There is such a point of view that information is an abstract unit as an invariant of informational processes. Information consists of object, procedural and morphological components.We have an opportunity to consider that information consists of object and procedural components. So we have the relation-functional concept of information.Information has such attributes as syntactics, semantics and pragmatics. These attributes are relational definitions. Semantics and pragmatics are considered to be external features (characteristics) of the definite syntactics.

I defend the truth of the principle of methodological individualism in the social sciences. I do so by criticizing mistaken ideas about the relation between individual people and social entities held by earlier defenders of the principle. I argue, first, that social science is committed to the intentional stance; the domain of social science, therefore, coincides with the domain of intentionally described human action. Second, I argue that social entitites are theoretical terms, but quite different from the entities used in the natural sciences to explain our empirical evidence. Social entities (such as institutions) are conventional and open-ended constructions, the applications of which is a matter of judgment, not of discovery. The terms in which these social entities are constructed are the beliefs, expectations and desires, and the corresponding actions of individual people. The relation between the social and the individual 'levels' differs fundamentally from that between, say, the cellular and the molecular in biology. Third, I claim that methodological individualism does not amount to a reduction of social science to psychology; rather, the science of psychology should be divided. Intentional psychology forms in tandom with the analysis of social institutions, unitary psycho-social science; cognitive psychology tries to explain how the brain works and especially how the intentional stance is applicable to human behavior.

Does science have any limits? Scientists say no. Philosophers are divided in their response. The humanities say that science is not "humanitarian," and thus not metaphysically deep. In response, scientists and some philosophers contend that science is the best knowledge we have about the world. I argue that science is limited by its form. Science has no object that derives from the human form. Everything that is incomparable to the dimension of the human body is reducible to notions that are commensurable to that body. This phenomenologically clarifies some of the most important discoveries in contemporary science. The Special Theory of Relativity shows the dependence of space and time on the accounting system. Quantum mechanics displays the limits of observation (Heisenberg) and logical indefiniteness by compelling the creation of a macropresentation of micro-objects and gets around logic (Feyerabend) through the principle of additionality. Experimental science has come out as an artificial projection of human expansion, not as a reflection of the transcendent order of the world itself. "The life world" successfully takes the place of "the objective world" of modern rationality.

Wesley Salmon has suggested that the two leading views of scientific explanation, the “bottom-up” view and the “top-down” view, describe distinct types of explanation. In this paper, I focus on theoretical explanations in physics, i.e., explanations of physical laws. Using explanations of E=mc2, I argue that the distinction between bottom-up explanations (BUEs) and top-down explanations (BUEs) is best understood as a manifestation of a deeper distinction, found originally in Newton’s work, between two levels of theory. I use Einstein’s distinction between ‘principle’ and ‘constructive’ theories to argue that only lower level theories, i.e., ‘constructive’ theories, can yield BUEs. These explanations, furthermore, depend on higher level laws that receive only TDEs from a ‘principle’ theory. Thus, I conclude that Salmon’s challenge to characterize the relationship between the two types of explanation can be met only by recognizing the close relationship between types of theoretical explanation and the structure of physical theory.

I consider two alternative solutions to the problem of computing the values of theoretical quantities, and, thus, of testing theoretical hypotheses, viz., Sneed's structuralist eliminationism and Glymour's bootstrapping. The former attempts to solve the problem by eliminating theoretical quantities by means of the so-called Ramsey-Sneed sentence that represents the global empirical claim of the given theory. The latter proposes to solve the problem by deducing the values of the theoretical quantities from, among others, the very hypothesis to be tested. I argue that in those cases where the theoretical quantities are not strongly Ramsey-eliminable-which seems to be the case for most of the actual physical theories-eliminationism does not succeed in computing the values of theoretical quantities and is compelled to use bootstrapping in this task. On the other hand, we see that a general notion of bootstrapping-which, though implicitly, is present as a subreasoning in structuralism-provides a formally correct procedure for computing theoretical quantities, and thus contributes to the solution to the problem of testing theoretical hypotheses involving these quantities.

Indeterminacy, uncertainty, disorder, randomness, vagueness, fuzziness, ambiguity, crisis, undecideability, chaos, are all different terms. Yet, they are also semantically related to the idea of something opposed to order or structure and organization. Such terms denote prima facie insuperable obstacles to the attainment of true, certain, or precise knowledge about things and events. After analysing the ontological, logical, and axiological status of indeterminary, I outline the aoristic logic which allows adequate descriptions of phenomena pertaining to an area of indeterminary. Aoristic logic provides a propositional calculus that makes possible the compatibility of order with indeterminacy.

Given the great historical distance between scientific explanation as Aristotle and Hempel saw it, I examine and appraise important similarities and differences between the two approaches, especially the inclination to take deduction itself as the very model of scientific knowledge. I argue that we have good reasons to reject this inclination.

Es propósito de esta comunicación revisar la teoría pragmática de la explicación sostenida por van Fraassen en The Scientific Image y otros escritos. Se cuestiona la necesidad de responder objeciones como las de Kitcher y Salmon en términos de la identificación de una relación de relevancia objetiva en las explicaciones concebidas como respuestas a preguntas por qué. En consecuencia, se examina la alternativa de considerer positivamente la existencia de haces de relaciones de relevancia especialmente como determinantes de la producción de diferentes desarrollos teóricos que proporcionen nuevas imágenes no literales de cómo es el mundo. Se toma como punto de partida para esta propuesta la adhesión de van Fraassen a la concepción semántica de las teorías científicas. Se señala entonces el contraste entre el análisis complementario que de la explicación y de la reconstrucción de teorías realiza el enfoque estructural y la posición sustentada por van Fraassen. En esta última se advierte el divorcio entre la concepción pragmática de la explicación y la tesis de que las teorías científicas se identifícan a través de sus modelos más la definitió teórica que define estas estructuras. Se sugiere la necesidad de restablecer la conexión entre ambas aun sin comprometerse en una teoría de la unificación, pero reconociendo virtudes informacionales en la explicación. En un análisis que incorpora las dimensiones pragmática y diacrónica se intenta reivindicar el valor de la explicación en la generación de teorías que sean empíricamente adecuadas en principio.

I explore the nature of scientific explanation in a culture centering on the doctrine of yin and yang combined with that of five phrases, wu-hsing (YYFP). I note how YYFP functions as an alternative to the causal way of thinking, as well as the meaning of scientific explanation in a culture. I also consider whether a scientific concept becomes metaphorical when it is superseded by an alternative organizing concept.

Many efforts have been made to discover some paradigm-like changes in mathematics, the social sciences, arts, history, etc. Gary Gutting forcefully criticizes the tendency of over-constraining the original conception that mostly led to insignificant analogies. But some applications may fall between correct isomorphic utilization and insignificant analogizing. The paradigm conception of technological change emerged in the early 1980's. This paper shows how fruitful the analogy has been for developing the idea of technological 'paradigms.' But a technological paradigm shows decisive differences which concern the values (which are not only cognitive ones) of technologies, the hierarchical systemic communities, the partly different nature of crises (through 'presumptive anomalies,' by Constant), and the necessarily integrated nature of technological knowledge leading to successful artifacts linked to goal-oriented research. Technological-paradigms-thinking became an established part of evolutionary economics also. According to this, paradigms rival conceptions that show further changes in comparison to the original Kuhnian approach. I conclude by discussing the nature of scientific change from the viewpoint of technological paradigms.

This paper addresses the problem of understanding what mathematics contributes to the exceptional success of modern mathematical physics. I urge that we give up the Kantian construal of the division between mathematics (synthetic a priori) and physics (experimental), and that we ask instead how algebra helps synthetic a posteriori mathematics improve our ability to study the world. The theses suggested are: 1) Mathematical theories are about the empirical world, and are true or false just like other theories of empirical science. 2) The air of artificiality in mathematics lies exclusively in the use of algebraic method. 3) This method is constructive much like all fiction is, but this construction is for the purpose of experimental investigation of the physical world to the extent that anything in the world has objects like those in the fictional world of a particular algebra. 4) This is why algebraic techniques are successful even when the assumptions of the system are false: they may still be applicable to some things considered from some perspective. 5) The success of mathematical physics is also due to Descartes' discovery of a remarkable truth: we live in space and time which can be described as a whole. 6) Therefore, what distinguishes modern science from earlier and later philosophy is not a general method of science, but the fact that it happened to find a truth, and a particular way of studying reality which bore fruit.

I propose to sketch and compare the "picture theories" of Hermann von Helmholtz and Heinrich Hertz. These semiotic conceptions of scientific knowledge are forerunners of the now prevailing semantic views of scientific theories in philosophy of science, and my intent is to bring out the respective main features that either proved to be influential or, as such, retained in contemporary formal approaches to the semantics of physical theories. For our purposes, "picture theories" can be characterized as conceptions that (a) take as a departure the fact that scientific theories are embodied in a system of signs and (b) involve a systematic treatment of the relation that obtains between the semiotic system and the world. Essentially, such a theory will have in its core an answer to the question: "What does it take for a picture to be a picture of something?" In concludion, I outline a filiation between Helmholtz, Hertz and Carnap pertaining to the question of monomorphism or categoricity in the general semantics of physical theories.

I discuss in a systematic order the most important epistemological positions in the instrumentalism-realism debate, viz., instrumentalism, constructive empiricism, referential realism, and theory realism. My conclusions are as follows. There are good reasons for the instrumentalist to become a constructive empiricist. In turn, the constructive empiricist is forced to become a referential realist in order to give deeper explanations of success differences. Consequently, there are further good reasons for the referential realist to become a theory realist.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, many now realize that the opposition of science and religion has been exhausted. Today, unification of the two is imperative. The first step in this direction is recognizing that science is not the only source of knowledge; experience, spiritual discernment and spiritual experience constitute the unified process of cognizing the world.

Discussions about physicalism, reduction, special sciences, the layered image of reality, multiple realizability, emergence, downward causation, etc., typically make the ontological presupposition that there is no room for new properties in the physical world. The domain of physical properties would thus have been established once and for all. It is my purpose in this paper to explore the alternative hypothesis that there can be, and that in fact there are, new physical properties. In the first section, I propose a brief analysis of the notions of property, physical property, and new physical property. In the second section, I present four general situations in which it would be plausible to speak of the existence of new physical properties. All of this is used to evaluate the content and scope of the hypothesis of physical novelty. Lastly, I examine certain interesting consequences of such a physical novelty in relation to some of the above mentioned topics.

This paper draws a connection between recent developments in naturalized philosophy of science and in economics. Social epistemology is one part of the naturalistic enterprise that has become especially important. Some approaches in this field use methods borrowed from economics, a fact that has often been overlooked. But there are also genuinely economic approaches to the problems of science and knowledge. Some of these approaches can be seen as contributions to an "economic epistemology." While these contributions are certainly fruitful, they have also raised criticism from economists. I overview of these points of criticism and outline possibilities to deal with these problems. In particular, the Buchanan research program offers some help.

This paper analyzes recent work from within the physical sciences which argue for the emergence of a new paradigm capable of unifying the sciences and demonstrating the ultimate meaningfulness of the universe. I argue that while there is powerful evidence for cosmic teleology, the works in question do not represent a new paradigm and neither unify science nor adequately accommodate the evidence in question, but rather attempt to "put new wine in old skins." As Aristotle demonstrated, only teleological argumentation offers a complete scientific explanation, and authentic teleology is effectively ruled out by the hegemonic scientific paradigm which gives first place to mathematical formalism-something which makes possible rigorous description but not authentic explanation. This does not mean returning to Aristotelian science, but rather exploring the "road not taken" when Aristotelian science entered a crisis at the end of the medieval period: generalizing the concept of teleology so that it can accommodate both the physical (especially astronomical) evidence which created problems for Aristotelian science long before Galileo and Kepler, and account teleologically for such phenomena as chaos and disintegration. The work of scientists like Gal-Or, Bohm, and Prigogine provides important resources for moving in this direction, but a more explicit option for teleology is necessary if the evidence is to be accommodated and the internal contradictions of the existing paradigm to be resolved.

This paper introduces an epistemological model of scientific reasoning which can be described in terms of abduction, deduction and induction. The aim is to emphasize the significance of abduction in order to illustrate the problem-solving process and to propose a unified epistemological model of scientific discovery. The model first describes the different meanings of the word abduction (creative, selective, to the best explanation, visual) in order to clarify their significance for epistemology and artificial intelligence. In different theoretical changes in theoretical systems we witness different kinds of discovery processes operating. Discovery methods are "data-driven," "explanation-driven" (abductive), and "coherence-driven" (formed to overwhelm contradictions). Sometimes there is a mixture of such methods: for example, an hypothesis devoted to overcome a contradiction is found by abduction. Contradiction, far from damaging a system, help to indicate regions in which it can be changed and improved. I will also consider a kind of "weak" hypothesis that is hard to negate and the ways for making it easy. In these cases the subject can "rationally" decide to withdraw his or her hypotheses even in contexts where it is "impossible" to find "explicit" contradictions and anomalies. Here, the use of negation as failure (an interesting technique for negating hypotheses and accessing new ones suggested by artificial intelligence and cognitive scientists) is illuminating

The formation of a new scientific picture of the world is connected with the necessity of subjectivity. This subjectivity posits no limits for the scientific aspects of cognitive processes, but embraces a comprehensive world of spiritual activity. To choose the most effective model of social behavior, it is important to have an adequate knowledge of reality (i.e., the objective regularities of the surrounding world). Modern science reflects the vagueness of reality and, in consequence, the impossibility of using classical approaches. Increasingly, the negative phenomena of the surrounding world reflects the complexity of natural and socio-natural systems, especially on the global scale. Restrictions of the classical approaches to this complexity can be overcome within the synergistic theories or hierarchical systems theory that are becoming more and more popular. The necessity of appeal to modern theories, initiated as the result of ecological crises, stimulates the processes of new paradigm formation in science, acting often in spite of the needs and motives of society.

Toulmin, Hull, Campbell, and Popper have defended an "Evolutionary-Analogy" view of scientific evaluative practice. In this view, competing concepts, theories and methods of inquiry engage in a competitive struggle from which the "best adapted" emerge victorious. Whether applications of this analogy contribute to our understanding of science depends on the importance accorded the disanalogies between natural selection theory and scientific inquiry. Michael Ruse has suggested instead an "Evolutionary-Origins" view of scientific evaluative practices in which scientific inquiry is directed by application of epigenetic rules that have become encoded in homo sapiens in the course of evolutionary adaptation. Among these rules are "formulative theories that are internally consistent," "seek severe tests of theories," (Popper) and "achieve a consilience of inductions" (Whewell). As a descriptive theory of science, the "Evolutionary-Origins" view is prima facie inconsistent with evidence that human beings often make decisions that violate the "genetically-hard-wired rules." As a normative-prescriptive philosophy of science, the "Evolutionary-Origins" view is limited by the fact that in biological evolution, adaptation to present pressures may be achieved at the expense of a loss of adaptability (the capacity to respond creatively to future changes in environmental conditions).