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21. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2000 > Issue: 23
台灣哲學學會簡介
台灣哲學學會簡介

22. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2000 > Issue: 23
中國哲學會簡介
中國哲學會簡介

23. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2000 > Issue: 23
第十一屆國際邏輯、方法學與科學哲學會議紀聞
第十一屆國際邏輯、方法學與科學哲學會議紀聞

24. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2000 > Issue: 23
「佛學網路資料庫J 的建構過程與內容 簡介
「佛學網路資料庫J 的建構過程與內容 簡介

25. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2000 > Issue: 23
國科會人文學研究中心簡介
國科會人文學研究中心簡介

26. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Jin Xiping Had he to understand the meaning the Being, so far as he is a human?: A critical assessment of Heidegger’s Idea on language in 1928
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Heidegger said in 1928: “die Frage nach dem Sein [ist] keine beliebige und [wird] nicht von aussen dem Menschen zugetragen, sondern in ihm mehr oder minder wach ist, sofern er ueberhaupt als Mensch existiert…” The author is very critical of this assertion. If it is really the case, are the people who speak non Indo-European language still human beings or not? Is it possible the non-Indo-European language speaking people could have latent understanding of the meaning of being without the word being at all in their language? If the second one were a reality, could the assertion of Heidegger be correct that Sprache is “das von Sein ereignete aus ihm durchgefuegte Haus des Seins”?
27. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Lester Embree Disciplines beyond Philosophy: Recollecting a Phenomenological Frontier
28. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Leung Po-Shan 從物的存在看歷史即現狀: View History as the Existing Situation from the Being of Thing
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View History as the Existing Situation from the Being of Thing. The question of “What is a thing?” is closely related to that of Being. Heidegger had dealt with the research of thing repeatedly since 1919. The following article will show that, regardless of his inspiring thinking about “ready-to-hand” of thing in Being and Time, his research was more extensively developed in his later years at the end of 1940s. By exploring the possibilities of viewing a thing, Heidegger continuously attempted to reveal the serious limitation of Platonic tradition in the western philosophy. This article will analyze in detail the crucial role of History of Being in Heidegger’s understanding of thing through an example of jug. Heidegger in his piece not only suggests a change of attitude to view a thing, but also “viewing a thing” as not simply a passive activity. It is rather a kind of “step backward” of thinking, which means how to let the representative, analytical and interpretative art of thinking return to its pre-reflective, pre-conceptual and intuitive state of existence.
29. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Wong Yiu-Hong 時間性、死亡與歷史:後海德格的反思: Temporality, Death and History: A Reflection after Heidegger
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Temporality, death and history: a reflection after Heidegger. This paper aims to evaluate how Heidegger deals with the problem of time in Being and Time. The fundamental issue in that magnum opus is to explain the question of the meaning of Being under the horizon of time. But what kind of philosophical resource could make Heidegger be capable to resolve the problem in the most effective way? The phenomenological interpretation of time takes the first priority in consideration. Although in Being and Time Heidegger has literally made a very little reference to Husserl, the influence of Husserl is too obvious to be denied. Heidegger, however, finds Husserl’s elucidation of time has ever dissolved the dimension of time into the immanence sphere of subjectivity. By making the position of the subject in an all too mighty status, the phenomenon of time has not been rendered faithfully in a phenomenological sense, the motto “zu die Sache selbst”. And, Heidegger would regard Husserl’s working on time has not fully observed this highest norm. Bearing the problem in mind when starting to compose Being and Time, Heidegger has to find a new way to avoid the same “mistake” as his master, and the overall contribution of his great work could in turn be assessed under the same evaluative principle. Has Heidegger successfully saved up “time” from the over dominance of the subject? Has he re-disclosed time as objectively as time itself (die Sache selbst)? This paper focus especially on how Heidegger’s thinking of the past and the future moments in Being and Time. Then, we can see that, when comparing with two other phenomenologists’ treatments on the same issue, Gadamer and Levinas, Heidegger resolutions on “past” and “future’ obviously show their weakness. And, the promise of removing the dominance of the subject is doomed to failure. Moreover, the underlining structure of organizing Being and Time has not fully escaped the way of metaphysical thinking. In his later period, which is so called the “turning”, Heidegger attempts to break down the metaphysical thinking about “foundationalism”, behind this thinking is the presupposition of dichotomy between founding and founded. Judging from this perspective, Being and Time has found no way out of the labyrinth.
30. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Hsieh Sheng-Yu 歷史處境中的行動主體:馬克思哲學與現象學的交互觀察: The Active Subject in the Hiistorical Situation: An Inter-Observation between the Philosophy of Marx and Phenomenology
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The active subject in the historical situation: An interobservation between the philosophy of Marx and phenomenology. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Phenomenology and Marxism have been two major paradigms in human science based on their contribution to ontology about human being instead of methodology. The phenomenological analysis of the ability of sense-giving of human-being made man as a being-active in the world, while the historical materialism of Marx defined man as a passive-being within the particular historical situation. However, these two discourses may easily open to misconception. Phenomenology was once seen as under the banner of solipsism and the philosophy of Marx as an economical or material determinism. In fact, in Husserl’s Ideas II, Husserl had noticed the role and the function of the body in constitutive act and then the human being had been thought as a passive-being, a corporeal-being-in-the-world, in phenomenology. On the other hand, for Marx, his historical materialism had never negated man as a being-active in the historical process. But both of these two philosophical systems cannot successfully describe human being as being-active meanwhile as being-passive. Therefore, I suggest that it is propitious moment to clarify the unclear dimensions of these two philosophical discourses through the dialogue between them. In addition, I will attempt to propose some new statements on the relationship between the body, will and history.
31. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2011 > Issue: 42
王文 方 Wen-fang Wang
N.J. Smith 之《含混性與真之程度》
Nicholas J. J. Smith, Vagueness and Degrees of Truth

32. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2011 > Issue: 42
丁 福寧 Ting, Paschal Fu-Ning
亞理斯多德的靈魂不朽概念
Aristotle on the Immortality of the Soul

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亞理斯多德的《論靈魂》一書探討所有有機體;植物、動物和人之所以 有生命的事實,以及它們分別可以有的活動。他將靈魂定義為生命的原理,靈魂是潛能中可以有生命的自然身體之所以活著的現實原理。有關靈魂不朽的問題是亞理斯多德思想中最不清楚的問題。唯可以明確 的即靈魂不朽的概念是他早期已遺失的著作中的核心問題。在早期著作中,他基本上受柏拉圖的影響,肯定靈魂不朽。在他的成熟期著作中,亞理斯多 德以物理學中的形質論,類比的用到靈魂與身體之間的是形式與質料之間關 係。人是一完整的人,靈魂不能分開、自立地存在,靈魂當與身體組合成一 完整的人。在形質論的框架下如何解釋在身體死亡後,靈魂仍有繼續存在的 可能,就成為哲學家不斷地探討的問題。在本文的探討中,我們指出亞理斯多德雖從沒有一系列有關靈魂不朽的 論證,但從他肯定理性才是人的靈魂,它是形上的簡單,是非物質的,它的 固有活動是非物質的活動,他肯定靈魂的本性是不朽的。理性非身體的形 式,它是在自身分開的實體,形質論不能用到理性與身體的關係。不同於植 物和動物的靈魂當與身體組合在一起,理性是不同類的靈魂。從理性是分開 的實體,它的活動與身體無關,它是非物質的,它因而是永恆和不朽的。亞 理斯多德的這種有關理性的靈魂的獨特本性和活動的特性有著濃厚的柏拉 圖色彩。本文旨在論證靈魂不朽的概念是亞理斯多德早期思想中的主要概 念,也是他一生所未曾放棄的。
33. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2011 > Issue: 42
孫效 智 Johannes Hsiao-chih Sun
論儒家現實擁有判準理論 與等差之愛原則的人類胚胎觀點
Confucian Accounts of Personhood and the Moral Status of Human Embryos

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本文旨在探討當代儒家在位格理論上所提出的「儒家現實擁有判準」 理論及「等差之愛」原則,以及它們對於人類胚胎的觀點。「儒家現實擁有 判準」(Confucian actual-possession criteria)是區別位格(person)與非位格 (non-person)的一種理論,該理論及由之衍伸出來的「儒家位格漸進論」 (Confucian gradualism)、「儒家社會性位格論」(Confucian social personhood) 是本文首先要加以探討的幾個儒家位格理論,這些理論對於人該如何看待人 類胚胎乃至如何看待人提出了非常具爭議性而值得探討的看法。其次,本文 進一步要探討訴諸儒家「等差之愛」原則以證立「為了醫學進步及人類福祉 的理由而許可傷害人類胚胎」的主張。本文主張,無論「儒家現實擁有判準」、「儒家位格漸進論」或「儒家 社會性位格論」等概念,都無法從儒家思想中推導出來,而且也與儒家思 想互不相容。至於以儒家「等差之愛」原則來證立犧牲胚胎的作法,不僅 證據薄弱,從「不傷害」(first, do no harm)原則的角度來看,更是站不住 腳的。
34. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2011 > Issue: 42
徐 學庸 Hsu, Hsei-Yung
四個角色的理論 ─西塞羅《論義務》I, 105-125
The Theory of Four Personae -Cicero’s De Officiis I, 105-125

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根據羅馬哲學家西塞羅《論義務》(De Officiis)的記載,西元前二世紀 的斯多葛學派的哲學家帕奈提烏斯(Panaetius),在論述合宜行為時提出四 個角色(personae)的理論(I, 105-125)。合宜行為的判定,根據帕奈提烏 斯的思想,必須依據一個人是否將其具有的四個角色扮演好,即理性,個人 特質,環境與運氣及選擇。這篇文章的論述主要有兩個目的:首先試探究帕 奈提烏斯的四個角色理論的內涵;其次是藉此理論的討論為當代一空洞的口 號「做自己」,提供一可能的內容充實。本文主要由三部分組成:第一部分 針對四個角色分別進行討論,並論及帕奈提烏斯的思想是受哪些哲學家或學 派的影響;第二部分主要處理的問題是:這四個角色如何能和諧運作?最後,能使四個角色和諧運作者會有什麼樣的生活,會是第三部分關注的焦點。
35. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2011 > Issue: 42
陳瑞 麟 Ruey-Lin Chen
牟宗三「科學開出論」的形上學困難 ─以儒家思想為本的中國文化 可以開出現代科學嗎?
Metaphysical Predicaments in Mao Zhongsan’s “Science Kei-Chu-Lun”: Could Modern Science Be Developed Out of Chinese Culture Based on Confucianism?

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「以儒家思想為本的中國文化可以接受西方現代科學嗎?」是二十世紀 新儒家企圖解決的一個核心問題。他們的解決方案是牟宗三著名的「科學開 出論」,亦即主張科學必須從中國文化內部、即儒家思想本身發展出來(開 出)。這套科學開出論預設了一個道德形上學的學說,包含一個「先驗道德 界」與「經驗現象界」的二分架構。本文爭論這套形上學不相容於現代科學 發展的形上學條件,因此無法支持科學開出論,進而我們可由此申論儒學與 中國傳統文化無能力發展出現代科學,雖然它已經產生中國傳統科學。最後 本文想指出,當代台灣哲學家要面對的問題不再是「中國文化與科學的關 係」,而是「在現代科技的衝擊下,什麼是中國文化」的新問題。
36. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2012 > Issue: 43
黃文 宏 Wen-Hong Huang
論早期西田哲學中「自覺」的基本構造 ─以〈邏輯的理解與數理的理解〉 為線索
On The Basic Structure of Self-awareness in Early Nishida -In View of His Discussion of "Logical Understanding and Mathematical Understanding"

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「自覺」是西田對「純粹經驗」的發展的一個邏輯性說明。本論文的 目的在依據西田〈邏輯的理解與數理的理解〉(1912)來思考西田早期的 「自覺」構造。在這裏有著西田對齊格瓦特與李克特的邏輯思想以及對羅 伊斯與戴德金的無限觀念的改造,我們將重點置於李克特的部分,看看西 田如何從自身的立場轉化了李克特對邏輯與數理的想法,將「邏輯」與「數 理」視為連續性的關係,乃至有所謂「由邏輯往數理」的說法,這形成了 後來西田《自覺中的直觀與反省》中自覺的第一個階段。筆者的論點在於,自覺的體系除了無限自我表象的系統之外,還必須包含著一個對「有+非 有」的全體的直覺,這個全體的直覺或體驗才是自覺體系的中心。在行文 上,我們先沿著〈邏輯的理解與數理的理解〉的思路,重構西田對「邏輯 的理解」(第二節)與「數理的理解」(第三節)的思考,在最後一節(第 四節),筆者試著透過《自覺中的直觀與反省》西田對「絕對自由意志」 的討論來補充之。在這裏,筆者將西田這種「全體的直覺」連結到海德格 對康德的「先驗想像力」的闡釋,西田與海德格都將重點置於經驗中的「無 而生有」的領域。西田所謂的「理解之前的理解」或「純粹經驗」指的就 是這種全體直覺。筆者個人的觀點也表達在這裏。
37. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2012 > Issue: 43
洪巳 軒 Szu-Hsuan Hung
論《管子》政治權威之形式與基礎 ─以〈權修〉為核心之探討
On The Forms and Bases of Political Authority in Guanzi ─A Research on “Quanxiu”

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本文將政治權威視為一種「命令─服從」的權力關係,並以呈現此種 關係之不同的性質為其「形式」,又以支撐起各種形式之原因為其「基礎」, 進而以此種角度探究《管子•權修》對於政治權威相關主張。結果本文發現, 〈權修〉篇中已然將道德與法律視為政治權威的形式,而且在法律形式中又 可以進一步區分出合法性、引誘性以及強制性等三種權威形式。再者,道德 形式的政治權威其基礎則是心理的,法律形式的政治權威則是以經濟與武力 為其基礎。
38. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2012 > Issue: 43
陳 平坤 Chen Ping-Kun
幻有假名觀下的「物不遷」論辯
Dialectic of “Things Do Not Shift” under the View of “Naming of Illusory Existence”

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本文旨在論究僧肇依據幻有假名的佛教觀點,如何洞徹一切諸法的存 在底蘊,去開顯其中稱得上是究竟真實的內涵,以簡別於非真實的存在體 和認識構作物,從而為世人打通一條得以趣入「諸法實相」或「物性」的 思維道路。本文論述的主要典據是〈物不遷論〉和《注維摩詰經》的僧肇注解;而 所採取的進路,則為重視反省思維和闡釋義理的哲學研究進路。本文研究成果的主要重點如下:(1)涉及「物性」課題的「物不遷」論點只是一種假名言說。(2)「不遷」假說建立在取相分別之認知活動架構上。(3)「物不遷」雖不意謂就是諸法實相,但可當作趣入實相的一道 法門。(4)有關「物不遷」論據的探討,必須清楚辨明認識論問題思維脈絡 中的「[事]物」與存有論問題思維脈絡中的「[事]物」二者間的不同意 義分界,如此才能不管反對僧肇、還是贊同僧肇,在論據上都有比較圓滿的 說服力。
39. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2012 > Issue: 43
黃麗 綺 Li-Chi Huang
從「虛無」到「笑」 ─論尼采「永恆回歸」之概念
From “Nihilism” to “Laughing” -on Nietzsche’s doctrine of Eternal Recurrence

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在尼采「上帝已死」的思想中,人失去其價值根源的有效性,在強力意 志所建構的生成世界中,人不再具有不變與永恆的意義與真理,而是由其 相對、暫時的效用與價值來理解存有的意義。本文即嘗試研究在尼采永恆回 歸學說中,是否提供了一種在「上帝已死」、傳統形上學之外對生命的理解 與評價的可能,並且由這個新的理解方式創造出在生成世界之內的新價值。 對此,本文所提出的假說為:永恆回歸的學說是人自我評價的方式,它的特 殊性在於透過此評價方式,一方面保住了生成世界的意義,另一方面在虛無 與生成中創造了存在的價值;而此方式在尼采哲學中呈顯為由從「虛無」到 「笑」的動態發展;在一切言說與理性之外,「笑」創造了一個由身體出發的新視角,它是人作為超人的意義。
40. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2012 > Issue: 44
杜保 瑞 Bau-Ruei Duh
對王陽明批評朱熹的理論反省
Reflections on Wang, Yang-Ming’s Criticism of Chu, Xi

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This paper, taking ideas from history of philosophy, reflects on Wang, Yang-Ming’s criticisms of Chu, Xi. The reflection indicates that these critical ideas are all derived directly from Wang’s interpretation of Dah Xue (The Great Learning). Taking the perspective that nearly all Wang’s works are based on criticizing Chu’s theory, we can say however that Wang is deeply influenced by Chu. Actually, their difference is not that explicit as seen from the generally held distinction in history of philosophy between Cheng and Chu about Li (principle) school on the one hand and Lu and Wang about Xing (principle) school on the other. In fact, according to Wang’s criticisms which concentrated the limits of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu, we see clearly that the problem originated from Wang’s confusion of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu with Chu’s personal ability of Kung Fu. Moreover, on the Kung Fu theoretical level, Wang’s criticisms confused Chu’s theory of Kung Fu procedure and ontology with pure Kung Fu theory. Consequently this confusion caused the lost of accuracy. Besides, there were other problems relating to criticism based on different interpretations of Pre-Qing Dynasty texts and various views on deviating editions of Dah Xue. This paper however holds the view that these differences caused by referring to ancient texts can be attributed to their differences concerning their attitudes towards the fundamental philosophical problems. It is on thisview that this paper argues that the difference between Wang and Chu can be resolved by elaborating their differing problematics.本文針對哲學史上王陽明對朱熹批評的意見做反思,指出這些批評意 見,從直接的材料上講,主要都是依據《大學》文本詮釋而來的,從陽明的 哲學創作來講,又多是針對朱熹理論做反對而來,就此而言,王陽明實在是 受到朱熹影響很深,兩人真正的差距,不像是哲學史上將程朱、陸王分為理 學、心學兩派之差異那麼樣的極端。又從實際上王陽明所爭辯的問題來看,則多為朱熹工夫不得力的批評,這就又有屬於朱熹談工夫理論還是朱熹自己 的工夫修養程度兩種問題,陽明亦是混淆此兩者。又從工夫理論的批評來 講,陽明又有哲學基本問題的錯置,將朱熹談於工夫次第及形上學存有論問 題的發言都從本體工夫的形式去批評,以致失去其批評的準確度。此外,還有從不同的先秦典籍之義理依據而做的文本詮釋之批評,以及對《大學》版 本本身的意見不同之批評,但上述批評,還是可以化約到哲學基本問題的不 同所致之批評。本文即以此為進路,說明陽明批評朱熹的意見是有可以被解 消之處,關鍵即在問題意識不同。