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81. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Yasha Rohwer Infringing upon Environmental Autonomy with the Aim of Enabling It
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Part of what makes the environment valuable is its autonomy. There are some who think that any human influence on an environment is necessarily autonomy-compromising because it is a form of human control. In this article, I will assume human influence on the environment necessarily undermines autonomy. However, I will argue, even given this assumption, it is still possible for the intervention to enable autonomy in the long run. My focus is on genetic intervention into organisms, because some might think human influence in these cases cannot dissipate. I argue this is mistaken and, borrowing a concept from botany, I argue genes, even genes inserted into a genome by humans, can “naturalize.” Furthermore, they can function in ways that are autonomy-enabling to the individual and to the system to which the organism belongs.
82. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Rachel Fredericks Orcid-ID CLIMATE LEGACY: A Newish Concept for the Climate Crisis
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Individual and collective agents, especially affluent ones, are not doing nearly enough to prevent and prepare for the worst consequences of the unfolding climate crisis. This is, I suggest, partly because our existing conceptual repertoires are inadequate to the task of motivating climate-stabilizing activities. I argue that the concept CLIMATE LEGACY meets five desiderata for concepts that, through usage, have significant potential to motivate climate action. Contrasting CLIMATE LEGACY with CARBON FOOTPRINT, CLIMATE JUSTICE, and CARBON NEUTRALITY, I clarify some advantages of thinking in terms of the former. I conclude by discussing some climate legacy-enhancing practical proposals that merit consideration.
83. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Marion Hourdequin, Orcid-ID Allen Thompson Editors' Introduction to the 2020 ISEE Special Issue
84. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Rebeka Ferreira Jennie C. Stephens. Diversifying Power: Why We Need Antiracist, Feminist Leadership On Climate and Energy
85. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Patrick Smith Kelly A. Parker and Heather E. Keith. Pragmatism and American Philosophical Perspectives on Resilience
86. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Allen Thompson Notes from the Editor
87. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Mark Woods Emmanuel Kreike. Scorched Earth: Environmental Warfare as a Crime against Humanity and Nature
88. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Philip J. Walsh Peter Dauvergne. AI in the Wild: Sustainability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence
89. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Anna Deplazes-Zemp Orcid-ID Are People Part of Nature? Yes and No: A Perspectival Account of the Concept of ‘Nature’
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The question of whether or not people are part of nature is relevant to discuss humans’ role on earth and their environmental responsibilities. This article introduces the perspectival account of the concept of ‘nature,’ which starts from the observation that we talk about the environment from a particular, human perspective. In this account, the term ‘nature’ is used to refer to those parts of and events in the environment we perceive as being shaped by typically human activities. Humans themselves are part of nature insofar as they participate in and are products of natural processes. Therefore, in this account, nature is not only the passive environment, but also something active and generative that does not operate human creativity, but rather and it in shaping our environment. According to the perspectival account, the ‘nature’ concept expresses a particular relationship between the human agent and the non-human environment, which can be the starting point for normative theory.
90. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Matthew Hall Orcid-ID Empathy for Plants
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Empathy, and its role in human-human and human-animal relationships, has been discussed at length in recent years. Empathy for plants has received little to no attention. In this essay I briefly examine existing theory about human-plant empathy, primarily Marder’s account of a projective empathy. I use contemporary scholarship by Dan Zahavi, as well as phenomenological accounts of empathy, to query this understanding of empathy and to lay the conceptual groundwork for developing an account of empathy for plants in line with Max Scheler’s embodied empathy. In doing so, I sketch an account of the basis for human-plant empathy, including the gestures and behaviors that an empathy for plants may pay particular heed to. The essay concludes by outlining how such an empathy for plants may be developed.
91. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Anna Wienhues, Orcid-ID Anna Deplazes-Zemp Orcid-ID Otherness-based Reasons for the Protection of (Bio)Diversity
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Different arguments in favor of the moral relevance of the concept of biodiversity (e.g., in terms of its intrinsic or instrumental value) face a range of serious difficulties, despite that biodiversity constitutes a central tenet of many environmentalist practices and beliefs. That discrepancy is considerable for the debate on potential moral reasons for protecting biodiversity. This paper adds a new angle by focusing on the potential of the concept of natural otherness—specifically individual and process otherness in nature—for providing additional moral reasons in favor of the protection of biodiversity as variety. Four arguments are presented. Two arguments draw on the individual natural otherness of nonhuman living beings and two additional arguments draw on the process otherness of active nature. The upshot is that each of these arguments—if successful—provides a moral reason in favor of the protection of biodiversity.
92. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Kyle Michael James Shuttleworth Authenticity Beyond the Anthropocene: Self-realization and Symbiosis in Naess and Watsuji
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In this paper, an ecologically extended ethic of authenticity is developed in dialogue with the Norwegian environmentalist Arne Naess and the Japanese ethicist Watsuji Tetsurō. More specifically, Naess’s concept of Self-realization is supplemented and supported with Watsuji’s ethic of authenticity (本来性) and phenomenology of climate (風土). And the ecological potential of Watsuji’s thought is realized in relation to Naess’s ideas of human responsibility and symbiosis. After establishing an ecologically extended ethic of authenticity, the practical application of this concept is then demonstrated in relation to satoyama and the preservation of nature in Japan. Whilst the intended outcome is to develop an ecologically extended ethic of authenticity, a secondary aim is to illustrate the benefit and importance of cross-cultural dialogue to advance philosophical thought and understanding.
93. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 3
Allen Thompson Note from the Editor
94. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 3
Marion Hourdequin, Orcid-ID Allen Thompson Guest Editors' Introduction to the 2021 ISEE Special Issue
95. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 3
Keje Boersma Orcid-ID The Anthropocene as the End of Nature?: Why Recognizing Interventionism Is Key in Coming to Terms with the Anthropocene
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In this article, I address and argue against the tendency to understand the anthropocene as inaugurating the end of nature. I conduct two key moves. First, by way of an engagement with the concept of anthropocene technology I explain how understanding the anthropocene as the end of nature prevents us from recognizing what the anthropocene is all about: interventionism. Secondly, I illustrate how a nondualist understanding of the human-nature relation allows us to recognize interventionism as the hallmark of the anthropocene without falling back into the hierarchical human-nature conceptions that underlie interventionism. A nondualist framework that conserves the human-nature distinction helps us in our ability to relate critically to contemporary science and technology in the anthropocene. I illustrate the conceptual narrative of the article through the specific case of gene drive technology development.
96. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 3
Anna Peterson Religion and the Possibility of a Materialist Environmental Ethic
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In Thinking Like a Mall, Steven Vogel proposes an environmental philosophy “after nature,” meaning one that rejects the division of the world into wild and humanized spaces. This division is false because environments are always constructed by people, who are enmeshed in landscapes and ecological processes. The opposition between wild and humanized parallels the religious division between sacred and profane, according to Vogel. He believes this dualism is an inextricable part of religious worldviews and thus that environmental philosophy must reject religion. This understanding of religion echoes the work of many scholars of religion, who define religion in terms of an opposition between sacred and profane. However, this approach fails to take into account the many traditions that do not divide the world this way. In many cultures, the sacred is connected to the profane much as the natural and the human are intertwined in Vogel’s materialist philosophy. This entanglement is evident in ecological restoration, in which human actions help construct processes that ultimately transcend human intentions and control. I argue that this is a kind of transcendence, which points to a way in which religious language can help us think about a post-natural environmental philosophy.
97. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 3
Lars Samuelsson The Cost of Denying Intrinsic Value in Nature
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Many people who claim to genuinely care about nature still seem reluctant to ascribe intrinsic value to it. Environmentalists, nature friendly people in general, and even environmental activists, often hesitate at the idea that nature possesses value in its own right—value that is not reducible to its importance to human or other sentient beings. One crucial explanation of this reluctance is probably the thought that such value—at least when attached to nature—would be mysterious in one way or another, or at least very difficult to account for. In addition, Bryan Norton’s influential convergence hypothesis states that, from a practical point of view, it makes no or little difference whether we ascribe intrinsic value to nature, given the depth and variety of instrumental value it possesses. In this paper, I argue that people who genuinely care about nature cannot avoid ascribing intrinsic value (in a certain sense) to it, if they want to be able to consistently defend the kind of claims about protecting nature they arguably want to make, i.e., claims to the effect that we ought to protect for instance nature areas and species. The cost of denying intrinsic value in nature is the cost of giving up a crucial resource to philosophically defend such claims.
98. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 3
Michael Aaron Lindquist Astroethics and the Non-Fungibility Thesis
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This paper approaches the question of terraforming—the changing of extraterrestrial environments to be capable of harboring earth-based life—by arguing for a novel conception of moral status that accounts for extraterrestrial bodies like Mars. The paper begins by addressing pro-terraforming arguments offered by James S. J. Schwartz before offering the novel account of moral status. The account offered builds on and modifies Keekok Lee’s No External Teleology Thesis (NETT), while defending a proposed Non-Fungibility Thesis (NFT). The NETT is modified and defended with specific reference to Lee’s work on artifactuality and transgenic organisms. The NFT builds on work around objectification and irreplaceability, offering an account that recognizes the importance of bearers of value above and beyond the mere value they purportedly possess. Finally, the plausibility of the account is established by an overview of its applicability to other possible candidates for moral status.
99. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 30 > Issue: Supplement
Robert Frodeman Filosofía No Confinada: Pensamiento Ambiental al Fin del Mundo
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Desafíos ambientales como aquellos que enfrenta la región del Cabo de Hornos en Chile, superan la competencia de cualquier marco disciplinario. Las aproximaciones interdisciplinarias al conocimiento, combinando la pericia de varias disciplinas, como también las perspectivas transdisciplinarias de los sectores público y privado, requieren un elemento unificador que permita integrar perspectivas tan dispares. El campo de la filosofía, que tradicionalmente ha ofrecido una visión del conocimiento en su totalidad, puede cumplir nuevamente esta función si los filósofos están dispuestos a adoptar una expresión des-disciplinaria de la filosofía.
100. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 30 > Issue: Supplement
Ricardo Rozzi, Ximena Arango, Francisca Massardo, Christopher Anderson, Kurt Heidinger, Kelli Moses Filosofía Ambiental de Campo y Conservación Biocultural: El Programa Educativo del Parque Etnobotánico Omora
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Los hábitats (dónde vivimos), los hábitos (cómo vivimos) y los habitantes (quiénes somos) constituyen una unidad ética a la vez que ecosistémica. Sin embargo, los hábitats son usualmente estudiados por ecólogos, en cambio, los hábitos por filósofos y otras disciplinas sociales. Con el fin de superar esta disociación, iniciamos un programa transdisciplinario de campo coordinado por ecólogos y filósofos ambientales, que ensaya una visión más integral de los habitantes embebidos en sus hábitats y hábitos en la ecorregión subantártica de Sudamérica. La biosfera puede ser concebida como un reticulado mosaico de unidades hábitats-hábitos-habitantes, donde los humanos han co-evolucionado con sus lenguas indígenas, sus prácticas y conocimientos ecológicos. Este mosaico está siendo hoy destruido por la imposición de un único modelo económico-cultural globalizado. Un segundo objetivo de nuestro programa transdisciplinario es contribuir a la conservación de la diversidad bio-cultural, especialmente en la ecorregión subantártica. En Cabo de Hornos, en el extremo sur de América, encontramos que los educadores, las autoridades y los tomadores de decisiones conocen poco acerca de los hábitats, las lenguas y la flora nativa. En contraste, los miembros de la Comunidad Indígena Yagán y los residentes antiguos poseen un conocimiento detallado acerca de la diversidad biológica y cultural nativa; sin embargo, ellos participan poco en la toma de decisiones y en el sistema de educación formal. Para ayudar a superar esta disociación entre los hábitats-hábitos-habitantes de Cabo de Hornos y aquellos promovidos por la “sociedad global”, en 1999 comenzamos el programa de educación, investigación y conservación biocultural del Parque Etnobotánico Omora que involucra tres etapas críticas: (1) descubrimiento de la diversidad biocultural con una aproximación de “filtro fino” que permite la detección de niveles de diversidad cultural y biológica usualmente omitidos por conceptos generales universalizantes, tales como amerindio versus eurocéntrico o conocimiento ecológico local versus global; (2) encuentros directos “cara a cara” con los co-habitantes humanos y no-humanos en sus hábitats nativos, a través de los cuales la diversidad biocultural deja de ser sólo un concepto o indicador numérico y comienza a ser una experiencia de co-habitación; y (3) actividades de educación y conservación. Estos pasos han sido implementados a escala local, regional e internacional a través de la creación de la Reserva de Biosfera Cabo de Hornos, nominada por UNESCO el 2005, y el establecimiento del Programa de Conservación Biocultural Subantártica, coordinado por la Universidad de Magallanes, el Instituto de Ecología y Biodiversidad de Chile y la University of North Texas.