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201. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Andrei Marmor Deep Conventions
202. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Marga Reimer Empty Names: Communicative Value without Semantic Value
203. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Recent Publications
204. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Richard Fumerton Practicing Magic
205. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
Bonnie Kent Aquinas and Weakness of Will
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Aquinas’s admirers, reacting against Donald Davidson’s criticisms of hirn, commonly argue (a) that the will does play a role in Aquinas’s account of incontinence, and (b) that his explanation of incontinent action turns on the weakness of the will. The first part of this paper argues that they are correct about (a) but wholly mistaken about (b). Aquinas rarely even mentions the weakness of the will, and he neverinvokes it to explain why someone acts counter to her own better judgment. In his view, such a person has the capacity for self-control but fails to exercise it. The second part of the paper considers Gary Watson’s account of incontinence, including and especially his objections to analyzing it as the failure to exercise one’s capacity for self-control. Here I argue that Aquinas’s account better serves the purposesof moral discourse and that it should not be expected to provide the kind of causal explanation Watson seeks.
206. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
Elijah Millgram Who Was Nietzsche’s Genealogist?
207. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
Mozaffar Qizilbash The Mere Addition Paradox, Parity and Vagueness
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Derek Parfit’s mere addition paradox has generated a large literature. This paper articulates one response to this paradox - which Parfit hirnself suggested - in terms of a formal account of the relation of parity. I term this response the ‘parity view’. It is consistent with transitivity of ‘at least as good as’, but implies incompleteness of this relation. The parity view is compatible with critical-band utilitarianism if this is adjusted to allow for vagueness. John Broome argues against accounts which involve incompleteness. He thinks they are based on an intuition of ‘neutrality’, which is most naturally understood in terms of equality. There is no rationale, on Broome’s view, for seeing it as ‘incommensurateness’ which leads to incompleteness. Parity provides one. Broome’s worries that ‘incommensurateness’ makes neutrality implausibly ‘greedy’, and that ‘incommensurateness’ and vagueness are incompatible do not constitute a knock-down case against the parity view. Similar worries arise for his preferred vagueness view.
208. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
Bradford Skow Earman and Roberts on Empiricism about Laws
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Earman and Roberts (2005) argue that a standard definition of '“empiricism about laws of nature” is inadequate, and propose an alternative definition they think is better. But their argument against the standard definition fails, and their alternative is defective.
209. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
Jason Stanley Replies to Gilbert Harman, Ram Neta, and Stephen Schiffer
210. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
Bernard Reginster Nietzsche’s New Darwinism
211. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
Richard Feldman Knowledge and Lotteries by John Hawthorne
212. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
Jason Brennan Modesty without Illusion
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The common image of the fully virtuous person is of someone with perfect self-command and self-perception, who always makes correct evaluations. However, modesty appears to be areal virtue, and it seems contradictory for someone to believe that she is modest. Accordingly, traditional defenders of phronesis (the view that virtue involves practical wisdom) deny that modesty is a virtue, while defenders of modesty such as Julia Driver deny that phronesis is required for virtue. I offer a new theory of modesty-the two standards account-under which phronesis and modesty are reconciled. Additionally, since the two standards account involves reflection on llloral ideals, I provide an account of the proper nature of moral ideals
213. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
Christian Miller The Structure of Instrumental Practical Reasoning
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Standard views of instrrumental practical reasoning often appeal just to an end-directed desire and a means-end belief. I argue that such accounts are insufficient when it comes to the practical lives of agents. Instead I offer a novel view of such reasoning, the heart of which is the addition of a normative belief concerning the desirability of the agent’s end.
214. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
Recent Publications
215. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
Stephen Schiffer Interest-Relative Invariantism
216. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
John T. Roberts Reply to Skow
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We have argued against a standard way of defining Humean supervenience about laws, and in favor of an alternative definition. Skow says that our argument against the standard definition makes a big mistake. He is right about this. But that mistake is correctable. Skow also argues that our alternative definition is seriously flawed. We think he is wrong about this.
217. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
Gilbert Harman Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Primary Speaker Meaning
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Jason Stanley’s Knowledge and Practical Interests is a brilliant book, combining insights about knowledge with a careful examination of how recent views in epistemology fit with the best of recent linguistic semanties. Although I am largely convinced by Stanley’s objections to epistemic contextualism, I will try in what follows to formulate aversion that might have some prospect of escaping his powerful critique.
218. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
Stephen Hetherington Is This a World Where Knowledge Has to Include Justification?
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If any thesis is all-but-universally accepted by contemporary epistemologists, it is justificationism-the thesis that being an instance of knowledge has to include being epistemically justified in some appropriate way. If there is to be any epistemological knowledge about knowledge, a paradigm candidate would seem to be our knowledge that justificationism is true. This is a conception of a way in whichknowledge has to be robust. Nevertheless, this paper provides reason to doubt the truth of that conception. Even epistemology’s supposed conceptual core is not as epistemically unchallengeable as we might have assumed to be the case.
219. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
Ram Neta Anti-intellectualism and the Knowledge-Action Principle
220. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 75 > Issue: 1
Jason Stanley Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests