even though we live the same exposing real content, or we can represent the same object, even though we live two different exposing real contents. 4- We are capable of intending the same object in different modes of consciousness. This very fact brings to the fore a wholly subjective factor that differentiates the representational experiences of an identical object.

For the ancients, dreaming was an experience that we find quite difficult to understand today. The nature of dreams, dreamers and interpreters of the dreams was a matter of curiosity for philosophers, scholars and sages as well as for the ordinary ancients. Ancient philosophers who enquired the experience of dreaming reached quite different conclusions: there were philosophers who regarded dreaming as a mystical experience and oneiroscopy as a skilful or prophetic work, on the other hand, there were those who thought otherwise and rejected both the divinity of dreams and oneiroscopy. However, there was an Ancient school, Stoicism, which seemed to have found a way to reconcile these opposing poles. The Stoics adopted both views in certain respects with their approach to dreams and oneiroscopy and sought ways to make room for both reason and belief with their theories on divination and its special type, oneiroscopy. The views of the Stoics on this subject are subsidiary and meaningless today but trying to understand what the ancient philosophers thought about such a subject and how they found a way is a call for us to reflect on the limits of science and pseudoscience, mysticism and physiology, reason and belief. Therefore, it is the purpose of this article to follow this call and to examine the Stoic dreaming experience in detail. For this purpose, the Stoic approach, which can be defined as a “scientific mysticism” or a “mystical scientism”, is examined and it is discussed whether this is a consistent thinking.

According to Aristophanes, as reflected in the play of the Knights, despite all its defects and the wrong decisions taken by the demos, the Athenian democratic regime does not have incorrigible structural problems. The regime, especially after Pericles, suffered a great wound in the administration of the new social strata, which had never had a say in the city administration and were enriched later by commercial activities. The demagogues, especially Kleon, who identifying themselves with demos but only think of their own interests and gains, instead of leading the demos or considering the public intererest, are seen as the main reason for the current problematic situation of the administration. Demos is deceived the wrong leaders who were elected. Aristophanes accuses these elected leaders for various reasons by using the unique characterictics of comedy style in his play of the Knight; on the other hand, he believes that a reformist attitude should be displayed in order to Athenian administration to regain its former glory. The general content of the reform, on the other hand, consists of demos turning his face on the noble classes that supported Athens throughout its glorious history, and turning its back on new type of leaders like Kleon. In this respect, the Knights, on the one hand, point to a break between the political classes that represent the power, and on the other hand, it criticizes the new type of politician typology. In this article, based on an elite Athenian poet the Aristophanes’ comedy of Knights, the political situation of the Athenian administration in the 5th century BC and poet’s expectations for administration will be tried to be questioned.

The role of values in science has been intensely debated, especially since the second half of the 20th century. To argue that science should be independent of values, has essentially meant defending its objectivity and credibility. When feminist philosophers of science explain that this ideal is constructed through the exclusion of women, they steered the discussion on the roles of values in science to a different and very important direction. In this study, by departing from a survey on feminist standpoint theory -which represents a very important position in feminist philosophy of science- it will be argued that besides being an indispensable part of science, ethical and political values can also contribute to the development of science. Furthermore, it will be argued that including certain values to science has positive contributions not only to science but at the same tame to the sphere of values.

Logical positivism divides our beliefs into two groups, factual ones and those about the language we choose. A number system, a physical language, etc. are the languages that we choose. We talk about the world in these languages. According to logical positivists, these judgments are synthetic. On the other hand, we make judgments about the languages and frames that we choose. Logical positivists regard these judgments as analytic. For Quine, the analytic-synthetic distinction is untenable. He introduces a holistic model in which beliefs are not divided into factual and linguistic ones. However, in Quine’s model, there is a distinction that evokes the analytic-synthetic distinction: the center-periphery distinction. Beliefs at the periphery are more sensitive to experience than the beliefs at the center. To erase the traces of the analytic-synthetic distinction from Quine’s model, Gila Sher proposes a dynamical version of the center-periphery model. In the dynamical center-periphery model, beliefs do not have fixed locations. In this work, first, we evaluate Sher’s dynamic model. Then, we propose an alternative model, which does not have center-periphery distinction. The model that we propose is more advantageous than the center-periphery model in two respects. Firstly, it completely eliminates the analytic-synthetic distinction. Secondly, our model is more in line with Quine’s pragmatism.

In Tractatus, Wittgenstein states that the function of a meaningful sentence is to assert a state of affairs and excludes all sentences that do not do so from the realm of meaning. Sentences outside the realm of meaning, however, are not useless; they can show something. Although this saying/showing distinction is of fundamental importance for Tractatus, Wittgenstein does not clearly explain the part of the distinction related to showing. In this paper I will argue that this notion can be understood, especially in the case of ethics and aesthetics, as showing an aspect. Aspect, which is a widely used notion in perception studies, has been carried to the field of linguistics, especially with studies on metaphor. It is often said that a metaphor makes an aspectual effect. What Wittgenstein meant by “showing” can be interpreted as making someone recognise an aspect.

The political sphere relies on a shared epistemic community and the knowledge gained through it. When we establish our place in this world, we are assured that the knowledge we have gained from others is accurate. However, our assurance is weakened by manipulation and falsehoods. Therefore, on the one hand, the quantity of closed-minded and dogmatic individuals who accept falsehoods due to their indifference and ignorance is rising, whilst on the other hand, disputes driven by scepticism and agnosticism towards political concepts are becoming more prevalent. This article analyses epistemic responsibility as a conceptual tool within epistemology and appraises its usefulness in comprehending the causes of political discord. The initial part considers the divergence between internalists and externalists concerning epistemic responsibility, while the subsequent section analyses the attempt to establish epistemic responsibility in the political sphere.

Because epistemology deals with the philosophical analysis of rational beliefs, it assigns central importance to justification. Justification involves identifying the condition or set of conditions that enables one to have grounds for believing a proposition. The principle of phenomenal conservatism, put forward by Michael Huemer as a justification theory that accords with the moderate/fallibilist foundationalist perspective that many of our beliefs have non-inferential justifications, is a principle that defines such a condition. According to the PC formulation, if it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. Seemings/appearances are sui generis experiences that refer to the possibility of rational belief formation and are different from beliefs and dispositions to believe. In this article, I introduce PC based on the nature of seemings and evaluate some of the criticisms directed at PC. The criticisms I discuss include objections that PC even justifies beliefs stemming from irrational/dangerous seemings and cognitive penetration, and that the dominant role that PC theorists assign to seemings in the act of justification and the differences envisaged between beliefs and seemings are exaggerated. In my opinion, none of these criticisms contain arguments that would lead to the rejection of PC. The main reason to accept PC or a similar principle that establishes the role of seemings in epistemic justification is the vagueness of its possible alternatives other than skepticism. For, if seemings are indicators that guide the epistemic agent in forming beliefs, this means that it is impossible for the agent to believe anything rationally when she lacks the relevant indicators.

Kantian strategy, while abolishing the theological ethics which had been so powerful since the scholastic period, also ensured that any ethical thinking that does not come to terms with autonomy argument is unreasonable. Autonomy argument which emphasizes the ability to reason the moral law together with the freedom of making choices and acting according to this law, is based on the assumption that human being is an entity which can determine the norms for his own kind. This assumption, however, has brought about many problems regarding humanity and the lifeworld. Being one of the most radical voices among the existentialist objections against this Kantian assumption, Heidegger refused almost entire frame of concepts and built his body of thought in which ethics or morality has no force. While dealing with the problem of possibility of ethics in Heidegger’s thinking, this work will tend to open the necessity of abandoning the concept of ethics into discussion, if we are to get rid of the traditional patterns of philosophy.

Hartmut Rosa offers a breath of fresh air to Critical Theory. On the one hand, he gives a contemporary content to the concept of “alienation” of the Critical Theory tradition with his theory of “acceleration”, and on the other hand, in his theory of resonance, which he puts forward as a response to this alienation, he presents a philosophical tradition that has fed social philosophy and critical theory from the outside but has not fully joined it as the ground on which he bases his thought, namely the phenomenological approach shaped in the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Rosa reminds us that we reconstitute and transform our world every moment in the call-response relations we establish with things, others and existing meanings, and that the possibilities of time and space we open for the preservation of this state of reciprocity are more vital than all the given answers and all the certainties achieved. This article aims to assess the novelty that Rosa's thought brings to critical theory and what this novelty means for the public sphere and inter-citizenship.

Interest in Otto Neurath's works has increased in recent times. This interest is, in a way, related to the manner in which Neurath addressed current problems in the philosophy and practice of science. Neurath's anti-foundationalism and his claims about the language of science contain significant insights relevant to contemporary philosophy and practice of science. The impact of Neurath's opposition to foundationalism and his views on the language of science is also evident in the works of Willard Van Orman Quine. Within this framework, the aim of this study is to provide an analysis of the points of convergence between Neurath and Quine's approaches to the language of science, referring to the contexts of naturalism, anti- foundationalism, holism, and the Duhem thesis. In this context, firstly, so called the French conventionalism that influenced Neurath in the context of the language of science will be discussed, followed by highlighting the similarities and differences between the Duhem thesis and Neurath's thesis. Subsequently, Neurath’s position on protocol sentences in the context of the language of science will be analyzed. Furthermore, the impact of Neurath's claims on Quine will be examined. In the conclusion, a general assessment will be provided, presenting a comparison between Neurath and Quine regarding the issues of the language of science and naturalism.

At the end of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he asserts that a reader who comprehends his work will recognize that what he articulates is nonsense. This paradox within the text often becomes a source of perplexity for nearly every reader who engages with it. Should the content conveyed within the work be deemed nonsensical, then it follows that nothing within it, including the notion of its own nonsensicality, should be taken seriously. Conversely, if the work is to be regarded seriously, then one must acknowledge that its content is indeed nonsensical. It can be asserted that a substantial body of literature exists regarding the manner in which this paradox within the work should be approached. This study aims to argue that, when evaluated within the context of Wittgenstein's therapeutic conception of nonsense, this paradox within the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus does not impede a comprehensive understanding of the work. To achieve this, I will commence by providing a general overview of the Theory of Pictures, thereby delineating Wittgenstein's conceptualization of nonsense. Subsequently, I will discuss ideas that I believe offer a solid justification fort the function of nonsense in Wittgenstien’s philosophy. Finally, I will posit that discourse concerning nonsense can solely manifest through the medium of nonsense itself, thereby contending that Wittgenstein has rectified a pervasive misconception through this means.

Peter Singer’s conception of effective altruism aims to establish a particular understanding of democratic way of life among humans by strengthening the spirit of collaboration through equal sharing of resources by practically applicable acts of giving. Even though there seems to be no explicit Spinozian ground to Singer’s theory and practice of effective altruism, one can argue that the two philosophers show a similar resistance to reduce interindividual relations to pure conflicts of power guided by the principle of the survival of the fittest and that, on this basis, they both embrace the idea of collective perfection. Our goal, in this article, will be to show that anyone who aims to develop a life strategy in tune with Singer’s effective altruism is also expected to build a Spinozian approach to calculate feelings with adequacy, to produce adequate ideas regarding one’s own reality without neglecting the human evolutionary process and to consider collective perfection as the necessary precondition for personal perfection. In this context, we will focus on Spinoza’s conceptions of nobility and tenacity in parallel with Singer’s analyses emphasizing the collaborative capacities of interhuman relations.

Modern people consider criticism almost as vital as air or water. The desire to live in a better world means not being content with what is given and questioning traditions and established values. Philosophical criticism is not an attitude limited to objecting to a particular view; it is also about the solidity of its foundations. Constructive or positive criticism, frequently encountered in sciences, takes on a destructive nature in social sciences, especially in philosophy. This type of criticism must also be equipped with a constructive quality for the destructiveness of philosophical criticism not to result in nihilism. In this study, it is argued that philosophical criticism may have norms. It aims to identify the three most well-known and accepted principles among these norms and show their role in justifying philosophical criticism. Thus, it is likely that philosophy, just like the sciences, can pursue the truth instead of being in the service of political powers.